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Abstract 
This portfolio of published work represents a discourse on Michael Fordham's model of 
development that extended Jung's theory to infancy and childhood. The papers were 
published over two decades and indicate how infant research, ideas from related fields 
and the author's own clinical and observational work have contributed to her 
understanding of development. The framework for her thinking has throughout been 
Fordham's model. In this essay the author contends that what she has learned from 
research and her own experience adds new contributions to the model, based on data for 
the most part not available to Fordham. 
The portfolio of papers is introduced by an essay comprising Part I. It begins with an 
account of the author's professional life and clinical experience pertinent to the study. 
Next there is a substantial section on Fordham ' s theoretical model and links he 
established with Kleinian and post-Kleinian thought. This exposition is followed by a 
section on the main sources for the author's work . Following this she proposes five 
areas that she considers to be her original contributions to the model: identifying and 
defining the features of massive surges of deintegration in the first year; identifying a 
period of primary self functioning; new considerations concerning the active 
participation of the infant in development; identifying precursors to projective and 
introjective identification, and symbol formation. 
Part II contains nine papers, virtually all of which are theoretical and include clinical 
work and infant research and observation. They are divided into three sections: 
'Theory ', which are predominantly theoretical and ain1ed at making a theoretical point; 
'Exp lications ', which aim to elucidate concepts and dynamics comprising the model; 
and 'Extensions', which are those papers explicitly or implicitly containing the author' s 
new links and ideas that add form and content to the model. 
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Introduction to a Study of Michael Fordham’s Model of Development: 
Theory, Explications and Extensions  
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
The aim of this essay is to introduce a portfolio of papers which, taken together, 
represent a discourse on Michael Fordham’s developmental model extending Jung’s 
theory to infancy and childhood.  The papers were published over two decades and 
indicate how infant research, my own clinical and observational work, and ideas from 
related fields have contributed to my understanding of development.  Throughout, 
Fordham’s model has provided a useful and enduring framework for my thinking. In 
this essay I contend that what I have learned from research and my own experience add 
new contributions to the model, based on, as Fordham would have put it, ‘sufficient 
evidence’ (Fordham 1993a, p 5).    
 
In what follows I begin by describing my professional life and clinical experience 
pertinent to my study.  As the portfolio centres on Fordham’s work, this is followed by 
a substantial section on Fordham’s theoretical model and links he established with 
Kleinian and post-Kleinian thought.  Next is a section on the main sources of my 
theoretical orientation, and researchers and others who have shaped my views. 
Following this is a statement of what I consider to be my contributions to the model and 
reflections on preparing this study.  
 
As for my portfolio, I had originally intended to organise my papers chronologically.  
However as it is intended as a dissertation on Fordham’s model, I decided instead to 
organise them according to theme.  Although virtually all my papers include theory, 
infant research and clinical and observational work, there are those which are 
predominantly theoretical or in which I wanted to make a theoretical point.  I include 
these papers in the first grouping, ‘Theory’.  Those aimed at elucidating the model are 
in the second, ‘Explications’.  The third grouping, ‘Extensions’, contains those  papers 
explicitly or implicitly containing new links or ideas of my own that add form and 
content to the model.   
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I conclude with my reflections on this study, and comments on my current work and 
future projects.  
 
Professional and Clinical Background  
 
I left teaching, where a close colleague first introduced me to Jung, to undertake social 
work training at Brunel University, which was then known for its psychoanalytic 
approach.  Two fellow students and now longstanding friends further deepened my 
interest in Jung and psychotherapy.  Upon my degree and qualification (1977) I took up 
a joint social work post, half of which was in a primary school for profoundly deaf 
children, and the other half was based in a local area social services team that supported 
systemic and psychodynamic casework.  I received supervision from Tavistock 
professionals and joined the SAP infant observation group, led by Gianna Henry 
Williams.  There I first met Michael Fordham in 1979.   
 
I began child analytic training in 1983 and qualified in 1988, whereupon I joined the 
adult training at the SAP.   I left local authority work to take up a half-time social work 
post at the Paddington Centre for Psychotherapy (now Parkside Clinic).  I worked in the 
Adult Department treating patients and assessing referrals, and occasionally worked 
with children because of my training.  I also ran groups, supervised honoraries and 
provided consultations to organisations.  Throughout I was supported by supervision 
and clinical meetings with colleagues from psychoanalytic, Jungian and other 
psychodynamic backgrounds.   
 
From 1983 to 1990 I met with Fordham for supervision during my trainings, thereafter 
continuing to see him weekly until he died in April 1995. Over the later years we 
discussed clinical work, his theoretical model and re-examined infant observation notes 
from the SAP group.  We also talked about some of the experimental infant research 
from American psychoanalysts (Lichtenberg 1983, Stern 1985), and, soon after I first 
heard Trevarthen lecture, I fed back how his research into the precursors of language 
corroborated the model.  
 
The year after Fordham’s death I left Parkside Clinic to work with children.  I had an 
established part-time private practice with adults and found a part-time post in a 
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CAMHS service, thus moving from a psychotherapy service to a multi-disciplinary 
team.  Not long after, I joined the Tavistock/UEL doctoral programme, intending to 
produce a dissertation on Fordham’s model and early development.  When the main 
lead of the SAP Child Analytic Training died unexpectedly, a close colleague and I took 
on responsibilities for the training.  This meant I had to withdraw from my doctoral 
work, whereupon I was awarded an MPsych Psych, which certified the completion of 
my Tavistock/UEL studies in child psychotherapy to that point.   
One of my CAMHS sessions was based in a large GP practice where I worked with 
children, including infants, and their parents and families.  I soon realised the 
importance of early intervention. This and my continuing interest in infant development 
prompted my initiative to set up a CAMHS Infant-Parent Support Service. In 2000, with 
the help of an exceptional manager, I organised a small team with two out-reach bases: 
one in a large GP practice in the south of the borough and the other in a busy health 
centre in the north. We formed links with the local health visiting services, perinatal in-
patient and community psychiatric services, and community social services.    
As part of the same shift toward this specialism, I took on a session in an in-patient 
psychiatric perinatal unit, where I was responsible for ‘raising the profile of the infant’ 
by providing parent-infant therapy and staff development.   The therapeutic aspect of 
my work included parent infant therapy with mother-baby couples and running a 
weekly mother-baby group. Mothers with infants under eighteen months were admitted 
to the unit for a wide range of mental illnesses and disorders, and a significant 
proportion did not speak English.  I decided that infant massage would be the most 
appropriate therapeutic activity, and became a Certified Infant Massage Instructor. 
As for staff development, I met regularly with nurses to discuss infant observations and 
clinical work.  To spare nurses from the onerousness of writing up their observations, I 
videoed ‘well enough’ mothers who were capable of giving informed consent for being 
filmed with their babies
1
.   Staff also accompanied me in the mother-baby group, partly 
for purposes of health and safety (for instance, if a mother became psychotic) and partly 
to develop understanding of group and inter-relational dynamics.     
I had been leading infant observation groups for Jungian trainings since 1991, and my 
work in the Unit offered an unusual opportunity to make my own observations.  They 
                                                          
1
  The video work was designated for purposes of teaching, and written parental consent 
was given for all filming.  A copy of the video was given to the parent.   
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were not systematic over time but they were widely varying in terms of maternal and 
infant relational capacities.  Moreover, they were numerous; in the fourteen years I 
worked in the Unit, I observed formally and informally several hundred babies, some 
over several months, with their mothers, family members and staff.   
Once I had become established in the Unit I became a member of the multi-disciplinary 
Parenting Assessment Team, providing Independent Court Reports based on six-week 
residential assessments of the parenting capacities of mothers who had mental health 
problems.  My role was to assess the bond between mother and baby, which I based 
largely on infant observations.  This work prompted my interest in further 
understanding the impact of fostering and adoption on small children.  I consequently 
took advantage of an opportunity in CAMHS to work psychotherapeutically with a six-
year-old adopted boy (Paper 9).  
 
The near-forty year period covered in this section describes the settings in which I was 
acquiring ‘data’ from my clinical and observational experience.   As I developed skills 
and understanding, my work in the unit allowed me to test out various ideas which I was 
working on and incorporating into Fordham’s model, thereby adding innovations.    
 
 Michael Fordham  
 
Michael Fordham is best known as a theoretical innovator and for a range of 
accomplishments still carrying his imprint.  Besides developing a comprehensive 
Jungian model of development from foetal life to old age, he was on the editorial team 
of Jung’s Collected Works, a leader in establishing the Society of Analytical 
Psychology, and the first editor of the Journal of Analytical Psychology; he set up an 
accredited Child Analytic Training and authored nine books
2
 and over two hundred 
papers and reviews.  These achievements speak to Fordham’s intellectual strength, 
emotional robustness and character.  Following Fordham’s death, Donald Meltzer paid 
tribute to him, commenting, ‘He was one of three great men I have known …’ (Meltzer 
1996, p. 26).   Expanding on this, James Astor wrote: 
Some … have compared him with Freud, Klein and Bion, but distinguished him 
from them in his capacity to combine pioneering clinical work with wearing the 
                                                          
2
 I include in this number Fordham’s memoirs (1993b), which provide a context for his 
work and its development. 
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mantle of office, of running the Society, fostering the trainees and being neither 
inflated nor destroyed by the spoilers great men attract.  (Astor 1995, p, 8) 
 
Fordham’s life (1905-1995) covered most of the twentieth century and, 
correspondingly, the first century of psychoanalysis.  He was born in London, the third 
of three children.  His early family life was spent in Edwardian comfort, raised by 
liberal parents who were involved in social issues and mixed with various writers and 
artists; John Galsworthy was Fordham’s godfather. In his memoir (1993b) Fordham 
described himself as a naughty child who loved his mother passionately.  His accounts 
give less attention to her precarious health (he had been born during one of her asthma 
attacks).  Her unexpected death just as he was turning fifteen shattered Michael, leaving 
him cut off from his emotional life in a way that left him little sense of direction.  This 
remained, despite the distractions of medical studies and his first marriage, until he 
entered therapy with a London Jungian, and soon after met Jung. 
Fordham had informed Jung before going to Zurich that he required an income if he 
were to train with Jung.  Despite this, Jung crushed Fordham’s hopes, saying there were 
no opportunities for making a living there because of Swiss laws disallowing foreigners 
to work.
3
 He invited Fordham to a lecture the following day and Fordham was 
impressed with Jung’s humanity, directness, vitality and erudition. Back in London 
Fordham was furious at what he experienced as Jung’s lack of sensitivity to his 
situation, and then realized that his rage was the expression of a strong tie that had 
formed.  This was accompanied by a lasting loyalty to Jung preventing close ties with 
psychoanalysts; he did not have analysis with a psychoanalyst until the end of his life.   
 
During the same year, 1934, Fordham was awarded a fellowship at the London Child 
Guidance Clinic on Tavistock Square.  He was the only Jungian amongst 
psychoanalysts at a time when Jungians were apprehensive, even disapproving of child 
analysis, on the basis it would overwhelm the child’s nascent ego. This initially 
handicapped him in his work with children until he discovered from Klein how to make 
emotional contact with his child patients through play.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
  I understand that this was in response to the influx of pre-war refugees.   
6 
 
Linking with Psychoanalysis and Kleinians  
 
In 1944 London Jungians invited Fordham to set up a training, which was the first 
outside Zurich.  At the same time Fordham became actively involved with the Medical 
Section of the British Psychological Society.  Members were working analytically with 
patients with psychotic personality structures, as Jung had done, and the Medical 
Section provided a forum for analysts to discuss new concepts that applied to their 
work.  Fordham recognised how these related to some of Jung’s established ideas and 
drew attention to this in the introduction to his third volume: 
 
    In recent years considerable changes have occurred in psycho-analysis in 
Britain.  These have made it desirable to relate its new formulations to those of 
analytical psychology …   (Fordham 1958, p. 2) 
 
Although Fordham’s thinking is essentially Jungian, his model lacked conceptual clarity 
without the ideas coming from new developments in psychoanalysis. The most 
significant influence was Klein herself: ‘...Winnicott, Bion and Scott … all derived their 
work from her, but she was the real innovator’ (1985, p. 216).  Fordham referred to her 
in all eight of his analytic books, beginning with his recognition in the first that 
unconscious phantasies are conceptually virtually identical to Jung’s archetypes 
(Fordham 1944).  
Although Jung and Klein drew upon quite different data, both conceptualised innate, 
instinctual features and processes, the expressions of which develop and became more 
complex while also continuing to operate on a primitive level throughout life.  Both also 
realised that analytic access to these primitive operations is achieved through 
transference and counter-transference.  While Jung ‘though[t] of the analyst as just as 
much in the analysis as the patient’ (Fordham 1985, p. 140), Bion’s extension of Klein’s 
definition of projective and introjective identification contributed detailed dynamics that 
indicated how affects in the analyst can be used to further analysis.     
Fordham was also a significantly influence by Winnicott
4
.  Their hospital clinics were 
not far from each other and they shared a close and warm relationship, discussing work, 
                                                          
4
 Fordham’s personal admiration, respect and affection for Winnicott are evident in his 
tribute given to the British Psycho-Analytical Society in honour of Winnicott.  He refers 
to the reciprocity between them by quoting from Winnicott’s review of Jung’s memoir, 
‘If we [psychoanalysts] fail to come to terms with Jung we are self-proclaimed 
partisans, partisans in a lost cause’.  (Fordham 1972, quoted in Fordham1995, p.196).   
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sparring with ideas, and contributing to each other’s thinking.  Fordham had especially 
high praise for Winnicott’s clinical work (Fordham 1972,1995) and also made use of 
the concept of transitional objects, although later holding reservations about  
generalising the idea because Fordham did not observe them in infancy as Winnicott 
had described (Fordham 1985). While Fordham acknowledged the importance to him of 
both Klein and Winnicott, he did not accept their metapsychologies.   
The Society of Analytical Psychology had been set up in 1946.  By 1955 and under 
Fordham’s influence, the Society was absorbing psychoanalytic ideas and technique, 
thereby creating an ideational split.  It was eventually resolved in 1976 by a group of 
predominately Zurich-trained analysts separating from the SAP.  Over the same period 
clinical discussions for members working with children gradually shaped into the Child 
Analytic Training.  This entailed providing an infant observation seminar and, at Esther 
Bick’s recommendation, Gianna Williams, an established Kleinian familiar with Jung’s 
ideas, was appointed its leader.   
Fordham joined the group as a ‘guest observer’, where he at last acquired data from 
direct observations of infants:  
Here, it seemed, was my hypothesis being enacted graphically and often 
dramatically. ….  The integrative sequences stared me in the face. … (Fordham 
1987, p. 357) 
Williams’ and Fordham’s discussions were so rich that a second monthly seminar 
including trainees was formed, separating discussions on observations from those on 
theory.  In linking Jungian and Kleinian ideas, Williams drew Fordham’s interest to the 
post-Kleinians, in particular, Bion, whose ideas of ‘O’ and beta elements closely 
parallel Jung’s concepts of the self and psychoids.  Fordham focused on Bion in his 
review of Meltzer’s series The Kleinian Development (Meltzer 1978), drawing further 
comparisons (Fordham 1980).  Bion’s influence appears in Fordham’s late writing 
(post-1980), as did Meltzer.  In 1981 Fordham nearly died from a viral infection that 
affected his heart.  As he convalesced he met weekly with Meltzer, to whom he credited 
‘my surprisingly good recovery’ and from whom he ‘developed … a rich professional 
and literary existence’ (Fordham 1993b, p. 142).   
 
An understanding of the links Fordham established between Jung and Klein would be 
incomplete without a comment on the historical context in which they occurred. The 
post-war period was highly productive for both psychoanalysis and analytical 
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psychology yet fell in the shadow of the breakdown of the Freud-Jung relationship.  As 
James Astor points out, Jung became deeply introverted and drawn into dreams and 
envisioned fantasies that had hallucinatory elements.  Although Jung was internally 
broken up, he did not experience a psychosis that impaired his sense of reality; he 
continued to work and maintain family life. In contrast Freud’s response was 
extroverted and politicised.  As the fallout between the two brilliant collaborators 
passed down to followers, the antipathy became institutionalised in training 
organisations as they spread.   
 
This was the professional climate in which Fordham began his work: a climate 
in which psychoanalysts, trained at the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, as a matter 
of loyalty to Freud did not read Jung – or at least did not admit to doing so 
(Astor 1995, p. 4).   
 
Some of the SAP membership felt a sense of inferiority combined with resentment at 
what was considered to be psychoanalysts’ intentional lack of acknowledgement of 
Jung’s contribution.  For instance,  
 
[Fordham] emphasised Jung’s recognition that the total involvement of the 
analyst in the [analytic] process was relevant to a successful therapeutic 
encounter – a point of view now widely acknowledged by psychoanalysts but 
not attributed to Jung.  (Astor 1995, p. 121).   
 
Bion appears to be an example.  Bion did know about Jung’s ideas; he attended Jung’s 
Tavistock Lectures in the autumn of 1935 with his patient Samuel Beckett, who was 
particularly taken with a comment Jung made about one of his cases.  One of Beckett’s 
biographers, Anthony Cronin, notes: 
  
There is no doubt that Bion and Beckett discussed Jung’s diagnosis of the little 
girl’s case, and Bion’s theory [concerning psychological and biological birth] 
was almost certainly elaborated from Jung and of course from his analysis of 
Beckett’s case. (Cronin 1997, pp. 222-224)  
 
This raises the question whether Bion was influenced more by Jung or Beckett.  Or, 
alternatively, as Gianna Williams commented, was it that ‘these thoughts ..., to use 
Bion’s phrase, [were] “looking for a thinker” ...?’ (Davies and Urban 1996, pp. 57-58).    
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There is more evidence for intentional non-acknowledgment in the case of Winnicott.   
Winnicott was open with Fordham that there was an unspoken edict within the Institute 
against mentioning Jung, which Fordham spoke about
5
 and noted in the following 
anonymised reference to Winnicott: 
 
...  a senior psychoanalyst friend had once told me … he had tried to mention 
Jung’s name during a scientific meeting of the Institute of Psychoanalysis in 
London.  The ensuing silence, he told me, made it clear that he was not to do so 
again! (Fordham, 1985, p. 121)  
 
But might Winnicott, and possibly other psychoanalysts, have been directly influenced 
by Jung and used Jung’s ideas with a patient, or patients, thereby claiming that the 
experience had become their own and then conceptualising this according to the 
analyst’s theoretical point of view?  While perhaps wanting in intellectual diligence, 
might this have presented a pragmatic and not entirely dishonest solution to a dark 
dilemma?   
 
In the course of these decades Fordham’s assimilation of Kleinian principles into 
Jungian theory has been passed down to become the hallmark of the SAP.  Providing 
the SAP with an identity of its own did much to resolve the SAP’s need for finding it by   
comparison with the Institute of Psychoanalysis, while facilitating continuing links 
between SAP analysts and their psychoanalytic colleagues.   
 
The Model  
 
In this section I introduce concepts that are developed in most of the papers in the 
portfolio.  In this introduction I regard them from a post-Jungian perspective that draws 
upon Fordham’s links with Kleinian thought.  Yet in an essential sense Jung is, to use 
an American expression, ‘a horse of a different wheelbase’ when contrasted to Klein 
and psychoanalysis.  Here it is important to appreciate that the Jung-Freud collaboration 
broke down in part because they did not agree on the essential nature of psychic energy: 
for Freud it was sexual and object related, and for Jung it was neutral and directed 
overall towards self-realisation in its deepest meaning.    
 
                                                          
5
 Fordham relayed what Winnicott had told him to some SAP associates, myself 
included.   See also Footnote 4. 
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The self  
 
There is little consensus in psychology, sociology or philosophy on what is meant by 
‘the self’.   Jung first identified what became his theory of the self from a series of 
drawings he made as he recovered from the breakdown of his relationship with Freud.  
He soon realised that they were mandalas, ancient spiritual and ritual symbols in 
Hinduism and Buddhism which represent the universe. In Kleinian thought the self is 
based on Freud’s structural theory.  Although ‘not explicitly defined ... [it] seems to 
indicate a concept of wholeness which embraces the ego, super-ego, and id, and is even 
perhaps something more as well’ (Fordham 1957, p. 198); that is, it implies a wholeness 
that unites the structural parts.      
 
For Jung the self is explicitly the whole of the individual, which is more than the sum of 
its constituents.  This gives it a conceptually superordinate position in relation to the 
parts, as it operates autonomously as an overall organizing principle providing the 
functional unity of mind and body in a constant flux of states of the organism.   As the 
totality, the self transcends and unites all its parts, and thus opposites; for instance, 
container and contained, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, instinct and spirit.  As this 
includes the opposites of conscious and unconscious, the self is ultimately beyond 
experience and unknowable.  Here lies the historical reference in Eastern thought: the 
self is inherently mysterious; it is mystical.  Bion captured this in his succinct 
abstraction of ‘O’: 
 
Its existence as indwelling has no significance whether it is supposed to dwell in 
an individual person or in God or the Devil; it is not good or evil; it cannot be 
known, loved or hated.  It can be represented by such terms as ultimate reality or 
truth.  … L, H, K are links and by virtue of that fact are substitutes for the 
ultimate relationship with O which is not a relationship or an identification or an 
atonement or a reunion.  (Bion 1984, pp. 139-140) 
6
  
                                                          
6
 Edna O’Shaunessy is critical of Bion’s shift from his earlier ‘vigorous disciplined 
thought’ to:  
mixing and blurring categories of discourse, embracing contradictions, and 
sliding between ideas rather than linking them. 
   …. [Y]et in scientific writings, such transgressions lead us to anything and 
everything we fancy – because, as is readily logically demonstrable, from a 
contradiction any proposition follows.  (O’Shaughnessy 2008, p. 1523)  
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The Primary Self  
 
Jung’s work and interests were with the adult mind and his thinking and concepts apply 
accordingly.  Initially Fordham accepted that self theory did not pertain to childhood or 
his child patients, but by the mid-1940s he had acquired clinical evidence that put ‘back 
very much earlier than Jung’s view had supposed the capacity of the child to have a 
“centrum”…’  (Fordham 1947, p. 271). 
 
 Winnicott had theorized that the initial state in infancy is unintegration followed by 
integration, but Fordham turned this around and postulated a primary state of 
integration; a primary self 
7
 which is the source out of which development emerges.  
Acknowledging Bion, Fordham wrote:  
 
I take [the primary self] to represent a state in which there is no past and no 
future, though it is present like a point which has position but no magnitude.  It 
had no desires, no memory, no images but out of it by transformation all of these 
can deintegrate. There is no consciousness and no unconsciousness – it is a 
pregnant absence.  (Fordham 1985, p. 33).  
 
As a biologist, Fordham postulated what refers to a species-specific life force: a primary 
self expressed in individuality, adaptability and continuity of being. As a scientist, 
Fordham avoided speculation and the attribution of innate contents and structures.  
Paradoxically his postulate avoided this while making it, as he acknowledged, a 
mystical concept.   
 
The ego 
 
Klein posited that the ego is an innate, discrete organising structure, while Jung held 
that the ego is a derivative of the self and thus a secondary organiser. In Fordham’s 
model, the ego is a deintegrate, that is, it emerges out of the self in the course of 
development.   
                                                                                                                                                                          
   O’Shaughnessy sees this from the perspective of the reality principle, which has its 
own means of validation.  What Jung and Bion are referring to is a different order of 
reality having its own numenal epistemology, in contrast to the sensate grasp of the 
phenomenal and its logical ordering.  Thus it can be argued that non-scientific language 
is appropriate because it captures the nature of this other sensed reality, the ‘ultimate’.    
7
 He also referred to this is as the ‘original self’ but later acknowledged that ‘primary 
self’ was the better term because every self is original in the sense of being individual 
(Fordham 1986). 
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The Individual and Individuation  
 
Jung maintained that personal identity derives from innate contents (archetypal 
objects/unconscious phantasies) while Freud held (for the most part) that ego identity is 
not intrinsic and is built up through identifications with external figures.  As Fordham 
notes, ‘Freud exalts the process [of identification] while Jung demotes it’ (Fordham 
1995, pp.63-64).  Fordham’s model incorporates the principle of individuality in his 
postulate of a unique mind-body unity from the outset, and by drawing attention to the 
infant’s active contribution to relating to externals.  
 
For Jung, the inherent goal of the self is the realization of one’s individuality, termed 
individuation.   Bion expresses the same notion in his definition of O:   
 
The most, and the least that the individual can do is to be it.  …  The qualities 
attributed to O, the links with O, are all transformations of O and being O. The 
human person is himself and by “is” I mean in both instances a positive act of 
being for which L, J, K are only substitutes and approximations.  (Bion 1984, p. 
140.  Italics in the original) 
 
Fordham regarded individuation from a developmental perspective, whereby the sense 
of having an individual self develops in the ego via the resolution of conflicts between 
opposites in the self; most notably is that between love and hate leading to the 
depressive position. 
 
Archetypes 
 
Jung understood archetypes to be inherent structuring functions likened to Bion’s idea 
of preconception.     
 
Archetypes are the modes of apprehension, and wherever we meet with uniform 
and regularly recurring modes of apprehension we are dealing with an 
archetype, no matter whether its mythological character is recognized or not.  
(Jung CW 8, para 280.  (Italics in the original).  
 
Both Jung and Klein referred to their respective concepts (archetypes and unconscious 
phantasies) as images of the instinct. Fordham defines an archetype as follows:     
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[The infant] does react in a way that is characteristic and typical and it is at 
once mental and physical.  That’s the characteristic of an archetype.  (Fordham 
1984) (My italics) 
 
The Dynamics of the Primary Self: Deintegration and Reintegration 
 
In Fordham’s model development occurs via the interplay between two-fold 
complementary actions of the self.  Together they account for the overall functioning of 
a self-organizing system and how the essentially individual self relates to and 
internalizes the external world.   
 
Fordham reasoned that if the original state is one of integration, there needs to be a way 
of conceptualizing how the organism relates to the environment in order to survive and 
develop.  He looked for a term that referred to an extroverted action arising from within 
the self that ‘opened it up’ or ‘reached out’ to the environment.  When assigning a term, 
he discounted ‘disintegration’ and ‘unintegration’ as inapt, and came up with ‘de-
integration’.  
 
The complementary action to deintegration is a process of introversion accounting for 
how a complex experience, say, a baby’s feed, is absorbed into the self.  This he termed 
‘reintegration’.  This term, like its counterpart, is based on logic: if the original state is 
of integration which becomes disrupted by deintegration, then any subsequent return to 
an integrated state is a re-integration. What is reintegrated are deintegrates, that is, pre-
objects that can become formed into internal objects via further deintegration and 
reintegration, that is, development.  As mental life becomes more complex through 
these dual processes, representations and symbols emerge.  
 
Significant Sources for My Study  
 
The principal source and inspiration for my work is Fordham and our discussions 
arising from our shared interest in early development.  Following his death and after I 
withdrew from my doctoral work, I planned to draw together a collection of his 
published papers on the model.  A complete bibliography of Fordham’s work had been 
compiled, and the papers were available in the Fordham Archive in the Wellcome 
Foundation Library.  To get a sense of the progression of Fordham’s thinking I read his 
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papers on development chronologically up to the mid-1970’s.  My plan was interrupted 
by the demands of writing court reports for the Parenting Assessment Team but, by 
then, I had acquired familiarity with the model and how it had developed.   
 
A number of researchers have been instrumental to my studies.  Foremost has been 
Colwyn Trevarthen, whose research into the precursors of language identified ‘typical 
and universal patterns of relating’ that I recognized as archetypal.  Stern’s classic, The 
Interpersonal World of the Infant (1985), opened my eyes to early infant amodal and 
transmodal perception and distinguished it from later perception (Paper 2).  From 
several researchers (Trevarthen [1989], Trevarthen and Marwick [1986], Stern [1985], 
Schore [1994], Panksepp [1998] and Hobson [2002]) I developed an understanding of 
the sequencing and identifying characteristics of surges of global changes, or massive 
deintegrations, that mark the development toward having a mind linked to other minds.   
This knowledge has been invaluable in my work at the mother–baby unit and an 
important contribution to what I consider I have added to Fordham’s model.   
 
In 1993 I reviewed Anne Alvarez’s book, Live Company (Alvarez 1992, Urban 1994) 
when I was relatively inexperienced and given to assumptions about how I ‘should’ 
work.  Alvarez’s book had the effect of placing theory, technique and research 
peripheral to learning from the patient and thus allowing me more access to my 
personality in my work.  
 
As neurobiology began to interest psychoanalysts and analytical psychologists, my 
attention turned here, despite knowing that my comprehension would be limited by my 
lack of medical training. I assimilated enough to gain some highly useful understanding, 
in particular, accounts of how emotion is transferred between mother and infant via 
imitation motor neurons and neurochemical processes (Damasio 1994, Schore 2002).  
From others (Sperry 1977, Stewart 1998) I acquired further understanding of the 
principle of emergence, which is now central to my view of the mind.   
 
James Astor’s volume, Michael Fordham: Innovations in Analytical Psychology (1995) 
is the most comprehensive and authoritative source on Fordham’s work. His book has 
been helpful to my broader understanding of Fordham as well as setting out ideas that I 
have studied but are presented from a different vertex.    
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Lastly, my observations of mothers and their infants have been central to the 
development of my thinking and have made early development vivid and real.    To 
those mothers and babies, who suffered and struggled to discover or recover their 
affectionate bonds, I owe not only acknowledgement but also indebtedness.     
Contributions to the Model  
 
In his late eighties Fordham introduced a paper summarising his model:  
 
I regard what I shall say as notes for beginning to construct a model.   It may be 
said that that I have … defined a model using Jung’s concepts of the ego, the 
archetypes and the self.  ... [T]here is not much that I would go back on, but I 
was then, and continue to be, aware that it needed filling out, and that may now 
be possible.  (Fordham 1993a, p 5).  (My emphasis)  
 
In this section I put forward five areas ‘filling out’ the model, based on research and my 
own clinical experience and observations of infants.  These are implicitly conveyed in 
various papers and are here stated explicitly.  They do not significantly change the 
model but, inasmuch as they are new to it, they can be considered to be innovations, and 
thus original.   
 
I. Identifying Periods of Massive Deintegration 
 
It was only late in life that Fordham referred to periods of massive deintegration 
(Fordham 1993a), specifying birth to be the first. He did not develop this and followed 
post-Kleinian theory to describe the development of the infant’s inner world.  Yet, just 
as he was introducing his model, Fordham was cautious about theory-led hypotheses: 
 
The issues, at present inconclusive, can, in our view, only be decided by 
a combination of observation and experiment with infants.  Analytic experiences 
must inevitably be content with giving indications of what to look for and when 
to look for it.    (Fordham and Gordon 1958, p. 174) 
 
According to Trevarthen, Schore and other researchers cited in the papers, surges of 
development accompanied by global changes are manifestations of the emergence of 
functional brain systems.  These occur at typical periods: (1) at six weeks to three 
months, when, due to the changes to developments in visual perception, the  infant 
becomes drawn to the mother’s (or another’s) face and begins to engage in 
protoconversations with this partner;
 
(2) at four to six months, when the infant’s 
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attention is drawn to physical objects which are manipulated and examined with almost 
scientific interest, thereby promoting self-agency and prompting gross control and fine 
motor dexterity; and (3) between ten and twelve months, when the prefrontal cortex 
‘comes on-line’, and person and object combine with a new anticipation from another 
mind of what can be done with the object.  This last shift marks a revolution in 
consciousness and a vast array of related developments, including an emergent sense of 
self and other, shared play, language development, and social affects, such as shame.  
(Papers 5, 7 and 9). 
 
This identification of universal and typical periods of massive deintegrative surges adds 
considerable form and detail to Fordham’s model.   I observed the regularity and 
consistency with which these archetypal shifts occurred at predictable times during the 
first year. Therefore I could introduce my court reports with a summary of relevant age-
related capacities against which I could assess if a baby was developing according to 
expectation.  Also, I could assess whether a mother was meeting these expectations and, 
if not, I could turn to experienced nurses, or try myself to draw out these behaviours in 
order to confirm an infant’s capacities or, alternatively, identify possible indications of 
developmental delay or impairments (Paper 7).   
   
To ‘know what to look for and when to look for it’ also served useful in parent–infant 
therapy.  For instance, some four- to five-month old babies became fussy, aversive or 
passively dulled if the mother continued to engage primarily face-to-face, although this 
quickly changed into interest and curiosity when the babies were allowed to explore 
objects.  The fourteen-month-old toddler I describe in Papers 7 and 9 concerned me 
because his play with his mother was aimless, solitary, and moved quickly from one 
thing to another.  My shared play with him demonstrated that his capacities were 
appropriate to his age and that they needed support from his mother and the nurses.    
 
II. Primary Self Functioning: Amodal Perception and Primary Consciousness  
 
Stern (1985) describes research that indicates that infant perception is not of distinct 
sense modes, such as sights, sounds and touches but, rather, is amodal, that is, of 
qualities such as shapes, intensities, and rhythms.  I realised that amodal properties and 
their perception also applied to affect; for instance, the soft contour, low intensity and 
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slow rhythm of tenderness.  In practice this drew my awareness to how I used my voice 
and its prosody to attune to babies and help mothers to do the same.    
 
Also, I observed how babies on the cusp of language acquisition reached into their 
mothers’ mouths as if they perceived spoken language amodally; that is, perceiving 
language sounds as objects in the mouth that have physical properties which can be 
grasped with the hands as a prelude to becoming grasped conceptually as 
representational (Paper 3). I happened to notice that the few children I worked with who 
had autistic features seemed to perceive amodally when in emotionally aroused states 
(Papers 1 and 2). I note these points as observations as opposed to generalising 
assertions.    
 
The shift at the end of the first year of life marks a development in consciousness.  
Various related fields, from neurology to philosophy, distinguish between primary and 
secondary consciousness (Edelman 1989).  The former is conceived as ‘… a form of 
consciousness that humans share with non-human animals; it is sense experience ...’ 
(Tallis 2010, p. 26).  Primary consciousness exists from birth and remains throughout 
life, while secondary, or higher consciousness (the equivalent of ego consciousness)   
begins to emerge toward the end of the first year and becomes the conscious awareness 
of being conscious, as in Descartes’ ‘Cogito ergo sum’.    
 
Fordham had maintained that the division between consciousness and the unconscious 
is not helpful when thinking about young infants but is a result of deintegration and 
reintegration.  The distinction between primary and secondary consciousness 
corroborates this.  Although my studies have not gone far into amodal perception and 
primary and higher consciousness, I consider that I have put forward enough to be able 
to refer meaningfully to an initial ‘period of primary self functioning’, which is marked 
by a preponderance of amodal perception, deintegrates/part objects, and archetypal 
patterns of relating.     
 
III  The Infant’s Active Participation in Development  
 
In contrast to the predominance Bick and Winnicott ascribe to the infant’s dependence 
on internalisations from the mother, Fordham believed that from pre-birth the infant is 
active in his own development.  Fordham repeatedly pointed out how even a very young 
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infant contributes to his own development by taking initiatives via signalling and giving 
feedback.  Of course development emerges only in relation to and through interaction 
with a sufficiently adequate parent, but Fordham’s point is that the infant is hardly a 
passive recipient of parenting.  The following are examples. 
 
In my mother-baby group I watched mothers as they started to massage their babies, for 
example, lifting a leg and stroking it.  As this happened, infants between four and six or 
seven months typically raised their other leg and reached to handle it.  Taking into 
account the baby’s use of variant and invariant features of experience (Stern 1985), I 
viewed this as the baby’s engagement in actively working out the distinction  between 
touching his own body and it being touched by another, thereby contributing to his 
sense of his own bodily boundaries.    
 
Another example comes from work I filmed with the fourteen-month-old boy I mention 
above (Paper 7 and Paper 9).  Examined closely the film reveals how he actively 
assembled sensate experiences (see Picture 7, Paper 9) in the process of constructing a 
new or, more likely, a new version of a dawning concept of inside-outside/container-
contained/three-dimensionality.
8
     
 
IV Developmental Components of Projective and Introjective Identification  
 
Klein’s concepts of projective and introjective identification are probably the most 
useful tools in understanding human unconscious communication.  In Paper 6 I refer to 
neurological studies providing a microanalysis of early neurochemical phenomena that 
underlie instantaneous communication of affective states between infant and mother, 
prior to projective and introjective identification, that is, when there are contents to 
project (Urban 2003b, Shore 2002).  I propound that these early phenomena comprise 
the contents of what becomes projective and introjective identification, thus filling in 
details of primary self functioning and affective communication.  Furthermore, young 
infants avert their gaze when ‘faced’ with depressed, psychotically withdrawn, or 
persistently non-responsive mothers, often turning to bright lights or spaces. This raises 
questions of the implications of this for later developments, for instance, a ‘black hole’. 
                                                          
8
 I have sought out other views of this material by showing it to students, senior 
colleagues and researchers, including Trevarthen.  None has put forward a contradictory 
view. 
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These explanations from psycho-neurobiology beg for a term that captures the primary 
unity of the human infant, one that is neither hyphenated (‘mind-body’) nor compound 
(‘psychosomatic’).   I have considered the term ‘psoma’, which has the disadvantage 
that it is a homonym of ‘soma’, while noting that the same disadvantage did not prevent 
Klein from devising ‘phantasy’.  I have not put this forward because further 
investigation is required before a new term is proposed.    
 
V  Symbol Formation and the Principle of Emergence   
 
Complexity Theory has led me to view reintegration according to the principle of 
emergence.  I introduce this in Paper 6 where I use this principle to describe how 
concept building develops into thinking, reflection, and reflecting on reflection.  This is 
not inconsistent with Fordham’s understanding of how symbol formation occurs as part 
of the development from whole objects (the mother as the whole world), to part objects 
(the mother as ‘good’ and/or ‘bad’).  Yet what I put forward adds another dimension to 
his common usage of ‘emergence’, and better accounts for the growing complexity of 
deintegrative and reintegrative processes.  Together they operate to draw in new 
experiences and shape and incorporate them with an ever-changing emergent whole that 
is more than the sum of its parts.  
 
Michael Rustin has recognized the contribution of emergence to a new understanding of 
how sustained developments arise from recurring shifts of state, namely those between 
the paranoid schizoid and depressive positions.   Rustin’s work adds to Fordham’s 
model and merits further examination. (Rustin 2002)   
 
Portfolio  
 
Toward the end of my child analytic training, Mara Sidoli and Miranda Davies edited a 
collection of papers by mainly SAP child analysts, titled Jungian Child Psychotherapy: 
Individuation in Childhood (1988).  While sharing the same heritage of ideas with my 
colleagues, my work, like theirs, has been individualised by particular experiences with 
particular patients in particular settings. Mine have been my experience with profoundly 
deaf children and the rare position I held as a child psychotherapist in a perinatal in-
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patient psychiatric unit.  The papers I include in my portfolio convey the new directions 
these experiences have led me.   
 
The papers in my portfolio are divided into three sections.  The first, ‘Theory’, contains 
theoretical expositions of Fordham’s model (Papers 1 and 2); the second, ‘Explications’, 
brings together three papers in which Fordham’s concepts are elucidated by clinical and 
observational material (Papers 3, 4 and 5); and the third, ‘Extensions’, includes 
publications that implicitly or explicitly include my innovations to Fordham’s model.   
 
The papers here were published in three different journals.  All refer to Fordham’s 
model and most include clinical material and infant observation as well as theory.  My 
own clinical material is used throughout as are several observations of infants.  Others’ 
observations have come from my observation group with Gianna (Henry) Williams and 
from observers in infant observation groups I have led.  My clinical material comes 
primarily from infants and children rather than adults, because acquiring consent is less 
disruptive to the therapy, and it has been easier to preserve the confidentiality of 
patients (and their families) due to the infant’s or child’s communication through play 
or other non-verbal means, and the inevitable  change into non-recognition that comes 
with growth.  
 
Section 1: Theory             
  
These two papers are aimed at putting forward Fordham’s theoretical model and 
clarifying his ideas and the terms he uses.  This is done through the use of metaphor and 
simile, drawing parallels with other theoreticians, and by illustrating his concepts with 
clinical and observational material. Throughout I am aware that theories cannot be 
proved, only disproved; hence I am not arguing the ‘truth’ of the model but, rather, to 
flesh out Fordham’s more abstract constructs.    
 
1. (1992) ‘The primary self and related concepts in Jung, Klein and Isaacs’.  
Journal of Analytical Psychology, 37: 411-432.        
My aim in writing this paper was to sort out a theoretical muddle described in the 
introduction. The theoretical section reviews how Jung, Klein and Isaacs conceptualise 
early psychic contents and processes, followed by an exposition of Fordham’s model of 
a deintegrating and reintegrating primary self.  The clinical material is from one of my 
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intensive training cases, a boy with autistic features, to illustrate how defences of the 
self interfere with deintegration and reintegration leading to representation and symbol 
formation.  I include instances when this oddly remote boy related to me via his 
perception of contours (the ‘O’ of ‘ostrich’), rhythms (the ‘Oh my darling’ song), and 
intensities (the plosive ‘Paks!’).   
 2. (2000) ‘Infant observation, experimental infant research and psychodynamic 
theory regarding lack of self/other differentiation’.  International Journal of 
Infant Observation and Its Applications, 3:64-79.          
 
This paper examines different analytic views on early states of what are variously 
termed identity, identification, projective identification and fusion.  Drawing on infant 
capacities and perception described by researchers, I use a detailed infant observation of 
a neonate to suggest how these states come about.
9
  The theory includes Klein, Sandler 
and Fordham regarding self/other differentiation.  Based on my understanding of the 
early predominance of amodal perception, I suggest that young infants perceive the 
other as separate but the difference is irrelevant in early life and until later feature-based 
perception and attachment processes emerge at the end of the first year.      
 
Section 2: Explications 
These papers describe Fordham’s model and its essential theoretical elements.  Each 
paper aims to illustrate the model and to bring its conceptual formulations to life 
through the use of clinical material and infant research and observation.      
 
3. (1993) ‘Out of the mouths of babes: An enquiry into the sources of language 
development’.  Journal of Analytical Psychology, 38:237-256.   
 
The clinical material in this paper details my work with a profoundly deaf ten-year-old 
girl who attended the school for the deaf where I worked.  The aims of the paper were, 
firstly, to demonstrate how the foundations of language rest on object relations and 
phantasies about communication.  Secondly, it illustrates deintegration by describing 
                                                          
9
 The infant observations in this paper as well as that in Paper 3 describe the observer 
picking up and holding the baby.  These were exceptions in the course of the 
observations (both of which were presented in the same group) and not part of usual 
practice.   
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how the sources of language follow a ‘normal’ course of deintegrations that leads from 
the nipple-in-the-mouth to the word-in-the mouth, and how compensatory 
deintegrations evolve in infants with profound deafness.   
This paper contains a detailed description of the identifying features of periods of 
massive deintegrations.
10
  I had observed the features of the developmental surge that 
occurs at six to ten weeks in my own infant observation but my notes failed to capture 
their aesthetic power (see Picture 3 of Harry, Paper 9).  Later I recognised the infant’s 
typical, compelling awe-struck expression in face of the deprived six-year-old boy 
described in Paper 9.  
4.  (1996) ‘“With healing in her wings ...”: Integration and repair in a self-
destructive adolescent’.    Journal of Child Psychotherapy, 22:64-81.   
This paper was written for the ACP annual conference in March 1995 and was the last 
paper I discussed with Fordham, who died the following month.  The topic of the 
conference was ‘reparation and repair’ from different theoretical perspectives, and my 
title refers to Jung’s idea that the cure is in the symptom.    
After a theoretical sketch of Fordham’s model I introduce three corollaries elaborating 
his view that internal development proceeds from whole objects, to part objects, to the 
depressive position I then link this progression with periodic surges of global change 
during the first year,   The paper was later included in a collection of papers, titled, 
Controversies in Analytical Psychology, followed by a Jungian and a Kleinian 
respondent.
 11
    Both pointed out that my account left out the young teenager’s father 
and sexuality, which I addressed in my counter-response (Withers 2003).         
5. (2003a) ‘Developmental aspects of trauma and traumatic aspects of 
development’.  Journal of Analytical Psychology, 48:171-190.  
This paper was written for a conference on trauma organised by the Journal of Analytic 
Psychology. The other speaker was a Jungian known for his work with traumatised 
adults.  As I represented a developmental perspective, I drew attention to how ‘the stuff 
of trauma’ is part of healthy development and describe how pathological splitting comes 
come about.   
                                                          
10
 There is a misleading statement on page 240: normal average heart rate is within a 
range of 60-100 beats per minute.  
11
 Julian David responded from a classical Jungian perspective (Withers 2003, pp. 23-
30), and Robert Hinshelwood was the Kleinian (ibid., pp.31-41).       
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I describe the massive deintegration at the end of the first year relevant to the 
development of perceived differences between self and other.  I assert that at this point 
the baby has a new awareness of self and other that includes the difference of status in 
the relationship.  I use an infant observation to capture the emergence of this sensitivity, 
along with short term clinical work with a young child, and analysis with an adult to 
show how failures in the reintegration of feelings of belittlement and shame resulted in 
grievance split off from grief at the loss of an idealised earlier object relationship.  
Section 3: Extensions 
The papers in this section represent the point at which I began to add my own 
discoveries and formulations to Fordham’s model.   Papers 6, 7 and 8 are theoretical,   
while Paper 9 concerns technique.  All four include my innovations to the model, 
although some are subsidiary to the aims I had in writing each paper.     
 
6. (2005) ‘Fordham, Jung and the self: A re-examination of Fordham’s 
contribution to Jung’s conceptualisation’.  Journal of Analytical Psychology, 
50: 571-594. 
 
This paper was presented at an SAP Analytic Group at a time when SAP thinkers were 
abandoning Jung’s distinction between the self and the ego, thereby conflating the two 
concepts.  My paper makes an argument for the usefulness of Jung’s distinction by 
regarding the self and the ego from a developmental point of view.    
 
I turn to Fordham’s conceptual analysis of Jung’s use of ‘self’, in which he identifies an 
apparent contradiction between Jung’s definition of the self as the psycho-somatic 
whole of the individual, while also referring to it as an archetype (a part of the whole).  
Fordham resolves this by drawing in a concept, the ‘central archetype of order,’ which 
he then left undeveloped.  I make use of Fordham’s idea of a central archetype by 
hypothesizing its emergence at the end of the first year along with a new order of  
reintegrating ‘bits’ ego consciousness, and support this with infant and neurobiological 
studies.    
 
Also included is a detailed description of the direct and instantaneous transfer of affect 
between mother and infant via perceptual and neuro-chemical processes (p. 577), which 
I link to early states of identity.  At the end of the paper I propose that ‘primary self’ can 
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be understood to refer to a period of development which is pre-consciousness (that is, 
before secondary consciousness) and marked by the predominance of deintegrates 
(primitive part objects), and which draws to a close around the end of the first year.    
 
7.  (2008)   ‘The ‘Self’ in analytical psychology: The function of the ‘central 
archetype’ within Fordham’s model’.  Journal of Analytical Psychology, 53: 
329-350.    
 
This paper was presented at a commemorative conference, ‘Michael Fordham: The Past, 
Present and Future of his Work’. It is essentially an extension of Paper 6 and further 
argues the usefulness of the concept of a central archetype.  I gather together Fordham’s 
statements about the term in order to define it before applying it to the changes that 
occur during the massive surge of deintegration at the end of the first year.  I detail a 
session with a young toddler to demonstrate the developmental shift from face-to-face 
to mind-to-mind.  In the last part of the paper I introduce the use of ‘emergence’ from 
mathematics and Complexity Theory in order to make the case that deintegration and 
reintegration function as emergent processes, which lead from sentience to 
mentalisation and the increasing complexity of the mind over the course of life.    
 
When later reflecting on this paper, my attention was drawn to the following sentence in 
the summary:   
What I have pressed to clarify is that the logical consequence of this is that 
phenomena associated with the self should be regarded as manifestations of the 
central archetype. (‘Summary comment’, first paragraph, last sentence, p. 346).  
 
When it was written I considered that it expressed my thinking as I had intended.    I 
now regard the sentence to be misleading, and I have come to question if the concept to 
which it refers adds to the model 
 
8.  (2009)   ‘Conjugating the self’.  Journal of Analytical Psychology, 54: 399-403.     
   
This short commentary was my contribution to a discussion prompted by James Astor, 
who was addressing what he considered to be an apparent rather than actual conflict 
between the different positions held by an SAP colleague and myself concerning the 
self.  The title refers to canonical conjugates (from Heisenberg’s principle that related 
pairs of variables cannot be measured simultaneously) described in Paper 6.  My 
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response is a distillation of Papers 6 and 7, concluding that the differences between my 
colleague and myself represent a reciprocal canonical conjugate: that we are regarding 
the same concept from different data; his from adults and mine from infants and small 
children. I include it in the portfolio to demonstrate that my thinking has been part of 
larger discussions in the SAP and analytical psychology.   
 
9. (2013) ‘Reflections on research and learning from the patient:  The art and 
science of what we do’.  Journal of Analytical Psychology, 58: 510-529).     
   
This paper was written for a Journal of Analytical Psychology conference in Boston, 
USA, titled ‘Attachment and Intersubjectivity in the Therapeutic Relationship’.  The 
main speakers were associated with research-informed and ego-related approaches, and 
I wanted to put forward the importance learning from the patient.  Here I assert that 
interpretive analytic work rests on the patient’s capacity for three-dimensionality. 
 
This is my only paper on technique or, rather, an aspect of technique.  Here I describe 
the treatment and slow development of a grossly deprived six-year-old boy over two 
years of therapy.  At a critical moment in one of our last sessions, I responded to him in 
a way that Fordham termed ‘working out of the self’.  Here I contribute to Fordham’s 
description by adding further considerations of the intrapersonal and interpersonal 
components that comprise ‘working out of the self’.     
 
Further Reflections   
 
In the course of re-reading these papers I was surprised to discover how soon I 
introduced research, and how often I referred to the periods of massive deintegration in 
the first year.  I also realised that my early papers contained thinking and material that 
could be linked to more recent work.  For instance, the description of Baby Toby’s 
development from the nipple-in-the-mouth to a word-in-the-mouth (Paper 3) connects 
to the toddler’s purposeful use of his body to construct a concept of inside-
outside/container-contained/three dimensionality (Paper 7), and both of these to the six-
year-old boy’s construction (as opposed to expression) of a three-dimensional space in 
which he could hold his loving feelings (Paper 9).    
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In reflection, I consider that my most substantial and well-substantiated contribution to 
Fordham’s model has been the identification and dating of surges of massive 
deintegration in the first year of life.  My most exciting discovery has been how active a 
young toddler was in constructing - and then discovering – a new mental concept 
arising from shared activity with another mind.  On the other hand, I need further to 
clarify certain points, such as, what I mean by the ‘irrelevance’ between self and other 
in early infancy, and need to study more into the precursors of ego, that is, what is now 
called ‘subjectivity’ and the early sense of the self; those assemblings of sensation with 
perception into ‘the feel of’ a ‘happening’.   
 
I continue to work with adults and to supervise, teach, give presentations, run an infant 
observation group and serve on the SAP Ethics Committee, the editorial committee of 
the Journal of Analytical Psychology, and the Fordham Fund, which distributes the fund 
raised for the Child Analytic Training.  In the course of preparing this essay I presented 
a short paper to a journal conference on the importance of the JAP as a vehicle for 
Fordham’s ideas, and plan to present at a minor literary event next year, which will be a 
new experience.     
In his obituary of Jung, Fordham wrote, ‘The best monument that can be raised to Jung 
is to make use of and develop his work rather than let it be passively accepted and 
sterilized (Fordham 1961, p. 168).  My papers here were written to clarify my thinking 
and link it to what I was learning from research and my clinical experience.  Yet, 
looking back, I realise that what I have done has been in similar spirit to Fordham’s 
monument to Jung: of honouring Fordham and expressing my admiration, loyalty and 
affection. I hope to continue my study of Fordham by completing the collection of his 
papers on the development of his model that I started a decade ago, and a friend has 
encouraged me to do a collection of my own papers, which I hope to be able to do in 
due course.  This present exercise will serve me well should these projects proceed.   
*    *    *    *    *   *    * 
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THE PRIMARY SELF AND 
RELATED CONCEPTS IN 
JUNG, KLEIN, AND ISAACS 
ELIZABETH URBAN, Lo11do11 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper has its source in some comments made by Dr Fordham 
in one of my supervision sessions. The patient under discussion was 
a boy with autistic features, who had been seeing me in ana lysis for 
three years. When Dr Fordham said, almost as an aside, that it is not 
possible to analyse someone who is autistic , I was considerably taken 
aback, because that was what I thought I had been trying to do. 
When I asked what he meant, he answered that analysis is of internal 
objects, and that autistic children have no internal objects. What do 
they have inside, I wondered, and Dr Fordham answered chat the 
primary self is lacking in contents. This made me realize that I · 
had confusions and misconceptions about the primitive mind and its 
contents. 
This paper represents my attempt to address these questions . It is 
a study of early psychic contents and processes, beginning with a 
consideration of the differences between Jung, Klein, and Isaacs, on 
the one hand, and Fordham, on the other. I then examine Fordham's 
theory of a primary self and its actions, and attempt to describe how 
contents are built up in the psyche. Some of the primary processes 
described are illustrated by an infant observation. At the end of the 
paper I give clinical material through which I hope to show how the 
same psychic processes that contribute co psychic growth can also 
result in the failure of psychic deYelopment. 
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JUNG, KLEIN, AND ISAACS 
A major, if not the major, difference between Freud and Jung lay in 
their views about the inner world. Freud's main emphasis was on 
the way contents of the mind are derived from personal experience, 
whereas Jung's studies viewed the mind as innate ly endowed with a 
priori configurations that encompass far more than personal contents. 
Klein too departed from Freud on this point, and the Contro versial 
Discussions of the British Psycho-Analytical Society revo lved around 
this issue (Hinshelwood 1989). Both Jung and Klein thought that the 
primary contents of the mind are inextricably bound up with the 
instincts , that, in fact, they are the mental representations of instincts. 
According to Jung , the primary content of the psyche is the arche- . 
type. · In contrast to instincts, the archetypes are 'in born forms of 
"intuition" ' Uung 1919, p. 133), 
analogous to instinct, with the difference that whereas instinct is a purposive 
impulse to carry out some highl y complicated action, int uition is the unconscious, 
purposive appre hension of a highl y comp licated situation. (ibid . p. I 32) 
Jung also notes the similarities between archetypes and instincts. The 
archetypes make up the collective unconscious , which is universal 
and impersonal ; that is, it is the same for all individuals. Instinc ts, 
according to Jung, are also~ impersonal and universal, and are, also 
like the archetypes, hereditary factors of a dynami c or motivating 
character. Thus, instincts 'form very close analogue s to the arche-
types, so close, in fact, that there is goo d reason for supposing that 
the archetypes are the unconsciou s images of the instinc ts themse lves' 
Oung 1936 , pp. 43-4 ). Elsewhere he writes chat the archetype 'm ight 
suitably be described as the i11sti11ct's perception of itself, or as the self-
portrait of the instinct' Uung 1919, p. 136). 
Archetypes described in this way are virtually the same as Klein's 
unconscious phantasies. She writes, 'I believe that phantasies operate . 
from the outset , as do the instin cts, and are the mental expression of 
the activity of both · the life and death instin cts' (Klein 1952, p. 58). 
Isaacs presents a fuller exposition of the relationship between- phantas-
ies and instincts than does Klein. Isaacs states that 'phantasies are the 
primary content of unconscious mental processes ' (Isaacs 1952, p. 82). 
'This "mental expression" of instinct is unconscious phantasy. Phan -
tasy is (in the first instance ) the mental corollar y, the psychic represen-
tative , of instinct' (ibid ., p. 83). 
Although for the most part Klein and Isaacs describe phantasies in 
terms of 'st or ies' , for example, 'I want to eat her all up ', these stories 
are based upon images: 
Wh:it, then, does the infan t hallucinate? We may assume , since it is the oral 
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impulse which is at work, first, the nipple, then the breast , and later his mother 
as a whole person; and he hallucinates the nipple or the breast in order to enjoy 
it. As we can see from his behaviour (sucking movements, sucking his own lip 
or a little later his fingers, and so on), hallucination does not stop at the mere · 
picture, but carries him on to what he is, in detail, going to do with the desired 
object which he imagines (phancasies) he has obta ined. (ibid .. p. 86) 
The 'picture' of the breast that is an image of the instinct makes 
Isaacs's description of unconscious phantasies virtually identical to 
Jung's description of the archetype as the 'self-portrait of the instinct'. 
When she writes 'such knowledge [of the breast] is inherent ... in 
the aim of instinct' (ibid., p. 94), she can be understood to be talking 
about the same thing that Jung is describing when he states that the 
yucca moth has an image of the yucca flower and its structure, so 
that, when present externally , the flower sets off instinctual behaviour 
Oung 1919). Both Jung and Isaacs are stating that there is an image 
of the aim of the instinct-the object that fulfils the instinctual urge-
that exists within the psyche, enabling the instinct ' to know what it 
is looking for'. 
Important differences do, however, exist between Jung and Klein. 
Klein was a psychoanalyst who extended Freud 's concepts of libidinal 
and destructive instincts to pre-Oedipal development, focusing on 
how infancy lies at the core of the personality. On the other hand, 
although Jung drew attention to the inherent richness of the mind 
before Klein began writing, his interest in childhood and infancy is 
limited. Although he refers to the individuality of the infant (Jung 
191 I, 1921), for the most part he thinks that the infant is in primary 
identity with the mother (Jung 1927). Th e issue of primary identity 
raises a number of questions which have since been addressed by 
Fordham. 
THE SELF, THE PRIMARY SELF, AND 'THE ULTIMATE': JUNG 
AND FORDHAM 
My misconception was that I had pictured an innate, internal realm 
of images and phantasies that from birth were projected on to the 
external world. Sorting this out required that I 'empty out' the con-
tents of the infant mind and differentiate between the self described 
by Jung and the primary self described by Fordham. 
Jung concluded from his studies 'that a class of images, expressing 
totality, symbolizes the self, defined as the total personality, conscious 
and uncons cious ' (Ford ham 1976, p. I 1) . Jung 's awareness of the self 
arose from the period following his break with Freud. At this tim e 
he discovered the meaning of the mandala symbols that preoccupied 
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him. In Memoi-ies, D1·ean1s, R~ffectio,zs, Jung writes, 'Only grad ually 
did I discover what the mandala really is: ''Formation, Transform-
ation, Eternal Mind's eternal recreation" .... Mandalas were crypto-
grams concerning the state of the self which were presented co me 
anew each day. In them I saw the self-that is my whole being-
actively at work' Oung 1963a, p. 221). Later he adds, 'I knew that 
in finding the mandala as the expression of the self I had attained 
what was for me the ultimate' (ibid., p. 222). 
The 'ultimate ' to which he is referring is the individuating self, 
which, according to Jung, emerges out of an initia l prima ry identity 
with the mother Oung 1927). Fordham has applied Jung 's ideas about 
the self and individuation to early childhood, and has introduced 
clinical material from his work in support of the idea that children 
show signs of individuation at a very early age (Fordham 1969). He 
revises Jung's ideas and postulates that the child's individuation 
emerges not out of a primary identity with the mother, but out of 
an original, or primary, self, which is a pre-indi viduating self (Ford-
ham 1976). Drawing from Jung's definition of the self as ' the totality 
of the psyche altogether, i.e. conscious a11d unconscious' Uung 1955, 
p. 389) and also, 't he self embraces the bodily sphere as w ell as the 
psyche' (Jung 1963b, p. 503), Fordham defines the primar y self as 'a 
psychosomatic integrate-a blueprint for psychic maturation - from 
which the behaviour of infants may be derived as they graduall y 
develop and differentiate into children, adolescents and adu lts' (Ford-
ham 1976, p. Ir). Thus 'the ultimate' for Jung is the individuating 
self, and for Fordham it is the primary self. 
Together these two concepts describe the self as alpha and omega. 
To understand this more fully, I have found it important to consider 
how the 'empty' primary self (Fordham' s 'ultimate', the ultimate 
source), which has the potential for prov iding the space for inner 
objects , acquires the characteristics of inside and outside and deYelops 
into a container for psychic contents to wh ich the ego might then 
relate Uung 's 'ultimate', the ultimate goal). For me this has meant 
going back to 'the very beginning', to the point at which the prima ry 
self is in its most prim ary state, before it has any characteristics and 
when it is 'pure' potential. This-F ord ham's 'ultim ate· in its ultimate 
form-would be at the instant when the foetal organism acquires a 
psychic constituent (thereby becoming psychosomatic) but prior to 
deintegration and reintegration, that is to any further relating to the 
environment. This state exists only as a theoretical construct. But, 
for my purposes here , it is import;nt to describe it. 
The fertilized egg at the instant of union more aptly illustr ates the 
primary self at ' the very beginning ' than does the infant at birth. 
This is because deintegration and reintegration occur i11 11tero. These 
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processes are accelerated at birth and lead eventually to the internaliz-
ation of objects and, later, to symbolization. But, at birth, the pri-
mary self has developed beyond its 'original state'. 'Originally' the 
primary self exists as 'nothing but ' potential. As Fordham describes 
it, it is a 'pregnant void': 
I conclude with a reflection on the 'ultimate ' . I take it co represent a state in 
which there is no past and no future, though it is present like a point which has 
position but no magn itude. It has no desires, no memory, no thoughts. no images 
but out of it by transformation all of these can deincegrace. There is no conscious-
ness and so no unconscious-it is a pregnant absence. (Fordham 1985, p . 33) 
The primary self at birth has developed from the 'ultimate' but is 
still mainly without contents; that is, it is primarily void-but-predis-
posed-to-receive objects from without that can be internalized. Fur-
nishing the internal world really gets under way only after increased 
deintegrative and reintegrative processes have taken place after birth . 
However, the primary self has undergone transformations from 'the 
very beginning ' up unt il birth and to the point at which there are 
the primary contents described by Jung, Klein, and Isaacs. That is, 
the images considered by them to be innate are not; what is innate 
is the potential and predisposition to have images. 
Fordham has drawn upon Freud's analogy of the protozoa amoeba 
to the ego to describe his postulate of the primary, pre-individuating 
self, and I would like to extend the analogy to describe Fordham's 
'ultimate'. In Fordham's analog y, the amoeba, like the primary self, 
is a living organism. It is a nucleated mass of protoplasm, densest at 
the outside , which forms a boundar y with the outside world. Finger-
like extensions called pseudopodia protrude from the amoeba and 
engulf food, which is then incorporated into the organism . In this 
analogy , the nucleated endoplasm of the amoeba corresponds to the 
centralizing and ordering functions of the primar y self. The pseudo-
podia correspond to deintegrates of the primar y self, extending out 
and relating to the environment ,,:hi le still maintaining a relationship 
to the whole. The taking in and digestion of food corresponds to 
reintegration. 
A model of the primary self at its most primary stare-at its 'very 
beginning' -is of a less developed amoeba. This can be pictured by 
imagining the reversal of the de\·elopment of the amoeba as though 
looking at high-speed film shown in reverse. The amoeba will then 
be seen to become smaller and smaller, its ectop lasm shrinking to 
become .part of the nucleated mass until the whole of the organ ism 
becomes quite simply a dot , 'like a point which has position but no 
magnitude' (Fordham 1985, p. 33). 
Another picture of Fordham 's 'ultimate', which views it from the 
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inside, so to speak, has been supplied to me by the conscious vision 
of a patient in her late twenties. This Yision occurred at the outset 
of a period of considerable change in the patient's life. I understand 
this experience to belong to a state of integration , in \Vhich deinte-
grates came together momentarily into a state of oneness, expressed 
through an image of 'the ultimate' . This experience is rele\·ant to my 
subject because states of integration in indi\'iduating adults are very 
similar to primary states of integration in infancy and thus to the 
primary self. As Fordham comments: 
It follows that in normal devdopment the 'delusional' state of primary idenm y-
or unity-with the mother can only be transitory and the formation of a new 
integrate, a new dynamic equilibrium within che inf.inc. corresponding co. bur 
more differentiated rhan. rhe original self unit. (Fordhdm 1985. p. r rol 
In this vision the patient is an infinitely small speck- ·a point with 
position but no magnitude' - in an infinitely large universe of blue 
sky which is a pure nothingness . She 'knows' that this is the moment 
of death. Around and before her is timeless eternity, in w h;ch she is 
suspended in an eternal pause of beginning. This seems to be vvhat 
Fordham is describing above as the ·pregnant absence· of 'the ulti-
mate' (Fordham 1985, p. 33). 
THE DYNAMICS OF THE PRIMARY SELF: DEINTEGRATION 
AND REINTEGRATION 
For Jung and Klein, the contents of the mind. whether they are 
called archetypal images or internal objects, are autonomous internal 
realities, relating to one anot her , to the ego, and , via projection and 
incroject ion, co the external world. But how does the primary self 
relate to the environment if it has no contents to project? In answering 
this question , Fordham offers a unique contribution to our ideas 
about psychi c dynamics as well as about indiYidual deve lopment . He 
writes: 
I considered the self as a dynamic system that acted not only as an integrator of 
psychic and physical elements bur also as a system rhat spomaneous ly could diYide 
itself up into parts. For chat. I coined the rerm 'deintegration·. \\'hich did nor 
disrupt che integrity of the organism as \\'Ould be implied b>· disintegration . I 
postulated a rhyrhm of integration Jnd deinregracion chat leads ro gro\\'th. Deime -
grares are ne\\' C'Xperiences. either predominantly affecriYe or co~niriYe. \\'hi ch 
can then be digested and integrated imo the \\'hole. ( ford ham r 987. !'.'· J H l 
It is important for an appreciation of Fordham's theory to under-
stand that the concepts of deintegration and reintegration are designed 
to describe the dynamic of inner with outer without necessarily refer-
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ring to mental mechanisms and contents, although the dynamics of 
the self can give rise to them. Initially, the self is a structure of 
potentials and predispositions without contents and without character-
istics: structures without images, the word processor's template with-
out the print . Although deintegration is similar to projection and 
reintegration to introjection, they are different in a significant way. 
Neither projection nor introjection can occu r unti l there are internal 
objects-internal, initially , to the self-because projection and intro-
jection necessitate a content. Deintegration is the inherent action of 
the primary self and is a way of relating that occurs before objects 
have been internalized as well as after. 
Because deintegration means relating to an experience. whe ther it 
is internal or external, early deintegrates are the same as Bion 's beta 
elements, which are the primar y instrument of the baby 's relating. 
Beta elements represent the facts of experience, that is, sense 
impressions and very primitive emotional experiences (Bion 1962). 
Therefore, like early deintegrates, they are physiological as much as 
mental; they are, to use Bion 's term, 'proto-thoughts ' or, to use 
Fordham's, 'proto-mental' (Grinberg et al. 1975, p. 3 8; Fordham, 
1985). This means that primitive mental processes have a psycho-
somatic, mind-body quality. One can observe how an infant 's phys i-
cal actions, such as sucking, eliminating, and crying, are imbued with 
emotions, and how they enable the baby to manage variou s states , 
like getting rid of discomfort, as well as co communicate with another 
through projective identification. This runs contrary to Stern's con-
clusion that projective and introjeccive processes are no t operative 
until the baby is capable of symbolization, because he presum es that 
these dynamics are mental rather than mind-body (Stern 1985; Davies 
1989). 
Deintegration begins i11 tltero and accelerates at birth, when the 
infant must adapt to extra-uterine life. About this Ford ham wr ites: 
Suppose that when a ne '.\' adaptat ion is required the self responds by deimegrating 
optima lly followed by a new integration. Birrh is such an experience. A massi\'e 
deimegrarion woul d occur causing fears of a ,·ery primiti,·e kind recorded later 
on as such experienc es as catastrophic chaos. namc:less dread. dropping into a 
black hole. etc. A reintegration \\'Ould follow proYided rhe suitable enYironmem 
,vere made aYailable. (Fordha m 1991) 
Commenting on the 'massi \'e deintegration· following birth, Hobdell 
writes, 'Sleep for the infant is the time for integration. As much as 
eighteen out of the twenty-four hours is spent on it, which giYes 
some idea of the psychic and physical energy expended on deincegra-
tion' (Hobde ll 1988). 
The point I should like to make here is that che ·massi\'e deintegra -
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tion' at birth may affect subsequent deintegrations, such as those at 
the breast, and that the relationship to the breast may be preceded 
by other experiences which have been taken in and organized by the 
self archetypally. That is, when the infant is put to the breast, the 
infant's response to it may not be, strictly speaking, an innate 
response, but rather the result of the interplay between the infant's 
self and the environment. 
The process that begins with the facts of experience, that is, sense 
impressions combined with primitive emotions into a psychosomatic, 
mind-body experience, quickly goes on to develop in complexity. In 
interactions with the mother, the baby takes in not only the physical 
contents of the breast which are assimilated into his body through 
milk, but also proto-mental contents that are also assimilated. The 
baby's actions and the mother's actions interrelate, so that the baby's 
experiences of the mother also come back into the baby's self, and 
are reintegrated. Experiences of the mother are taken in again and 
again through repeated deintegrations and are processed again and 
again through repeated reintegrations. 
Once the baby has related to an experience, whe ther externai to 
him, like the breast, or internal, like a pain in his stomach, the 
deintegrate withdraws and takes something in from the experience 
that will form a content. Actions of the self \vill form the contents 
into an internal object that is primarily archetypal. This means it is 
universal, unconscious, typical, and is combined with intense 
emotional 'meaning'. Being imbued with the self, these objects are 
felt to be omnipotent, have an all-or-nothing quality, and thus seem 
to be of one extreme or its opposite. 
As the process unfolds, 'bits' of experience, Yia actions of the self, 
coalesce in such a way that the contents of these exper iences acqui re 
characteristics. Stern concludes that initiallv the characteristics are 
'global' (that is, archetypal) and are of 'inte~sities, shapes, temporal 
patterns, vitality affects , categorical affects, and hedonic tones· (Stern 
198 5, p. 67). In this way the baby gets ·an idea· of what the mother 
is like. Mother/infant observations show that babies can have this 
'idea' soon after birth. Foetal studies, which demonstrate deintegra-
tion in 11tero,_ also support this. Verney, drawing upon the results of 
such studies, . vividlv describes 'how the unborn becomes an actiYe 
participant in intra-'uterine bonding· and com-incingly supports the 
idea that 'bonding after birth ... [is] actually the continuation of a 
bonding process that [begins ] ·1ong before, in the womb· (Verney 
1981 , pp. 61-2). 
This, then, is what Fordham means by reintegration; as experiences 
(that is, deintegrates , \vhich can be construed as similar to beta 
elements) get withdrawn into the self, they become integrated into 
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the self and then take on various forms which eventually acquire 
clearer definition. As cognitive and emotional development gains in 
complexity, the self begins to reveal its structure, mu ch as the ferti-
lized egg develops to reveal physical characteristics, such as individual 
facial features. As this development occurs, the infant can experience 
objects as having an inside and an outside . As this happens, and as 
the mind-now experienced as having an inside and an outside-
develops contents, something can be done with the inner objects. 
Relationships come into play, and objects can be identified with, 
projected, and introjected . This allows for further development of 
the inner world and its objects. 
With continued deintegration and reintegration comes the capacity 
for a qualitative change in the nature of inner contents. Stern and 
Trevarthen indicate that there are discrete, qualitatively different 
surges of change during infancy and childhood (which Fordham has 
described as 'deintegrating optimally'), but Stern is careful to distin-
guish them from developmental stages or phases (Stern 1985; Trevar-
then 1974 , 1987; Fordham 1991) . Fordham too makes this point: 
'Many psychiatri c constru ctions and theories about infancy refer to 
states that may lead to psychic damage. Many of these can be 
described and/or inferred with considerable certainty, yet the 
impression given that they are more or less continuous and so defin-
ing stages in development is questionable ' (Fordham 1987, p. 3 58). 
With the gradual separating out of mind and body and the develop-
ment of symbolization, objects, through inherent actions of the self, 
can take on an increasing correspondence to their correlates in the 
external world. As that happens, it can be said chat some contents 
refer mainly to reality and some refer mainly to the self. 
In summary, Fordham's theory of deintegration and reintegration 
makes explicit the interplay of the archetypal and the external, which 
occurs from befor e birth. The primary self, initially without contents 
and characteristics, deincegrates and reintegra tes as the infant adapts 
himself to extra-uterine life. The breast is an early object that the 
baby reaches out to and then assimilates, whereupon it becomes a 
perception imbued with meaning and organized in a particular-
archetypal-way to create an inner object. Experiences are taken in 
time and again, and 'recorded' time and again. There is a change in 
the nature of inner contents as the primary self unfolds through 
deintegration and reintegrati on, leading to growing complexity and 
the enrichment of the mind. 
According to Fordham , inner contents are initially internal to the 
self, and not, at least until representations have been built up in the 
mind , to the ego. This view contras ts with that of Klein , who, 
drawing upon Freud's structural model, postulates an ego from birth 
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(Hinshelwood 1989) because the id has no orgamzmg or contammg 
function . Thereby the concept of the ego is extended beyond chat 
which would be understood by Fordham. This also contrasts with 
the viewpoint of Stern, who runs into a conceptual difficulty when 
trying to account for the earl y organizing phenomena observed in 
infants before the ego (that which 'senses' the various ·senses of the 
self' that he describes) has become established (Stern 1985). 
EARLY DEINTEGRATION AND REINTEGRATION: AN INFANT 
OBSERVATION 
The most vivid way of describing early deintegration and reinte-
gration is to turn to infant observation. The first three observations 
of Toby show him reacting to varying degrees of discomfort and 
seem to indica te the gradual coming together of experiences into what 
becomes a bad object. 
First visit (4 days old): His mother pointed out the line of a bruise across his 
brow, wh ich she thought was from a contraction ... I watched him while he 
slept. I noticed him extend his arms forward from the shoulde rs and put his head 
back, in a single twitched mo,·emem. It seemed as though he was resisting 
something and pushing and moving against it. For the most part he lay with his 
arm s crossed at the forearm in front of his face . .. . The baby twitched a coupie 
of times, extend ing his hands forward and his head backward. bur was otherw ise 
still throughout the visit. 
In this observa tion Toby's only movement during sleep is a reflexive 
forward pushing out of his arms and a simultaneous pulling back of 
his head. In the expression of resistance there is a suggestion of 
something unpleasant, but it is not much more than a suggestion. 
Second visit (I week , 6 days old): Toby lay on his right side. with his hands 
held outside the co\"ers. During the whole of the observation he slept .... His 
. bro,v occasionally knit into a frown. and the skin twitched along the temple. 
between the outer corner of his eve and his ear. The e\"es themselves mo,·ed 
beneath the closed lids. giYing the impression that he \\"35 ;Seeing" despite the fact 
that the lids were shut. ... 
H e 1111>1•ed liis lie11d b11rkwJrd ,wd hi! ,1r111s stretched f.•1"11'11l'd . ... His cheeks moved 
·with the mO\"ement of his mouth when he dre,,: it back at the corners as if he 
were going co scare to cry .... Toby made one or two little monosyllabic crying 
noises. . .. At one poinr he scrt"wcd up his face as if he \\"ere going to cry and 
then farted qui te loud ly. His face chrn relaxed and he became still. 
The same movement observed in the first visit -the head mo\'ing 
back ward and the arms str etching forward-is observed in the second. 
Howe\'er, in the second Yisit, the experience is more clearly 
uncomfortabk, and is accompanied by crying noises and facial 
expressions that more than suggest discomfort. There seems to be 
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evidence of an inner object; it has qualities (discomfort ) and location 
(it is inside him), so that something can be done with the object . 
What is done is that it is evacuated through a bodily response, despite 
the fact that the experience is not entirely bodily because it also has 
something of emotion . In both observations, Tob y is sleeping, and 
it is evident that it is not relevant to talk in terms of Toby being 
either conscious or unconscious; the distinction does not matter at 
this point. 
Third visit (2. weeks, 2 days old): Toby slept propped up in his chair . (He had 
had some milk from his mother' s breast, but the full feed was postponed.) He 
occasionally stretched his legs, straightened and raised his arms and hands , and 
srreuhed a11d reached ow, as if p11s/1i11g away from so111e1/ri1g i11 fro111 of liim . ... His 
face occasionally screwed up , and he knit his bro\\'. Occasionally his eyes opened, 
but when they did he closed them quickly before they focused on anything. After 
a while he became more awake and stared at the side of his chair. 
Once he had awakened (although he shut his eyes for intervals), he began co 
screw up his face. He tensed his hands and wrists, quickly drawing them up 
towards his face and quickly taking them away .... Once or twice he pulled his 
hands to his face and sucked on the cuff of his Babygro. His noises became more 
disturbing. (On the mother 's instruqion) I picked him up. He moved his head 
from side to side, and then quieted, relaxing into a half-sleep. Then he screwed 
up his face again and made repeated half-cries .... 
I lifted him against my right sho"ulder. His temple was againsr my right cheek. 
and he moved his head , which I supported with my hand . to"l.vard and away 
from m y face. His left hand flexed and clenched, and his right hand firml y gras ped 
the neck of my pullover . He pushed agai11s1 a11d away .frc,111 me, a push that 11•as from 
his shoulders ll'ith his liead back a11d arms {orll'ard. 
I patted his back w.ith my left hand, and he was quier and then became distressed 
again. I noticed that he was making a kind of clicking noise, and it seemed to 
be coming from the back of his mouth. It became increasingly distressing to see 
him so upset. ... He went from his rescless discomfort into a loud. open cry -
long chroat y aahs. The mother picked up Toby , ,. ... ho continued crying . ... She 
raised her pullover over her left breasr and direcred his face coward the nipple. 
He cook che nipple inco his mouch and sucked with closed eyes. rapidly and 
rhythmically. 
The same pushing movements observed in the first and second visits 
are again evident and observed with feelings of discontent. However, 
there are clearer indications of distress and d-iscomfort; that is, there 
is increased intensity in body movements and crying. 
Over the course of the three \'isics, the experience in che first 
observation has been combined, Yia actions of the self, with sub-
sequent experiences (deintegrations ) of unplea santness and discomfort 
to coalesce (reintegrate) into a more clearly defined bad inner experi-
ence, or object. Initially the experience does not haYe an 'all-or-
nothing ' quality because actions of the self have not by that point 
shaped it archetypally, although this happens within a short period 
after birth. 
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I would like to make a further comment about the initial absence 
of an 'all-or-nothing' quality. Lichtenberg writes: 
It might also be asked: ls there an inborn affect of anger or , as Kleinian analysts 
propose, an intense destructive oral rage? ... I believe it is noteworthy that 
references by neonate researchers to anger or rage are relatively rare. (Lichtenberg 
1983, p. 25) 
Thus Klein's hypothesis of innate rage is not supported by Lichten-
berg's infant research or my baby observation; nor is Jung's hypo-
thesis of the infant's primary identity with the mother. However, 
Fordham's postulate of a deintegrating and reintegrating primary self 
is supported by observation. In fact, while infant observation has 
here been used to illustrate the concept of deintegration and reinte-
gration, one can equally say that the concept of deintegration and 
reintegration illuminates infant observation. 
This also applies to the concept I am studying in this paper. Infant 
research attests to the 'elaborate innate machinery' of the primar y self 
(Trevarthen 1974, p. 231). For instance, Stern concludes that 'Infants 
are not lost at sea in a wash of abstractable qualities of experience. 
They are gradually and systematically ordering these elements of 
experience' (Stern 1985, p. 67). He also describes deintegration and 
reintegration: 'Development occurs in leaps and bounds; qualitative 
shifts may be one of its most obvious features. . . . Between these 
periods of rapid change are periods of relative quiescence, when the 
new integrations appear to consolidate' (Stern 1985, p. 8). 
CLINICAL MATERIAL 
As clinicians, we know that actions of the self that shaped Toby's 
inner world archetypally and enabled his inner development can also 
result in the failure of maturation. What Fordham calls defences of 
the self serve to protect the integrity of the personality, yet can also 
stand in the way of psychic growth (Fordham 1947; Davies 1991). 
This can come about as follows. 
Deintegration is the way the self divides up and differentiates. 'The 
most primitive [differentiation] is the distinction between a good and 
a bad breast', and development follows from the reintegration of 
these experiences (Fordham 1987, p. 357). But, 
If. for instance, a baby is submitted to noxious stimuli of a pathogenic nature 
(either i11 utel'o, during or after birth ) a persistent over-reaction of the defence-
system may start co cake place: chis may become compounded with parts of the 
self by projective identification, so that a kind of auto-immune reaction sets in; 
this in particular would account for rhe persistence of the defence after the noxious 
stimulus had been withdrawn. Noc-self objects then come to be felt as a danger 
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to or even a total threat to life. and must be attacked, destroved or their effect 
neutralized. The focus is therefore on the not-self and little ~r no inner world 
can develop . (Fordham r976 . p. 91) 
In the following clinical example I hope co describe how these 
defences affected the patient's deintegrations and reintegrations , what 
the consequences were for his internal world, and how treatment 
brought about change. The material is that of a boy whom I call 
Ricky, and it was the supervision of his sessions with Dr Fordham 
that started me thinking about how the self acquires contents. 
Ricky attended a special school because of his difficulties in relating 
and learning . In some cognitive respects, Ricky was precocious: he 
could read well and was particularly good at arithmetic. However, 
he read with a fl.at, robotic quality that was detached from meaning, 
and his mastery of numbers was obsessional. For instance, he repeated 
over and over again in sessions a 'numbers game', in which he did 
nothing more than make a chart of the multiplication tables . Initially 
he had little eye contact with others and spoke in an echolalic manner, 
unable to speak spontaneously. He confused personal pronouns, refer-
ring to me as 'she' when he meant ·you', and to himself as 'he', for 
instance, 'He wants the key' when he meant 'I want the key'. His 
sessions opened and closed with an obsess.ional ritual, and if he had 
to depart from it, he became very upset . Despite his extreme cut-
offness, he had a strong wish to fit in and be accepted by others, 
and often tried to do this by playing the clown. 
When he began treatment his mother told me that he had been 
breast fed, but failed to develop a good relationship with the breast 
and was a difficult feeder, with frequent vomiting , diarrhoea, and 
crying. At 2 1/: he developed asthma, which for a period was life-
threatening. His family, which included both parents and an older 
sister, was a loving one -..vith many strengths. My picture was that 
he had undermined his parents' confidence, leaving them feeling 
intimidated by his odd behaviour, which they did not understand, 
and frightened by his asthma attacks. Thus he tended to control 
them, preventing them from helping him in areas where they might 
have done, like providing firmness for his silliness. He was not quite 
six years old when he came to his first session: 
Once in the consul ting room , Ricky became rather nervous. l said that there was 
a box on the table \Vith some things in it I thought he would like to look at. He 
answered mechanically and with false enthusiasm. 'Game, it"s a game!' and circled 
me as I sat in my chair. He ended up standing beside me on m}· left and touched 
his head against mine .... He stood 3\\"3)" and said cleverly. 'Elizabeth, your 
name's Elizabeth.' As he ,,·alked around me, I said he wondered who I was and 
what I wanted to do with him. 
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He went through the contents of the toy box, and, with exaggerated 
emphasis, recited what each object was, reading, when he could, 
what was on the manufacturer's label. Then, 
He stood in the middle of the room and said to himself. 'Your name's Elizabeth 
Erminella' , and, laughing ro himself, softly repeated. 'Erminella'. I said rhac 
Erminella was close to Urban. buc noc quite rhe same rhing; perhaps ic \\'as his 
word for me which was different from my word for me. He came close to me 
and stood nexc to me, looking incenrly ac iuy mourh. I said char he was curious 
about me and wanted to kno\v who I was. so he wanted to look inside me-
inside my mouth-co see where che words were coming from. As I said chis. he 
peered-at a distance of less rhan an inch-into my mouth and chen -from the 
same distance-into my ear, my nose. and chen moved behind me. his head 
remaining only an inch from mine. I conrinued that he wamed co look inco all 
my holes to see what was inside me. 
Toward the end of the interview, 
He came and couched my lefc ear, Yery gently. whereupon my earring came off. 
He looked in wonder ar the earring. and I poinred out that ic was shaped like a 
hole and that he was interested in m}· holes-ID}' mouch. my ears. my nose. and 
my bottom hole. He tried to replace the earring and I helped. He laughed to 
himself, saying 'Ostrich·. I asked wha't an ostrich does, and he said excitedly , 
'It's got an O!' 
What Ricky understood as a game seemed to involve our matching 
wits against one another. He expressed this concretely, so that 
matching wits, presumably located in one's head, was represented by 
putting his head against and touching mine. He knew very little of 
me, and this aroused his anxiety. Who I am-what kind of person I 
am inside-could only be explored by attempting a close examination 
of my physical inside, or what he could examine of it through my 
orifices. Holes, through primary thought processes, were linked with 
my round earrings, and then to 'ostrich' (0). This was not because 
of the meaning of 'os trich' as a large, flightless bird, but because ·of 
the way the word itself looks. Thus, Ricky's inner objects had only 
flat , sensate qualities, and what was outside the sensat e, or concrete, 
was beyond his ability to take in. 
The flat, unidimensional quality of the 'O' deserves comment. It 
strikes me that the ·o· in Ricky's material held the potential for be ing 
a container, or self-representation, but was instead felt as a hole. This 
is reminiscent of Tustin's autistic black hole (Tus tin 197{), although 
I view this phenomenon from a different theoretical perspective. 
I have previously quoted Fordham on the 'massi,·e deintegration' 
at birth , 'causing fears of a \'ery primiti\'e kind recorded late r on as 
such experiences as catastrophic chaos, nameless dread, dropping into 
a black hole, etc.· (Fordham I99I). I should like to expand on this 
comment and consider that at birth there is an explosion of deinte-
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grates reaching out to make contact with the new , extra-uterine 
environment . The deintegrates would carry with them inherent 
'expectations' of, say, a breast, but if the environment does not 
respond or contain these deintegrates, the deintegrates meet with 
'nothing' and 'nothingness' is then taken back into the self. If the 
'nothingness' is felt to be overwhelming, the self would not be able 
to assimilate the experience, although some kind of processing might 
be done which combines it with colourings of, say, dread. The 
'nothingness ' would then be defended against in the way described 
by Fordham (Fordham r947). 
This could explain why Ricky so resisted what was experienced 
by him as 'not -self' (whether this was the contents of his mother's 
breast or my interpretations) , and how, in not letting 'not-self' inside 
him, he was unable to experience having an inside, internal world, 
that is, having a mind that is a container. The defence against 'not-self 
objects' involved splitting, including that between good-inanimate-
controllable objects and bad-animate-uncontrollable objects. Stern and 
Trevarthen demonstrate that neonates respond differentl y to people 
and to inanimate objects and that relating to them both is requi red 
for development (Stern r985; Trevarthen r974, r987). Ricky drew 
upon his ability to manipulate inanimate objects in an attempt to 
'relate ' to people. 
In the introduction to this paper I described Ricky as having autistic 
features . From the material I have given, it is clear that he had 
something of an internal world, but it was highly defended against. 
In further discussion in my supervision, Dr Fordham clarified that 
no one is completely autistic; some deintegration has taken place in 
order for the individual to survive . However, as a result of splitting, 
Ricky's deintegrations were primarily cogrritive. For him, cognitive 
development had become defensive and served to replace affective 
development, insight, and symbolic thought. He could relate cogn i-
tively to the toys that I provided and 'know' what they were by 
reading the labels, although he never played with them nor did he 
come to know their emotional meaning for him by projecting part s 
of himself on to them. Only at the very end of treatment did he 
seem to become aware of the emotional meaning of some pictures 
he drew , · thus indicating that the 'O' that so fascinated him at the 
beginning of treatment was becoming a container for psychic experi-
ence. 
As his treatment proceeded, I could respond to Ricky's likeability, 
but typically I experienced cuc-offness, frustration, uselessness, and 
exclusion. Sometimes r felt driven nearly mad by his obsessionalicy 
because it made me feel so excluded and controlled. He spent one 
session reading out the chan ges of number on his digital watch, 
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which-to my relief-his mother usually kept at home. At one point 
in his treatment, I tried an experiment, in which I made a point of 
surrendering to his control. What happened arose out of what was 
happening in the session and was at a time when I was interested in 
a particular infant study which drew attention to the impact on infants 
when they experienced themselves as efficacious (Broucek 1979). I 
was also driven to desperation by having so little impact on Ricky. 
The experiment began in a session eighteen months into treatment. 
Coming to his session that day meant that he was unable to go out 
on the playground during break, and he responded to this by calling 
out 'The rap y stop!' when I went to pick him up in his classroom. 
In the therapy room he followed his ritual for taking out the toys 
from the cupboard, then paced the room before lying down on the 
couch and asking, 'Is it time?' I commented on his anger at missing 
playtime, and this was met by a mischievous sparkle in his eyes. He 
became increasingly prankish and silly. 
After a bit he started whispering, and I could make out that he 
was saying a children's rhyme-something about going to the zoo 
to see the elephants climb a fence so high it reached the sky. I 
repeated the lines in a whisper. Then he started rhythmically patting 
the back of the couch and softly sang 'Oh My Darling Clementine'. 
I joined in, singing as softly as he did. It took a moment for him to 
realize what was happening, and he stopped abruptly and turned to 
look at me to see. 
There was a pause before he settled again and started patting the 
back of the couch, but not singing. I sang to the patting, following 
its faster or slower beat. When singing with him, I had sung at his 
pitch, but alone I sang at a lower pitch which was more comfortable 
for me. When I did this, he said, 'Higher ', and I lifted my pitch; 
later he said 'Lower', and I followed. His eyes sparkled and danced , 
and he giggled from deep within himself. When the session came to 
a close and as he was making to go, he said, 'That's a lovely "Oh 
my darling" song.' 
For the next several sessions he continued co direct my singing the 
same song by patting the back of the couch. Variations were intro-
duced by my adding verses, so that he would direct me to sing 'In 
a cavern', 'Ruby lips', or 'Oh my darlin", and he wou ld be upset if 
I did not comply. I attempted to add interpretations by making up 
some verses, such as: 'Baby Ricky, Baby Ricky,/Wants Elizabeth to 
sing./When she does he is delighted, / She's the bride and he's the 
king.· 
He seemed to enjoy the custom-tailored words , but their meaning 
had no interpretative impact. This play wen t on for several weeks, 
by which time I felt resistance towards his increasing bossiness arid 
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also I began to question the value of what we were doing. This 
was because the treatment failed to include analytic thinking. I had 
abandoned mine and thus did not give my attention to the manic 
defence that Ricky felt to be so high that it reached the sky. I was 
also ignoring his heroic, large-as-an-elephant efforts to address this 
defence, a heroism that became clearer later in the treatment. 
Ricky was understandably upset when I returned to more orthodox 
interpretations and resisted his attempts to control me. For my part, 
although I felt guilty that he had felt seduced by me, I had established 
in my own mind the value of offering Ricky my analytic thinking, 
a position which can better be explained after I have described the 
outcome of the treatment. Establishing this position resulted in my 
becoming more accepting of the slow pace of the work and the 
impression that there was no change. 
This impression was, however, false. By the end of the second 
year of treatment, Ricky was accurately using 'I', and his pronoun 
confusion had disappeared. Although still quite inhibited, he was able 
to show some spontaneity, and this was reflected in his voice, which 
lost its mechanical quality. His echolalia disappeared, and he was able 
to speak from himself, although the results were somet imes .baffling. 
I shall give an example of this, as it shows where he-and his family-
had reached by the end of two years of treatment. 
In the following excerpt, he had left the special schqol two months 
before, having reached the end of the period offered to pupils. At 
that . time his family also moved outside London. Because special 
school provision would have meant Ricky being placed with children 
who were educationally subnormal , his parents arranged for him to 
go to a local school, which, although small, had classes far larger 
than Ricky had kno w n at his special school. Th~ parents valued 
Ricky's therapy and, concerned at the effect of their moving on their 
son, arranged to bring him to London for once-weekly sessions. 
Initially I shared the concern expressed by the special school that 
Ricky 's accomplishments wou ld not be sustained, let alone increased, 
if he attended a mainstream school. In this I was underestimating 
Ricky's heroic quality and not understanding that it attached to his 
wish to be normal. I had only a faint awareness of this wish, when, 
during a session while he was at the special school, he was distracted 
by two boys outside, walking along the pavement. Teachers at 
'normal' schools were on strike that day, while those at special schools 
did not take action. Ricky was aware of this because his sister attended 
a mainstream school, and, like the boys on the street below, did not 
have to go to school that day. He looked at them long and hard, as 
if trying to understand what he was looking at. I also sensed a longing 
in his expression, and commented that, although I knew that he liked 
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his special school very much, he also wanted to be 'normal' like the 
boys. 
I also had not appreciated the effect of the changes in Ricky in 
restoring his parents' confidence. They had become firmer with him 
when it was appropriate, and his mother could translate his sometimes 
peculiar statements. This is demonstrated in the following: 
Ricky and his mother came up the stairs and srood on the landing by che waiting -
room door. He said something that he had to repeat several times because it was 
not comprehensible, but eventually it became, 'Are you going co cell abour her?' 
His mother translated back co him, 'Is there something >·ou want me co tell Miss 
Urban?' 'Yes, about Cubs.' She then explained ro me char he had started to go 
to Cubs. He was delighted and laughed in a giggly, convulsive way. He called 
out, 'Packs!', and went up the stairs to the consulting room calling chis out. He 
went into the room ahead of me and shut the door (which \Vas typical), and I 
could hear him inside, laughin g and calling, 'Packs! Packs! Packs is 11ormal!· 
I went into rhe room and sat down. ·1 chink char you' re saying chat your going 
to Cubs is what normal boys do and that going rhere makes you feel normal.· 
He continued to giggle in a manic way and then said loudly, 'Shhh! Don'r ralk! 
Be quiet! ... Sit down and do your work and be quiet!' He continued to tell 
me to be quiet as I started to say; 'I think you 're celling me now about going to 
a normal school, where your teacher cells you ro be quier. • 
Toward the end of the session he said to me. 'You're a therapist', and I 
answered that having therapy meant chat he felt he wasn't normal. He asked 
when therapy would end. 
The above session indicates Rick y's need for thinking . This is 
provided by his mother, who can understand and translate his rather 
odd communication and give it meaning, much as a mother does for 
her infant. His excitement about telling me that he is capable of 
joining in 'normal' activities was not contained, and he gave way to 
the feel of the plosive 'Packs!· (beta elements) rather than the more 
linguistically meaningful 'Cubs'. 
The kind of thinking that Ricky's mother offered in the above 
example I have called ;translation', because his mother translates 
Ricky's sometimes idiosyncratic language into common parlance in 
order to give it meaning. Translation is different from interpreta tion, 
which is directed at the emotional meaning of what a patient says 
or does and is an expression of the analyst's symbolic thinking. 
Interpretation, in contrast to translation, offers possib ilities for a mul-
tiplicity of meanings and an opening up of on-going related meanings, 
that is, an unfolding of meaning. For example, a toy truck with 
which a child plays can be interpreted in such a way that it is not 
only a toy but also a part of the child's self that is also part of an 
on-going story about the child in relation to others and other parts 
of himself , including the range of emotions im·olved. When the child 
understands this, the coy has a number of dimensions and a depth of 
48 
The primary self 429 
meaning for him, reflecting that his mind has multidimensionality 
and depth, that is, it has an inside which contains. However, the 
child needs to discover the inside of another 's mind if he is to develop 
a mind of his own that is a container. Ricky seemed very close to 
this point by the time his treatment stopped. 
A year after the session just described, Ricky announced that 
'the rapy is for babies ' and wanted to stop. I considered his request , 
discussed it with his parents, and we agreed to an end of treatment. 
By that time Ricky had developed and maintained his capacity for 
self-expression. His heroi c efforts to do what 'normal' children do 
resulted in a number of accomplishments, including moving into his 
second .year at the mainstream school and managing a school weekend 
outing away from his family. I was concerned that , if his wish to 
end was not respected, his confidence would be undermined; added 
to which, I questioned what he could gain from a treatment for 
which he had little or no motivation. Moreover, bv the time he had 
asked to stop, he had had a brief glimpse into what was for him a 
new way of thinking. 
His parents drove to his sessions on the motorway and Ricky had 
become interested in the signs and what they meant; the y had pic-
tures, not words. In his sessions he began to draw the pictures he 
had seen on the signs, drawing them in three different sizes. I inter-
preted that he was drawing the Daddy Motorway, the Mummy 
Motorway, and the Baby Motorway. What I said seemed to· have 
some meaning for him and produced more pictures of the motorway 
signs. Although there was an obsessional feel to the repetitiousnes s 
of the drawings , there was also a sense of his tr ying to capture 
something, which I understand to be a thought. He expressed this 
once when drawing the motorwa y signs, telling me excitedly to 
'Read that again!', meaning to repeat for him that his pictures were 
also meaningful representations co him of Daddy, Mumm y, and him-
self. 
The reason I gave up my experiment in play therapy with Rick y 
was tha t it resulted in ·my not offering him symbolic thought. Only 
if it was offered to him, despite his not yet consistently being able 
to use it, would he have been able to achieve the awareness he did 
of the meaningfulness of the road sign pictures. I think that my 
opinion is confirmed by work with a profoundly deaf girl, with 
whom I used play therapy (U rban 1990). Although this kind of 
therapy brought about a dramatic change in her behaviour, it was 
limited in promoting her capacity for symbolic thought. 
By persisting with my interpretations in my work with Ricky, I 
felt that I was able to offer him 'the mind of the analyst . .. [as] the 
breast, pro viding food for thought that is part of the experience of 
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the analytic upbringing of our patients' (Astor 1989, p . r 17). In 
response, by the end of three years of treatment, Ricky showed 
signs of acknowledging and enjoying the symbolic aspect both of his 
analyst's mind and of his own . 
SUMMARY 
In this paper, I have tried to re-examine my understanding of early 
psychic processes and contents. This has involved comparing and 
contrasting the ideas of Jung, Klein, Isaacs, and Fordham, with an 
emphasis on the contributions of Fordham . Fordham's postulate of a 
primary self that deintegrates and reintegrates is a model of the mind 
that combines structure and dynamics, and which, moreover, helps 
to describe what is observed in infant obse rvations and infant 
research. Infant observation has been used to illustrate these concepts, 
and clinical material used to show how the same concepts can be 
used to describe impairments to psychic developm ent. 
To pursue this study I have had to construct for myself models 
that describe and explain. I am aware that they are just as inaccu rate 
as they might be accurate, because they imply that there is an answer 
to the questions I am asking, and that there is a way of describing 
and explaining what ' the answer' is. 'Nature is always too strong for 
principle', wrote Hume (Hume 1751, p. 121), and chis is particularl y 
true of the ultimately unknowable self. 
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Infant observation, experimental 
infant research and psychodynamic 
theory regarding lack of self/ other 
differentiation 
Elizabeth Urban 
Abstract 
In this paper I draw upon infant observation. experimen tal infant research and psy-
chodynnmic theory to explore the early development of internal o~jects in which 
there is no differ entia tion between self and object. J have used an infant observation 
to experiment with the idt:a that. early on, idcntilil:atory processt:s predominate over 
projt:cti\·C mechanisms. From developmenralist understanding or early perception. l 
have suggested that amodal perception may create a different kind of object than 
ft:atural perception. With amodally shaped objects •representations the difference 
between self and other is irrelevant . and with foature-based objects /re presentations 
what counts is the difference. 
Introduction 
In this paper I nm examining psychodynamic theory that attempts to explain early 
states marked by lack of differentiation between self and other. Concepts in psychoa-
nalys is and analytical psychology that relate to these states include projective identifi -
cation (Klein. 1946 ; Bion, J 962), primary identification (Sand ler, 1993), and primi-
tive identit y (.lung, 1923: Fordham. 1976). All are considered to operate from very 
early in life. and n:fer to the lack of perct:ived differentiation betw.:o::n subject and 
object. Analysts agn;c that lho::se processes, however they are conceptualised , persist 
inro later life and are manifested in psychopathologies of varying severity. such as 
autism and borderline states . 
'Fusio n' and 'merge r' refer to these states. howeve r it is unclear whether these terms 
refor to two people: merged together in a combined mind. or the exper ience of each 
- or one or the otht:r - of being fused with anoth.:r. J n othe r words these terms arc 
ambiguous because each refers both to subject iv~ states and to stTuctures of the mind. 
In an efforr to be clear I shall be dcscribing these states in t.:rms or lac.k of pcrccived 
differentiation, and exploring how internal objects (structures) develop in one mind 
r~ Tnvishick Clinic F,iundation ISSN 1.3698036 
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in interact ion with an other, and trying to imagine how om: (subjectively) experi-
ences early objects in one's own mind. I shall be drawing upon what developmentalists 
have discovered about ear ly infant perception and using this in a 'devclopmenta list 
informed' psychoanalytic infant observation . Fo llowi ng this I examine various theo -
retical perspectives about early states of lack of subject! object differ ent iation , and 
last ly commen t on the thoughts that have struck me from this study. 
My work in this area makes me one of several, perhaps now many, analytica lly trai ned 
child therapists from different theoretical backgrounds who are attempting to assess 
and integrate various aspects of experimental infant researc h with analytic und er-
sta nd ing of ear ly processes and devel opment (Alvarez, I 992 ; Dubinsky , 1997; Reid, 
I 997; Rhode, 1992; Urban, 1998; Urwin, 1987 to name a few in Britain alone). Al-
th ough the work of deve lopmental ists can be difficu lt to assimilate wit h psychoana-
lytic models , their contributions are not antit hetical to ana lytic thought and can add 
to its substant iality . 
Infant experimental research 
Deve lopme ntalists point out that in the first year there are two kinds of perception: 
amodaJ perception and feature-based perception. Feature-based perception is more 
developed than amodal perception, and is the way we are ordinar ily incl ined to thin k 
of percept ion - through one or anoth er specific sense mode . Amoda l perception 
means not be longing to one sense mode or another; amodal pe rception is not of 
s ights and sounds and touches, but of certain abstract properties. Newborns and 
young infants (and, Bower ( 1982) think s, foetuses) perceive shape (cont our). 
intens ities (both absol ute intensity and the contour of intensity) and temporal pat · 
te rns (tempora l beat, rhythm , duration) . In ot her words young infants perceive the 
'tha tness' and 'thereness' of something, its 'aliveness' and certa in qua lities of its ani-
mati on (rhythm and intensity) . 
A-moda l perceptio n in newborns make s sense if one conside rs that the infant is re· 
quired to relate to life, which is char acter ised by abstract prope1ties. Stewart (1998), 
a mathematician, points out : 
Life is not a thing [thnt is, the specific molecular structure of DNA ]: it is some kind of 
ai>structpropcrtyofa system, characterised by such features as adaptability , flexibility . 
reproduction , se lf-complica tion, self -orga niz ation ... ' (my italics) 
Human life is not only an expression of these properties. Infant min ds with imma· 
tu re se nse modes (es pecially s ight) could not com prehend and recogn ise life-sus-
ta ining life for ms in the ex ternal world if they did not have an inherent grasp of the 
abstrac t properties that identify a liveness. This comprehension appear s to be innate 
and is ev ident in the ncw born's grasp of abstract principles inherent in life · shape , 
unity. rhytlun s and intensities. 
These abstract qualities also app ly to qua lities of emotio n; emotions have shape (the 
softness of tenderness, the sharpness of anger) , intensity, and temporal patterns (du · 
ration, the slowness of ca lm and the quic kness of exci tement). Becau se the se abs tract 
properties do not bel ong to one sense mode or another (they are a-moda l) they can 
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- and do - automatica lly translate from one mode to another. The translati on across 
sense modes is known as "transrn odal''. Meltzoff and Bo1ton ( 1979) give an example 
of this. They studied three-week o ld infants , who were blindfolded and offe red two 
different teats to suck, one sph erical and the other with nobbly protrusion s. When 
the infants had had time to get used to the teats in their mouths, they began to show 
by incre ased suck ing that they preferred one teat ove r the othe r. The blin dfo lds we re 
then removed, ,md the babies shown both teats they had prev iously exper ienced only 
through suc king. They cons istent ly looked more at the teat they had preferred when 
sucking. indicatin g that th~y recognise d by sight someth ing they had previously only 
touc hed. 
To relate this to the deve lopmen t of internal objec ts, l am turnin g to one of the 
developmentalists' great mysterie s; newborn face imitation. How can an infant only a 
few hours old imit ate another's face , despite having never see n another face nor his 
own? Bowe r ( 1989) under stand s this as an expression ofamoda l percept ion. li e ex-
plain s th at the foet us bui lds up a primit ive map of its body v ia touching its face with 
its hm1ds and moving its face. mouth and tongue, which we know foet uses do 
(Pionte lli. 1992) . AJ"tcr birth, when the infant looks at his mothe r's face, say, stickin g 
out her tongue. the infant will respond in kind because the seen face is percei ved to be 
the sam e as U1e touched and visce rall y fel t tface - a transmodal perception in which 
there is no distinct ion between one sense and another. 
However the experience is not on ly tnmsmoda l. it is also lransp ersona lbecuu!,·e there 
is a yok ing of two people into one perception . As the focus. so to speak, of the percep-
tion is on an ab stract qual ity - shape - the perception is one in which the distinct ion 
between se lf and other is not relevant . That distinction is based more on lasting fea-
tures (such as specific fac ial or vocal featu res) tha t dist inguish self and others, and 
foarural diff ere nces are not dist inguished and intern alised until months later . 
T he perception of emotion wou ld also be transmodal and transpersonal. An infant 
directly perce ives, say, the mother's feeling of lov ingness and goodness when she 
talks to him , and apprehends the perceived goodness in her vo ic~ to be the sam e as 
his own experience of goodness. What is relevant to the infam is what the 
deve loprnentali sts ca ll the ca tego rical affec t (in this instanc e. the qua lity of goo dn ess') 
,md its contour and intensity . It is irrelevant to the baby that two peop le are 
experiencing it . Thi s docs not represe nt a confus ion betw ee n se lf and other. nor is it 
the result of projective processe s; it is simply the way young infant s perceive 
ex peri ence. 
The infant can prod uce an 'im itation' for a short time after the other' s face has gone 
(Gerge ly. 1992) , and this suggests short term memory and that the perce ption has 
been represented. Howe ver more is need ed to understand how the repre sentation 
becomes a durable menta l conte nt. This appear s to be done via the infant's capacity 
to identi fy the invar iants of experience, which amo unts to an ultr a-sop histicated 
computer 'search and find '. Stern ( 1985) deta ils how the mother off ers her infant 
comple x behaviour marke d by theme and vari ation . From behaviours that are both 
fan1iliar (the theme ) and interes tingly novel (the var iation), the infant performs an 
auto matic search and find, and seeks out those parts that are j ust the same as similar 
past exper iences which always go along with that part icular kind of experie nce. For 
insta nce. thumb- suck ing is always acco mpanied by a numb er of'i nv ariants': volition 
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('I want to suck my thumb'). motor activity (thumb raised to mouth ), proprioceptive 
feedback (hits target and lodges inside) and predictable consequences (sensations 
in both the thumb and mouth). When the infant sticks his thumb into another's 
mouth. he may not be able to get it inside (the consequences are not predictable) , 
and, if he does. he will not have sensations in his own mouth. 
Thus the baby groups together like - experiences that relate just to himself , and groups 
of experiences that relate just to his interchanges with others. However. unlike the 
word processor , the baby stores these collections of like experiences - and their emo-
tional qualities - as representations , and so, according to Stern. comes to have core 
representations of himself and of others. This appears to be how the baby develops a 
containing skin . as Bick ( 1968) described . although in her account lhc infant de-
pends passively and more or less exclusively on the mother's capacity for contain-
ment , which the infant then internalises . Accord ing to Stern's description. the infant 
has his own means and is quite active in forming his sense of his own skin. although 
it is of course formed within the relationship with his carer. 
Stern describes how like - experiences are grouped together internally via the in-
fant's capacity to identify the invariants of experience . Gergely ( 1992) adds that af-
fect can serve as an invariant, thal is. affects , like feelings of goodness or badness. can 
be the constant that link similar experiences together which are then formed into 
representations. The result might be seen as the structurin g of good and bad inter-
nal objects . 
In contrast to amodal perception , featural percept ion is of constant, lasting features . 
say the features of the mother 's face, which are experienced through differentiated 
sense modes. The change from arnodal to featural perception (and representation) 
does not occur until about five months . Bower ( 1982) found that infants under five 
months were not bothered when presented with multiple images of their mothers , 
and they interacted with each in tum : that is, the difference between different selves 
was not relevant. This contrasted sharply with infants over five months, who were 
distressed when shown simultaneously several representat ions of their mothers . 
The deve lopment from amodal representations to featural representati ons demon -
strates another astonishing capacity of the infnnt. The invariable features of. say. ex-
changes wilh a smiling mother , arc gradually worked out through repea ted experi -
ence and become generalised into a prototype that is not identical to any parti cular 
experience . For instance the baby generalises a representation of his mother's smil-
ing face made up of an average of all her different smiles . This prototype (of moth-
er's smiling face) is then used as a model against whic h other prototypes (the moth-
er's laughing , uninterested , troubled , worried faces) can be compared to establish 
invariable features, and so on until a stable representation (of her face) is estab-
lished . This example is of the organisation of visual percep tions , but prototypes would 
also be created around other sense modes as these gradually become differen tiated 
(for instance, mother's loving, tired. and angry voice) . 
If one adds the emotional colourings of these different prototypes , say the infant's 
love of the mother 's warm, smiling face and the anger al the cross, disappro ving face, 
then what is being brought together in rhe development of leatura l perception are 
not only 'pictures' bu! feelings. The result seems to be a descripti on of the develop-
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men t of the dep ressive positio n. Interest ingly , Klein ( J 935) dated the onset of the 
depress ive posit ion at midway in the first yea r, which is when Bower (1982) notes the 
cha nge from amoda l to featural perception . 
To summ ar ise. perceptua l devel opment in the first year shifts from amoda l to fi:atur al 
perception. Am odal percept ion is linked to represe ntatio ns/obje cts in which the 
distinction betwe en se lf and oth er is irreleva nt. In later 'feat ure-based' repr ese nta-
tions the disti nctio n between subj ect and object is of utmost relevance. Alth ough 
featur al perce pti on through sepa rate sense modes comes to predominate the way we 
perceive the world , amoda l perception remai ns. It may be the way prematur e babi es 
and ch ildren with autistic features percei ve, and, paradox ically, the means through 
which we appreciate music and poetry. and the world directly pe rcd ved, unint erpreted 
by separate senses. 
Psychoanalytic infant observation 
I am go ing to trace in detail the interplay of mini -events and feelings betwe en a 
newbo rn and hi s moth er aro und a feed. when their respective fee lings of anx iety 
shift with and agains t love and plea sure. Frames of reference are necessary fur care-
ful observation. and my way o f see ing this infant and his mo ther is in line with psy-
choanalytic think ers who feel that the ve ry you ng infant docs not have the mat urity 
for proj ec tive identificati on (Bick, 1968; Fordham . in Astor , 1995). and that 
identificatory processes are developme ntally more fundamental than proj ect ive 
mec hanisms (Fordham, in Astor. 1995: San dler. 1993) . I sha ll be looki ng more closely 
at the theoret ica l framewor k in the next sect ion of this pap er, while here my task is to 
describe how an infant. by mean s of ident ificato ry processes, develops internal ob-
jects or represe ntatio ns in which there is no distincti on betwe en se lfa .nd other . 
The baby. whom I shall call Nathan, was a wanted baby and seco nd so n. He is two 
weeks and two days o ld at the time of the observati on. When the obse rver arr ives. she 
i~ met by the mother and Nathan 's fourt een-mont h-old brother. To ge ther they take 
the observer to meet Natha n, who is lying in his bass inet alone in the parents' bed-
roo m. 
He was lying on his right side with his right arm tucked under his body and his left ann 
bent up so that his hand was ne.ar his face. His head with its soft covering of j et black 
hair was touching the top of the bassinet and the mother said he had wriggled his way' 
right up to the top. His eyes were open and he was moving his whole body slightly :is if 
a little restless. His mother said he was probably hung1y as it was nearing feeding time. 
He then suddenly quietened and for several minutes lay absolutely still with his black 
eyes staring at the side o f the bassinet. 
Nathan has been on his own in the bass inet, appare ntly mak ing it famili ar by moving 
up to the top so that his head was in contact with a surfac e. the way it was for him in 
utero. He becom es rest less as. presumably. feeli ngs of hunger ~tart. He then settles. 
but I thin k it is un clear whether his sudden quieting and abso lute ~'!illness are due to 
heari ng his mother's voice. or 'playing poss um' l'he way Broucek ( 1979) describes in 
small babies, because he has heard the strange voice of the obse rver. 
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His mother said the birth had been very easy. [She details the events surrounding the 
birth.] She said she just couldn't believe it was over so fast, particularly after her bad 
experience of g iving birth to Nathan's brother. Nathan weighed 61bs 2 oz and after the 
birth he was put to her breast and sucked vigorously. Since then he has fed hungrily and 
the feeding has gone very well. The day following the birth there had been some 
incident 
with the baby gaspi ng and the mother had been very anxious and called the nurse, but 
the nurse told her that the baby had something that was quite normal for new babies. 
Wh en Natha ns brot her was born, the mot her had! bee n in labour for three days, and 
this difficult experience shaped her expectations of Nat han's arr iva l. As Nathan's 
birth turned out to be just what she wanted, her love and grat itude toward him are 
evi dent, altho ugh her worry is also noticeable (the gas ping incide nt). 
The mother picks up Nathan and they all go into the sitting room. The brother 
becomes demand ing, and the mot her hands the baby to 1he observer while she g<Jes 
to make coffee. taking the brother with her. 
Natha n lay in my arms looking intently at my face. often opening his mouth and mak-
ing sucking noises. l talked to him and he responded by fixedly looki ng at my face. 
Severa l times he looked as though he was trying to smile and finally he gave a slight 
smi le in response to my talking. Then he looked away as if explo ring the room and, 
when I spoke he turned his head back to me looking in the vicinity ofmy face but not 
able immediately to focus direct ly. 
Nat hau 's vision at 16 days is still immature. Presuming that he fo llows the norm, he 
can foc us on obj ec ts at ten to twelve inches but not over distances greater tha n that. 
That is, whe n the observer interprets that he is 'exploring - the room', this is unlikely. 
What Nathan sees wo uld be contrasts (such as the hairl ine between dark and light) 
and pat tems and sha pes. The obse rver interprets Nathan 's smile to be in response to 
her talk ing, whic h wou ld enhance her good feel ings toward him. It is hard not to 
imag ine that she is smili ng as she talks to him , and l suspect that his effort at a smi le 
is a tTa.nsmoda l pe rce ptio n like that descri bed by Bower, ( 1989) in which the seen 
face (held in short tern, memory) is experienced as a viscerally felt face. which regis-
ters in his own facia l muscu lature. G iven his foca l limits, when Nathan turns away 
from the observe r's face as if exploring the room , he is, more like ly, taking in his 
a.moda l perceptions of the shape and contour of her face , and organising them ac-
cordi ng to the variants and invariants of his expe rience of faces. The fact that he does 
not read ily re -engage w ith the obse rver's face is because its pattern does no t matc h 
that of the mothe r's face whic h has been registe red ins ide him. 
The mo ther ret urn s with the co ffee but the n Ihe brot her becomes so w1ruly tha t she 
leaves to put h im dow n for a nap. The observer continues to hold Nathan unt il the 
mo t her co mes bac k. 
T he mother talked to Nathan gently and lovingly. smiling a great dea l at him and saying 
she j ust couldn't believe he was really here . The n she took the baby and put him to her 
righ t breast to feed. lt took a few attempts for Nathan to get the nipple proper ly in his 
mou th. but he then sucked loudly and greed ily and hiccoug hed. The mothe r said he 
oflen hiccoughs because he drinks so quickly and she laughed and said what a greedy 
lit tle thing he was. Nathan has put on wcighr.. and is now 7 lbs. She commen ted she is 
los ing weight but tl1at is usual when one breast feeds. She fed him for five minutes. 
Nathan sucked vigorously , occasionally stopping for a rest . At first his eyes were wide 
open looking into his mother's face but after a couple of minutes they shut while he 
continued to suck. 
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In the first part of the feed I think Nathan is responding as much to anxiety as he is to 
hunger. At the beginning he seems un-together and uncoordinated, as indicated by 
the hiccoughs. Although the hiccoughs are interprered by the mother and the ob-
server as his being 'greedy'. there is little indication that Nathan is very hungry. It 
makes more sense to me to think of his hiccoughing and sucking as urgent because 
of being held by the observer, a stnmger. 
Nathan then gradually setlles. Although this can be seen as his taking in what his 
mother has mentally digested (Bien, 1962), l do not think this hypothesis is neces-
sary, nor docs it tak:c into account other important factors. Here l have in mind the 
oral anatomy of newborns. The moist surface of the lips is considerab ly more spo ngy 
than it will be in just a few months, indicating its vascularity and. hence. sensitivity to 
touch. Also . in most newborns there is a narrow fold of erectile tissue along the out -
side base of the gum. called the Magi tot membrane. It swells during suck ing and is 
thought to be an organ of sensation and, presumably, plea sure. Th is disappears by 
seven months (Middlemore, 1941). 
As Nathan settles into the pleasure of feeding from his familiar mother: he takes little 
rests. Brazelton and Cramer ('I 991) notes that infants feed in short bursts of suck ing, 
five to twenty-five sucks to a burst, and then a pause. These rests occur more fre-
quentl y with breast than with botlle fed babies. They suggest that pauses serve a so-
cial purpose by eliciting t'he mother's response to return to feeding, and. in turn, the 
baby comes to expect thi s. I would add that pausing not on ly allows space for the 
mother to react but also would give the infant space to integrate his perceptions and 
feelings. Hence the goodness of the exper ience is integrated in regular little intakes 
between bursts of suck ing. 
In this part of the feed I think what is being integrated are multiple perceptions and 
fee lings into an ear ly mental content , or object. At first Nathan feeds while looking at 
his mothe r's face , and when he recognises its familiar shapes and pattern s, his anxi-
ety abo ut being held by a stranger abates. Then his eyes close. giv ing the impression 
that Nathan is giving himse lf more fully to the .::xpcrience, and experienc ing whole-
ness. The sense of wholeness would include the pleasurable sensations in his mouth 
and the so und of hi s mother's familiar , loving voice. Given the nature of young infant 
perception. T picture that the regularity of the rhythm of his suck ing and the reg ular-
ity of her familiar facial shapes and voice patterns . settle with the good ness of the 
expe rience to registe r as an amodal perception, or early good object, in which the 
distin ct ion between self and oth er is irrelevant. 
While Nathan seems to be putting together a good objec t, his mother seems to be in 
a different state of mind. 
The mother explained that she had learned a new way of getting the baby to release his 
hold on the nipple. She had been told to press his chin and that the pressure would 
stop the sucking action. She said !hat before she had just tried to pull her breast away 
but that that had been very painful because Nathan would continue sucking and !his 
method seemed much better. She demonstrated and the baby released his grip easily. 
She then sat him up holding him under his chin. His head flopped to one side and his 
eyes closed. I-le suddenly brought up some milk and then yawned widely. The mother 
talked about a yellow spot she could see at th<: back of his mouth and wondered about 
the possibility of thrush, but dismissed the idea as unlikely. She then lay him t)n his side 
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on her lap. while she got rea dy to feed him from the other breast. Nathan usually feeds 
every thre e to four hou rs. She said she finds the 7pm feed difficult because Nathan 
doe sn't seem to get enough and she feels as though her breast is empt y. 
When Nathan settle s into his feed his mother interrup ts it. This ma y in part have 
been done for the sake of demonstrating her pare nting to the observer , but I feel it is 
more fimdamenta lly due to her anxiety about the pain that can accompany close -
ness. She also repositi ons him, whereupon he possets some milk . This affects her and 
seems to make her anxious about him (her referen ce to the spot in his throat) . His 
being emptied of som e of her milk resonates, in what follows, with her own feelings 
of being emptied of milk (that is, seeing Nathan emptied of milk is the same as fee l-
ing emptied of milk) . 
She put him to her left breast and he sucked vigo rously with lots of littl e g runts and 
noises, look ing intently upwards . I thought he was trying to see his mother's face , but 
s he sa id he was looking at her red j um per. H e then fell asleep and stopped sucking. Th e 
m oth er went to remove her breast an d Na than immediately started sucking again . Af-
ter a coupl e more minutes the mother removed her breast w ithou t any resistance from 
Nathan, who was now fast asleep . She held him for some time in a sea ted pos ition, with 
the baby slig htly leaning forward and his mother supp on ing hi s neck. He burpe d loudl y 
wit hout opening his eye s. Then she lay him back in her arms and he looked very se rious 
holding his hand close to his mout h. His mouth gradua lly fell ope,1 and she pressed his 
lips together telli ng him 10 breathe through his nose else he'd take in too much ai r. She 
said she likes to ho ld him after a feed but she can 't if his brothe r is around because the 
brother does n't like it. 
Co nseq uent to the interr uption Nathan has a renewed sense of anxiety , the intensity 
of whi ch proba bly accords with the red ness of the jumper. Once again. he settle s and 
seems to restore the goodness of the experie nce, with ev idence of some anxiety as he 
seems to need to cling onto the nippl e to help him se lf hold 011 to these sensations 
when h is moth er tries to remove the breast. He is apparentl y as leep when he does thi s, and 
this raises th e quest ion of conscious ness in babies. Fordham (1987) bel ieves 
that it is not helpful to app ly the concepts of conscious and unconscious to small 
infant s, and his view is useful here . Stil l sleeping, Nathan is able to give up the breast 
a few moments later and sink into a sleep in whic h, presumab ly, he is taking in th e 
experience and integra tin g it. During this integra tion, he seems to attemp t to hold 
0 11 to the good fee lings in his mouth with his hand , wh ich neurologically is closely 
connected to his mouth (Trevatthen , 1989). He gradually relax es into deep sleep . 
The moth er enjoys the intima cy, possibly helped by projecting her impulse to rup-
tur e the closeness on to Nathan's brother (who mu st be absent if she is to enjoy this 
intima cy wit h Nathan). However her feelin gs of closeness g ive way to deciding she 
must change Nathan, althoug h it is not clear from the observation whether Na than 
needs it . She lays Nathan down and goes off to ge t a fresh nappy. 
She retun1cd and showe d me a mild rash on his bottom say ing it would be much ,...,·orse 
if he wasn' t being breast fed. She commemed that his scrotum was big because his 
testicles were filled with fluid but that the nurse said there wasn ' t any thi ng to worry 
about . She show ed me his long back and how long his legs were , co mmentin g, 'He's 
goi ng 10 be ta ll lik e me'. She sa id he loves his bath which he has ev ery secon d day in the 
eveni ng and that in a yea r's time he and his brother will be able to enjo y it tog eth er. She 
look ed at Na than in wonder , comme nting ' on his hean bea t and gently to uchi ng his 
fin gers sa ying how little they were and how perfect he was . She said th at her hu sband is 
sti l I rather scared to hold him because he feels he is very fragile 
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The changing seems to help the mother restore confidence in the goodness of what 
she has to offer, and she expresses her belief that her milk mitigates Nathan's discorn-
lorr. Her feelings or closeness come up against her anxiety about the difference be-
tween them - he is male (has testicles) and she is female - but the anxiet y soon sub-
sides aud she expresses a felt identity with him: they both have the same long back 
and leg s. The goodness of the exper ience begins to include her love of her other son. 
,md the pleasure they will all have when the boys can share bathing . This intensifies 
into a loving wondennent ofNat han's perfection, while her an:-.iety about Nathan's 
vulnerability mid dependency is projected on to her husband . 
Theories of early object development: psychoanalysis and 
analytical psychology 
I shall begin this section with psychoanalytic theories of early object developme nt 
that refor to lack of differentiation between self and other . and shall briefly review 
the theories of Klein. Bick, 13ion and Sandler 
For Klein ( I 958) , the infant at binh ha~ a primitive means of distinguishing self from 
other, and it is this premise that underlies hi::r belief that the infant is object related 
from the beginning ofli!e. Accord ing lo Klein , infant feeding is the prototype for the 
first dynamic introjcction, by which the infant takes in experiences that the infant 
innately recognise s as good or bad. Good objects which are formed from good expe-
riences and accompanying phanrnsies about them, come to support the fragile ego 
in getting rid of bad objec ts . Bad objects are derived from 'bad' experiences and the 
phantas ies of armihilation that are part of the death instinct which accompany the 
expe rienc e. Getting rid of bad objects is done via a fonn of projecti on by which parts 
of the self as well as the bad object arc eliminated into an objec t. Because parts of the 
self are involved in this process. the result is a projective identification . Another way 
of putting this is that the infant manages the early death instinct by identifying the 
unwanted pait of himself with an object via projection . The resulting subjective expe-
rience of projective identification is that the object is not 'felt to be a separate indi-
vidual but an aspect of the self (Klein, 1963). 
Bick ( 1964 : 1968), observed infants repeatedly falling into states of disintegration 
mid fears of ru111ihilatirm and then recovering coherence through the ministrations 
of the mother. She questioned whether the young infant's fragile ego could init ially 
recognise self from other , or be able to internalise or externali se good or bad experi-
ences. Bick concluded that the first object was necessari ly a containing object, pas-
sive ly introjected from the prototype experience of the nipple filling into the mouth 
during feeds with the mother. 
Bick had taken her ideas about containment from Bion, who extended Klein 's con-
cept of proj ect ive identificatio n by understanding it to he an 'inlerpene trating con-
tact' (Hinshelwood. 1989), that is, of one thing insidi:: another in such a way that the 
former is contained by the latter. Bion (1962) considered that projective identifica-
tion operated from binh and initia lly was a primitive means of comm unicating. As 
commwlication, projective identification was 'normal', although later it could be 
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used in the defensive and pathological way described by Klein. Bick disagreed with 
the notion that projective identification was a very early dynamic on the basis that the 
infant needed a firm boundaiy between self and other for this to happen , and this 
occurred only after the internalisation ofa containing objec t. which develops into 
the experience of having a containing skin (Hinshelwood, 1989). 
There are s ignrncant differences between Kleinian and non-Kleinian understanding 
of ear ly objects and processes. For Kleinians the term 'object' refers to subjective 
experiences, such as pain or pleasure, whereas for non-Kleinian ego-oriented psy -
choanalysts, objects are unexperienceable structures. For exam ple Sandler, a Freud -
ian, secs the earliest objects in terms of representations of self and other. 
Sandler bases his thinking on Freud's concept of identification. Freud thought that 
'identification is the original fom1 ofan emotional tie' ( 1921), and be lieved it lo be 
'a direct and immediate identification [that] takes place earlier than any object-cathe-
xis' ( 1923). For Sandler the phenomena persists throughout life, so he terms it 're-
current primary identificatio n' (1993). He first discovered the idea from his own 
experience: 'l was walking along a crowded street in London, along the edge of the 
pavement, when suddenly a man who was walking a yard or nvo in front ofme slipped 
off the edge of the pavement. f immediately righted myse lf,just as ifl were about to 
stumble into the street. In thinking about this expe rienc e l became aware of how, 
when we are not on our guard, we mirror the movements we perceive in others ... ' 
(fbid. , p. I IO I). 
Here Sand ler is describing a primary form of identification which is passive, auto -
maJic and renexive, and is associated ¥tith perception. It includes communication 
through a kind of resonance. including emotional resonances. which is understood 
to include sympathy ofa 'kind that binds animal societies together' ([bid.). Besides 
empathy, the concept also accounts for aesthetics and some states of oneness . For 
Sandler. primary identification is an ongoing fundamental state closely linked to per-
ception, and one in which representations of self and other, although established , 
become lost until one actively disidentifies with the other . For instm1ce when one 
listens receptively to another, one momentarily experiences the thought as one's 
own until quickly disclaiming this, thus moving from thinking with, to thinking about. 
For Sandle r, states or fusion can be understood to come about th rough primary iden -
tification or projective identification. Sandler distinguishes between the two. and 
defines the latter according to Klein's original desc ription ( 1946), of which a signifi -
cant eleme nt is the intention on the part of the subject to thrust an unwanted con-
tent into the object. Primary identification is. he stresses , a 'basic and automatic mir-
ror ing process' (Sandler. 1993). 
l shall now turn to theory in analytical psychology which relates to the earliest objects 
and their development. Whereas Freud believed that the personality was comprised 
of the gradual assimilation of identifi cations. Jung believed that the individual per-
sonality, the selt: was a given to be discovered in the course of life, and identifications 
with others compromised the true self. Paradoxically - or contradic torily - Jung con-
sidered that the cl1ild's personality emerged. or rather e-merged , from an uncon -
scious, fused stage of oneness with the mother's unconscious, during an initial stage 
of identity, which lasted for the first four to five years. Unli ke his theory of adult 
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personalit) . .lung's thcnr) ufearly devdnpmem was not well researched, and the Jung-
ian sLUdy of infancy and childhood Cell IL' M ichacl Fordham. 
Fordham's work wirh childrnn led him to conclude rhat, from co ncepti on. the child 
was an individual apart from hisfher parents. Fordham postulated a primary, psycho-
somati.: inkgrme. which he termed the primary sdf. !'he concept of the pr imary self 
assumes an initial organi..: wholeness tinLegrme) 1\hich then unfolds. unpacks 
(de int egra tcs) in order to r.:latc to the env ironment. What is cxpcrienccd is then 
assimilated into the personality in a proccss called reintegration . Deintegration anu 
reintegration are biologically (or archctypally) dctc:rmined (ear ly deintegrntion is 
very s imila :I' to Bion's ( 1962) inn3t c preconcep tion, and arc a means of relating be-
fore structures are built up and before objects have become internalised as well as 
after. These dynamics underlie projection and introjection but difn.:r from them in 
an important way, because projection and introjection require a content and a sepa-
rate object into which to project and from which to take in l Urban, 1992). 
For example. in my Jungian frame or re ler,:nce, th,: unity or infant amodal percep-
tion is an l.'\'.pression or the 11·holcncss of'thc primar~ self'. Wher,:as Mctria Rhode 
understands amoual p.:rception lrom a Klcinian framework and J,,oks to how th,: 
infant Jinks together the different senses I Rhode , 1997). I sec it as s1,mething th at is 
initially integrated. hut which through experience becomes de-integrated and sepa-
rated into differentiated sense modes. 
Although Fordham considered that projective and introjcctivc identificat ions could 
result in lack o!' diffcrentiation between sdf and object. he concluded that 'Al firs t an 
infant ha s not enough strucnire for projective identification to occur without an ear -
lier period in whi..:h identity bet ween subject and object predominates. ou t of that 
state enough struetmcs form to make thc theory of project ive iden tification useful' 
(Astor. 1995) . The earlier period to which he refers is on.: when prima1') identit}· 
predominates. However Fordham is car,:ful to say that primary identity refers W 
temporary and fluctuating ~rates. and is not a stage <)fdevelopment. as. lung saw it. 
During this initial period the inr::inr. via dcintcgrative a.nd reintcg.rativc processes. 
creates states of idc:ntity with th,;: mo1her. Out of these states the: first objects an: 
produced . which Fordham termed self objects. as they are shaped largely by the 
primar~ · selrtand the :irchctypal patterning that g.oes with itJ, in contrast to reality. 
·1 hese are understN>d to refer to objects in which there is littk difference between se lf 
and object . 
fordham said litth: more than Jung about the dynamic l'r prinrnry identity. except 
that ii docs tll)l involve projection (a5 .lung implied). and that it wa~ 'a state ,~here 
Cl'll~ciousness (and uncl,nsciousncss) an: not rclcviin1' tFordham. 1995). 
Comments 
I. Theoretical considerations 
/\s an a nalytical psychologist I tend to use a Jungian conceptualisation ,)fthe develop -
ment of early objects which are marked by the lad. of diffcrentiatil,n between self 
and other. fhat is. I am addressing thi, devclopmc-ll! by attempting to describe Lhe 
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dynamic of primar y identit y. From this study I understan d states of primar y identity 
arc a kind of sum of complicated interactions between an infant and his mother , 
interact ions which are a ser ies of mutually regulated. purpo sefu l 'reachings out' to 
eac h other that arc attempt s by each Lo match up feeling slates in suc h a way tha1 
eac h enjoys and is rulfilled from what is 'mat ched up'. The matching up involves 
'work', and a certain amount of hit and mi ss. For instance , at the beginning of the 
fee d Nathan's efforts are first affected by his own anxiety about being held by the 
observer , and then they come up against his mother's anxiet ies which interrupt the 
feed. For the mother's part , she is working through her worr ies about closeness and 
whether she can be a good mother to him . Dy the end of the observation , each see ms 
to have 'matched up' to the good fee lings inextricabl y assoc iate d with the other. with 
the ove rall effect that they have shar ed the goo dness of the feed. 
The ove rall effec t see ms to be compri sed of' rnini-mat chings up' bct\ vecn mother 
and bab y. My picture is that the matching s mig ht include a psyc hoso matic elem ent. 
matching not on ly feeling , but also somati c states , such as happens later in life in the 
matching up of body postures , or of rates of heartbeat afte r sexual intimacy. These 
mini-matchings are simi lar to Sand ler's idea of primar y identification s in that they 
are basic, automatic , related to percepti on and refer to emotiona l resonance s, but 
they are diff erent in that they do not occur passively nor are the y sustai ned, except 
that they cont ribute to the overall se nse of being together with someo ne in a parti cu-
lar way. This overa ll sense, which is the resu lt of all the 'mini-matchings up'. is n state 
of pr imar y identity in a Jung ian framework. that is. a feeling of being together in a 
shar ed expe rience. This sta te arises out of speci fic, but frequentl y occu rring , ep i-
sodes. By drawing upon his capac ity to organi se the invariants of the good aspects of 
this comple x feeding experien ce. such as the one desc ribed here, the infant can bind 
them toget her internally into an earl y good obj ect . Beca use these expe riences arc 
amoda lly per ceived, they reg ister interna lly as objects in which the distinction be-
tween se lf ,md other are not relevant , and are (probab ly) expe rienced subjective ly as 
being tog ether in a fuse d and loving togetherness. the consc ious ness of which is not 
relevant. Thus a state of primar y identity becomes an internal o~jeet in which there is 
a lack of differ entiation between self and other. 
Herc I need lo acknowl edge that I have used 'objec t' and 'represen tati on' inter-
changeably . when in fact they have rather different connot ations. Perlow ( 1995) has 
wriltcn a ve ry thoroug h and helpful concept ual analysis o f the psychoana lyt ic con-
cept o f mental object. There he point s out that the Kleinian idea o f the concept is 
irrec oncilab ly diffe rent from that o f ego-orie nted non-Kleinian s. A simi lar concep-
tual analy sis need s to be carried out within the framework of analy tical psychol ogy. 
altho ugh one has been attemp ted by compari ng .Jungian ideas to Perlow 's ana lysis 
(Knox, 1997) . On the whole , I jo in Anne Alvar ez when she ca lls for a modifi ed object 
relations theory that includ es wha t she calls 'pre-objects' (A lvarez, 1992) . 
2. T he deve lopm e nt toward proje ctive processes 
If pr imary identity occu rs prior to projec tive processes, when do project ive proc esses 
begin '? The an swer, I think , would depend in part upon when objects are formed. in 
other words, when there are conte nts to be proj ected. This seems to happ en qui ck ly. 
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and may vary from one infant to another . The following is from the second observa-
tion of Nathan, a week, later (3 weeks). 
While we were talking Nathan gave a big smile as ifin response to the familiar sound of 
his mother's voice even though she was out of his line of vis ion ... I talked to him and 
Nathan looked at me for a long time, at one point giving me a very wide smile. Then his 
eyes dropped and he looked at the side of the bassinet. He seemed restless and a little 
uncomfortable and his body was straining slight ly. Then he made soun ds as ifhe had 
defecated . 
What strikes me in this second obse rvati on is that Nathan's good objects seem more 
consolidated, and he smi les readily and broadly. He studies the observer's face and 
seems to conclude that it is friendly , although perhaps worryingly strange , but he has 
a capacity to manage the anxiety by getting rid of the experience by evacuatio n. That 
is, he now has objects inside and he can project them. 
3. Amodal perception , pathology and technique 
One cannot assume that, theoret ically , early contents and structures follow a uninter-
rupted line of development into more complex objects and structures. The early 
objects formed from a.modal perception may be qualitatively different from later 
objects based on featura l perception. With a.modally formed objects, it is in the na-
ture of the perceptions on which they are based that the distinction between se lf and 
other is irrelevant. With feature-based objects, difference between self and other is 
the hallmark. 
Although part of normal development, amodally shaped objects appear to underlie 
pathological conditions, such as autism. Fordham ( I 976) considered that autism is 
an instance in which the individua l's inner world remains fixed by self objects, which 
are dist inguished by the lack of self -other differentiation. Alvarez ( 1992) appears to 
be considering a similar kind of object, or objects, when she refers to 'pre-objects ' 
that predate objects in which the differentiation is evident. She has altered her tech-
nique with children with auti st ic features in order to help them create an enlivened 
object, and in doing so conveys an appreciation of a.modal perception. 
To explain, I shall turn to an example from my own, much more limited experience 
with children who show autistic behaviour. Tim , aged 7, was being asked questions 
by my psychiatrist colleague about what others might think , in order to assess whether 
he had a theory of mind, as Hobson ( 1993) puts it. Tim couldn't do this, and seemed 
to feel intim idated and angry. He took the toy he was holding and repeatedly thrust 
it towards her face. Without thinking, I matched what I said with the a.modal proper-
ties of his actions. that is, its rhythm, contour and categorical affect {the aggressive 
thrust); 'Tim! doesn't! like-it! when -he! can't! answer! questions!'. When I did he 
looked directly at me with sparkling eyes , turned and did it again to my 'accom pani -
ment' . It is important to add that this kind of response is only one aspect of the 
considerable expertise needed to work with these children. 
4. Experimental research and psychoanalytic infant observation 
I should like to make a plea for the further incorporation of experimental studies 
into the way we observe babies. Although they have difforent aims , both psychoana -
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lytic infant obse rvation and experimental infant research involve observation and 
arc valuab le research tools (Mill er er al, 1989). Experimental research draws upon 
technology that makes possible microanalysis of the observable. However, as Stern 
(1985) points out, what is omitt ed from experim ental studies are inferences about 
what is happening in the baby's internal world and emot ional life . Important sources 
of information in the making of psychoanalytic inferences are the observers' subjec-
tive responses.~ Davison, (1992) remarks. "Such a process would seem to have poor 
claim to be scient ific', bul continues that 'human beings are uniquely programmed 
to be sensitive to socia l cues, and to processes ... which at an unconscious level inform 
the inferences of mothers and observe rs" regarding the emotiona l life of an infant. 
Psychoanalytic observat ion can, I believe. be fairly criticised on the gro unds that it is 
used to con firm exist ing theo ry rather than investigating and questioning it. My ef-
forts here may be seen in that light, although I hope it is also evident that I am 
attempting to exp lore and experiment with theory rather than to prove it, whjch 
psychoanalytic infant observation cannot do. Although infant observation has not 
provided new knowledge in the way that experimenta l researc h has done, Michael 
Rustin (Mill er et al, I 989) ·points out its research value in describing phenomena 
discovered by developmentalists and others using a more empirically based method-
ology. My position is that these methodologies are comp lementary , and both arc 
necessary for understanding infant development. 
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OUT OF THE MOUTHS OF 
BABES 
An enquiry into the sources of 
language development 
ELIZABETH URBAN, London 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper is about the quest for what I call here the mother tongue. 
It is both my quest and that of a language -deprived, IO-year-old deaf 
girl. Both require an investigation into the developmental origins of 
language, and thi s is elucidated by infant observation and research. 
My model of early development is based upon that put forward by 
Michael Fordham, whose postulat e of a primary self derives from 
Jung's concept of the self. 
THE SELF AND THE PRIMARY SELF 
Jung's concept of the self developed out of his idea of the transcendent 
function (Fordham 1985a). In 'The transcendent function', written in 
1916, Jung describes the psychological function which mediates 
between opposites and produces a 'living, third thing' when opposites 
confront one another (Jung 1958, p. 90). Over four decades later, in 
his prefatory note to 'The transcendent function', he recalls the essay 
as being among 'the first attempt s at a synthetic view of the psychic 
process in analytic treatment' (Jung 1958, p. 67). The 'synt hetic view' 
refers to Jung's discovery of the integrating function of the self. The 
'self' in this context is 'the total personality', that is, 'conscious and 
unconscious', mind and body (Jung 1921, p. 460). 
Fordham draws upon this definition of the self when he postu lates 
a primary self. The primary self is a psycho-somatic integrate that 
contains the potential of the organism. From before birth the primar y 
self has the functions of both integrating (Jung's 'synthetic view') 
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and dividing up (Fordham's contribution). Development occurs 
through the dynamic of the dividing up in order to relate to the 
environment, or deintegrating, and the coming together again to 
assimilate experience, or: reintegrating (Fordham r976, r985a). Arche-
typal, that is, instinctively human, processes regulate the patterns of 
deintegration and reintegration . 
Early deintegration and reintegration can be seen in the typical 
and organized way very young babies approach the breast and feed 
(deintegration) and then assimilate the experience in sleep (reinte-
gration). According to Fordham, initially the baby experiences the 
touching, holding, feeding and other components of its relation to 
the mother's breast as a single, 'whole' experience; that is, for the 
infant the breast is the centre of the world. In time, the 'whole' 
experience of the mother and her breast wil l deintegrate into experi -
ences of increasing complexity and differentiation. The mother's face, 
voice and touch, initially perceived as all-in- one, develop into percep-
tions of different and distinct qualities . 
The first distinction the baby makes is between satisfying and 
frustrating experien ces, which the infant self organizes into 'good' 
and 'bad' experiences. Rudimentary awareness accompanies early 
experiences, and over time these 'bits' of consciousness coalesce into 
an ego. When the ego is established, the way is open for individuation 
to occur. Thus, the primary self is the developmental source of the 
self that Jung studied . 
INFANT STUDIES AND THE WORK OF TREVARTHEN 
Fordham first hypothesized a primary self in 1947 (Fordham 1947, 
1957). However imaginary or visionary the postulate is - and it is 
both - Fordham was aware that it 'hung fire' until supported by data 
(Fordham 1985b, p. 3) . He has explained how 'systematic obser-
vations of babies and their mothers in emotional interaction', in the 
natural environment of the baby's home and family, later confirmed 
his ideas (Fordham 1987, p. 356). The infant observation at the end 
of this paper is an example of this kind of confirmation. 
In addition to 'home observations ', 'laboratory observations', such 
as those done by Stem and Trevarthen, confirm and fill in Fordham' s 
intentionally abstract, 'empty' concept (Stem 1985; Trevarthen r974, 
1980, 1987a, 1987b, 1989a, 1989b, 1990; Trevarthen and Marwick 
1986). Trevarthen 's findings are easy to integrate with those of 'home 
observations ' because, first, both acknowledge the primacy of feelings 
over thought processes in early infant development. Trevarthen 
argues against developmental psychologists who, like Piaget, focus 
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on the baby 's cognitive development to what Trevarthen feels is the 
exclusion of the emotional underpinning that motivates later learning. 
He holds that the infant _is innately endowed with personal motives, 
emotions and powers that soon after birth intimately affect his or her 
caretaker , leading to an interpersonal, interactional relationship. 
Infants learn about objects because there is someone specially cared 
for and caring to share them with; children learn how to talk because 
there is someone specially interested and interesting to talk to. 
Second , Trevarthen's studies, too, are longitudinal and describe 
behaviour that is obser ved at home and not just in laboratories (in 
contrast, for example, to experiments which show the infant's prefer-
ence for the smell of the mother's milk by use of milk-soaked pads 
presented to the infant, which would not be observable in the 
ordinary home). 
There are important differences between 'home observations' and 
Trevarthen's. Selecting a particular behaviour for study and exper-
imentation, Trevarthen focuses on very early patterns of communi-
cation between mother and infant, but only while the infant is in an 
alert state. If the baby needs feeding or comforting the observation 
stops. The emotional intensity between the mother and infant is 
therefore moderat e, leading Trevarthen to describe the mother as the 
baby's 'favourite companion' (T revarthen 1987b, p. 365). A 'home 
observation', in which the observer would attempt to minimize his 
or her intervention , would include as much as possible of whatever 
happened during the observation, with the observer particularly 
noting expressions of int ense feeling . Trevarthen's observations are 
made in a laboratory 'studio ' , where what happens is videotaped, 
filmed, and audio-recorded for later fram e-by-frame microanalysis, 
showing details of mother-infant interchanges not available to 'home 
observers'. 
The results of Trevarthen's studies show a patterned development 
of communication over the first year, which can be summarized as 
follows. Although at birth infants can discriminate between people 
and objects and show means of orientating to each in distinctly differ-
ent ways, these capacities are rudimentary and not developed until 
later; weeks later in regard to humans, and months later in regard to 
objects. 
At 6 to 8 weeks the infant has a noticeably impro ved ability to 
focus visually and to exert control over the direction and duration of 
the focus. The focus of the infant's eyes is most drawn to the mother 's 
hands, face, and, especially, eyes. By making , maintaining, or br eak-
ing eye contact, the infant regulates a feelingful connection with the 
mother. An exchange of smiles that serves to match and express 
their respective feelings leads on to 'a dialogic "protoconversation", a 
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cooperative exchange made up of complementary utterances with 
gestures' (Trevarthen 1989b, p. 193). 
The patterns of behaviour of both infant and mother are character-
istic and universal. When engaged with the mother, the infant coos 
and makes elaborate lip and tongue movements that Trevarthen has 
recognized as efforts to articulate speech. Prespeech , as he terms these 
efforts, is accompanied by raising one or both hands and a variety 
of finger movements. The right hand moves more frequentl y than 
the left, indicating activity in the left hemisphere of the brain, which 
is where the language centre of the brain is located (Treva rthen and 
Marwick 1986). 
For her part, the mother synchronizes regular and exaggerated 
head, eyebrow and face movements , accompanied by a particular 
pattern of vocalization that Trevarthen calls 'intuitive motherese'. 'It 
is characterized by short, evenly spaced utterances with gently 
" breathy" voicing and undulating fundamental frequenc y in a moder-
ately high pitch range' (Trevarthen 1989b, p. 198). 
These exchanges can best be described as an intricately arranged 
duet for eyes, face and hands, 'as tightly organized as the performance 
of well-matched and highly practical dancers or musicians' (Trevar-
then 1987a, p . 179). Microanalysis of recordings of protoconversa-
tions reveal astonishing comparisons between infant and adult 
rhythms in expressiveness. For instan ce, mother and infant are drawn 
to join in with one another on a shared 'beat'. When mother and 
baby attempt to synchronize their voca lizations, the duration of the 
pause to 'catc h up ' with the other and establish the 'beat' is the same 
as that 'o f a wide variety of "pre-beat" signals - the article before a 
noun, prefixes, the up-beat of a conductor's baton, etc.' (Trevarthen 
1990, p . 700) . Each infant utterance lasts about the same time that an 
adult takes to say a short sentence, and the rhythm of turn-taking of 
utterances is a slow adagio; one beat every 0.9 seconds or 70 per 
minute (Trevarthen 1990). This is also the average rate of heartbeat. 
In these interchanges it is the baby who takes the lead and the 
mother who follows . If the mother fails to hold her attention on the 
baby's face, the baby will stop the protoconversation, avoid the 
mother's gaze, show signs of distress that arouse the mother's sym-
pathy, or withdraw. 
This changes at 3 months. Conspicuous body growth, rapid 
increase in strength and control of arm, leg and head movements and 
a maturation of binocular vision, all contribute to an increased 
capacit y to locate and manipulate objects. Tre varthen notes that the 
interest in objects competes with the interest in people during this 
period. The baby prefers objects to people, focusing not so much on 
the mother as on the animation she gives a toy. The mother naturally 
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coordinates with the baby by using more vigorous approaches, but 
not only with toys. She also introduces games, such as tickling games, 
along with baby chants, like 'This little piggy went to market', and 
baby songs. The patterns of the mother's songs and chants, like 
'intuitive motherese' , are unconscious and universal (Trevar then 
1990). 
By the tenth month the infant has established distinctly different 
ways of orientating to people and objects; there is 'communication 
with persons and "doing" with objects' (Trevarthen 1974, p. 230). 
Bringing together the distinction made between people and objects, 
the baby begins to regard the mother in a significantly different way. 
There is 'a new form of spontaneous play, one that is more explicitly 
a joint enterprise in the managing of experiences and manipulation 
of objects' (Trevarthen 1980, p. 330). At this point, and not before, 
play becomes a shared activity, and the baby begins to cooperate 
with the mother, anticipating her motivations and learning from her 
the purposes of certain objects, for instance, what to do with a comb. 
'Changes in the infant's cooperation as "receiver" or "listener" lead 
to large transformations in the mother's behaviour as "utterer" . . . . 
She replaces questions and invitations with imperatives and directives' 
(Trevarthen 1990, p. 725). The unconscious and universal reactions of 
the mother give way to patterns of behaviour established by particular 
cultures and social class. 
When people and objects, which have been differentiated, come 
together in cooperative play, the object becomes a potential symbol 
because the meaning of the object can be shared with a person (Trev-
arthen 1980). At the same time, utterances, termed 'protolanguage', 
are used to 'talk about' the objects and events of shared interest with 
another (Trevarthen 1980). 
Trevarthen concludes that 'The evolution of the infant's expressive 
behaviours, coordinating movements of the whole body, but particu-
larly face expressions, visual orientations, head movements, vocaliza -
tions and hand gesticulations, confirms the existence of a central 
patterning of expression' (Trevar then and Marwick 1986, p . 287). 
The 'central patt erning of expression' is, in my opinion, a reference to 
the influence of the primary self, and the 'evolution' which Trevarthen 
describes in remarkable detail is the unfolding of deintegrative and 
reintegrative processes. When Trevarthen defines infant 'motives' as 
'mental structures underlying perception and action', consisting of 
' images' and schema that do not necessarily reflect experience (Trevar-
then 1980, pp. 325--6), he is also defining archetypal struct ures under-
lying deintegration and reintegration. Both Trevarthen and Fordham 
view the way mother and infant interact as well as the overall 
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developmental pattern of their relationship as shaped by archetypal 
( characteristic and universal) processes. 
Incorporating Trevarthen's research with my understanding of 
deintegration and reintegration relating to early communication 
between a mother and her infant, I offer the following summary . 
Initially the infant experiences the breast as a whole, in which the 
qualities of 'good' and 'bad', and animate and inanimate, are com-
bined. First 'good' and 'bad' experiences are deintegrated and reinte-
grated, and then, when the infant is about 6 weeks old, experiences 
of animate persons deintegrate out of the initial experience of whole-
ness and are reintegrated following repeated protoconversations with 
the mother. At 3 months, experiences of inanimate objects are deinte-
grated out and then reintegrated, so that by 9 months the infant 
differentiates between people and things. At around 10-12 months, 
towards the end of the weaning process, the baby is able to combine 
in a new way what is animate with what is inanimate by sharing 
objects with others. When objects have shared meanings, they can 
serve as symbols. This marks a· significant point in the development 
of the mind. Trevarthen notes that Klein dates the depressive position 
at this period, and Fordham has pointed out that the depressive 
position 'constitutes the first step in the lifelong process of individu-
ation' (Trevarthen and Marwick 1986; Fordham 1989, p. 68). 
CLINICAL MATERIAL 
The deaf girl I call Virginia stole various things, such as money from 
her mother and small items of school equipment from her classroom. 
Consequently I saw her weekly over her last four terms at primary 
schoo l, from Easter until July of the following year. In what follows, 
I should like to examine what it was Virginia was trying to steal, 
or, as I was led to conclude, to retrieve. 
By the time she had reached the age of IO, Virginia' s impulsive 
bad temper and stubborn defiance made her a target for criticism 
from her classmates, unfortunately all boys, who made a point of 
excluding her. Her teacher and her parents were concerned about 
both her stealin g and their inability to manage her, as at times she 
became exasperatingly belligerent and obdurate. 
Before either her stealing or her behaviour became matters for 
concern, the school for several years had been worried about her lack 
of language development, which lagged noticeably behind that of her 
classmates. According to her audiogram , she was one of the deafest 
child ren in the school, yet, from the time she had started school, 
there had been an ambiguity about the degree of her deafness. From 
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her voice and lack of response, she seemed to be very deaf, yet - as 
will be seen - there were times when this conclusion seemed question-
able. Although the cause of her profound perceptive (nerve) deafness 
was unknown, she was presumed to have been deaf from birth. 
Virginia was the second of five children, and the only member of 
the family who was deaf. Her parents believed that she should be 
taught lip-reading, because they felt she would be excl uded from the 
usual advantages and opportunities available to those in the hearing 
world if she were taught sign language. Virginia seldom used her 
voice and communicated through gestures, which her mother and 
older brother seemed to understand .. 
She had two younger sisters and a baby brother. She had been 
quite involved with the care of the second sister when a baby, and 
their closeness remained until the sister began talking , whereupon the 
sister preferred to be with others who spoke. When her little brother 
was born, Virginia was also involved with looking after him. There 
were times when he screamed at such a pitch that the mother could 
not stand to be near him, and Virginia would turn off her hearing 
aids, pick him up, and patiently comfort him. 
Virginia started schoo l at the end of her second ye.ar, at the begin-
ning of a period of considerable change in deaf education . Until a 
year before I became the social worker there, the school, then typical 
of schools for the deaf in the UK, taught lip-reading and discouraged 
sign language . This was done with the genu ine convict ion that it was 
damaging to deaf children to isolate them from the world in which 
the majority use spoken communication. The year I began work at 
the school, in 1977, a select number of pupils were being taught sign 
language as well as lip-reading. Originally this was done in an effort 
to reduce the behaviour problems of these children , which to a certain 
degree it succeeded in doing. Six years later, by which time Virginia 
had been taught lip-reading for four years, there was a major shift in 
deaf education, and sign language was taught throughout the school. 
At the time I started to see Virginia, which was only a few months 
after sign language was incorporated into the curriculum. I was 
impressed by the impoverishment of her language. She was like the 
deaf boy of the same age who is described by Oliver Sachs in Seeing 
Voices. 'He perceived that something was "go ing on" between us, 
but he cou ld not comprehend what it was - he had, as yet, almost 
no idea of symbolic communication, of what it was ... to exchange 
meaning' (Sachs 1989, p. 39). 
In regard to our communicating, to begin with, there was as much 
lack of understanding as there was presence of it. Virginia could 
not speak discernibly, save for a very few words, and although she 
was being taught signing, she had, as I have explained, limited 
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understanding of language and what it is about. Added to this, she 
was uncommonly clumsy, and what signs she did use were conveyed 
in a sloppy manner. For instance, rather than point to herself to mean 
'I', she limply patted the hearing aid harnessed across her chest. I had 
some signing skills, but basically it was a foreign language to me. 
Gradually Virginia and I developed a 'good enough' way of com-
municating based upon a kind of pidgin-sign language, gestures, 
mime, drawing, and simple written messages. 
In our painfully unpropitious first session, I understood virtually 
nothing of Virginia 's communications, either analytically or in terms 
of signing. The feelings of being misunderstood and rejected which 
this evoked then became acted out . For the next two weeks, she 
refused to see me in my room, although I was able to persua de her 
to go to the shops with me during our second meeting, and in the 
third I joined her in her classroom. There she rebuffed me by refusing 
to look at me and by moving away if I started to approach her . I 
made it clear that I knew she did not like me, but it was equally 
clear that this did not provoke my retaliation. 
As the fourth session approached, I felt a strong sense of failure 
when I considered that she would yet again refuse to come. This was 
followed by a sense of relief that I would no longer have to suffer 
her lacerating rejections, which left me with feelings of thorough 
worthlessness and intense pain, the nature of which I had never been 
aware of experiencing befor e. I was very dependent on my super-
visor, Dorothy Davidson, who taught me how to rely upon projec-
tive identifications - the thoughts and emotions that Virginia aroused 
in me - to understand Virginia's feelings. When I could see that the 
rejection I felt had its source in Virginia, I could develop a way of 
understanding her. 
To my surprise, she came willingly to the fourth session, and 
rejected me in pretend. This was the beginning of a regular pattern of 
play; soon after the session started, she would feign a superior attitude 
and march haughtily into the medical room adjoining my office, 
slamming the door behind her. I would then jiggle the door handle 
in lieu of knocking and attempt to stick my head just inside the door, 
wh ereupon she would shriek one of her few understandable phrases, 
'Go 'way!' I would retreat behind the closed door and wait for a few 
minutes before trying again. Occasionally she would allow me to 
stand in the open doorway, and I would pretend to beg her to let 
me play with her. She turned me away repeatedly - sometimes six 
or seven times - before eventually letting me in. 
During the time she was alone in the medical room, she wo uld be 
arranging the furniture and equipment to suit her play or going 
through the contents of the box of toys I provided, studying each 
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object as if she were taking inventory of a treasure. When I was 
allowed in the room, she would play teacher and order me to pick 
up paper she scattered on the floor and direct me to do impossible 
homework. Later she became a doctor, isolating me beneath blankets 
and behind screens and leaving me until she returned to administer 
'medicine' from a urine specimen container. She would also give me 
anxiety-provoking medical examinations, including eye tests in which 
I was expected to identify individual letters her ruler whisked past 
on the wall chart. When I failed to keep up , she became exasperated 
and critical. 
As I have described elsewhere (Urban 1990), Virginia tended to 
expect others co look upon her with criticism and scorn. I found it 
difficult to watch her, Sa>f, examining the toys I provided without 
her feeling unbearably criticized. When she felt criticized, it was 
impossible to direct sign language to her; she would scream and turn 
away or refuse to look. I discovered that she was in fact interested 
in what I had to say because she watched me indirectly. When I 
became aware of this difficulty and how she managed it, I found 
alternatives to direct communication, such as using the mirror in the 
room or signing to a space next to her, rather than straight at her. 
The endings of the sessions were characteristically disruptive , 
initially because she wanted to take something from the toy box 
away with her. Only later did I understand that her behaviour had 
a bearing upon her language deprivation. For instance, at the end of 
the fifth session, she stubbornly insisted upon taking the entire box 
of toys with her, and I tried without success to dissuade her. As she 
was leaving the room with the box determinedly tucked under her 
arm, I asked feebly if she was going to bring it back the following 
week. She answered yes. This she did, thus making what might have 
been stealing - or confiscation - into an exchange; she takes some-
thing from me and then gives something back. This exchange was 
marked by ruthlessness (on Virginia's part) and intense anxiety (on 
my part). The anxiety that I experienced was related to dependency, 
because I felt that if she took all the toys and did not return them, 
we would not be able to continue to meet . This feeling was not 
based upon reality, because her play with me did not involve the 
toys; it involved playing school and hospital. But the toys were a 
means of exchange that served as a fundamental link between us. 
Within the familiar pattern of play there were significant changes. 
She used her increasing communication skills to tell me to wait, 
rather than slamming the door shut and leaving me out. We worked 
out ways of accommodating one another that allowed for moments 
of good will, such as moving furniture together to make the 
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arrangement she wanted. At our last meeting of the term, she wrote 
me a note: 'Elizabth not play. Sad not play Eliizabth (sic)'. 
By the end of the term, Virginia had shown considerable changes 
outside her sessions as well as within. Her behaviour both at home 
and in class had improved . Her parents told me that she had changed 
'roo% in her attitude'; she was more relaxed in herself and was more 
interested in joining in activities with others. Her communication 
skills had developed, and she was confident enough of her ability to 
communicate to have occasional chats with the speech therapist. Also, 
I had looked through the school accident book, where her name had 
previously been logged more than any other child's for regular falls, 
cuts, and bruises. There was no entry for her during the term from 
Easter to the summer break. 
To the best of my or anyone else's knowledge, she had not stolen 
from home or school since the first time she saw me. However, 
when I took Virginia's toys home with me over the long summer 
holiday, I happened to look inside . There, along with the small toys 
I had provided, was a strange toy I had not seen before. It was a 
tiny, soft cushion, probably part of the furniture for a doll's house, 
that only Virginia could have put there. Something had been added 
to that which stood for our means of exchange, that is, she had 
contributed something of her own to what passed between us. 
Granted, this was done surreptitiously, but it conveyed by its size 
and texture an element of tenderness. 
When we resumed meeting the following autumn, Virginia's play 
continued to reflect change. The emotional intensity of the sessions 
in the first term became more moderate, and her reactions to me less 
volatile. Her relationship to me shifted from one marked by control-
ling/being controlled to one of mutuality. She confided to me her 
need for help with her homework, and drew a picture of a 'beautiful 
rainbow' to express the feeling of togetherness that existed between 
us. A new pattern of play developed; she played that she was my 
friend . The development of this play reached a climax in our last 
session before the Easter break, just a year after we had started to 
meet. 
At the start of the session , she pulled out some disused speech 
therapy equipment that had been stored in my room. Using some of 
this equipment and the procedure with which she was familiar, she 
pretended to give me a hearing test. She put the hea~set on me and 
made various vocalizations behind me. Pretending to be deaf, I raised 
my hand when I 'heard'. She reversed our places, and I gave her the 
'test', saying one of three names that she knew. At one point she 
turned, looked at me, and smiled. Pointing to her ear and nodding 
affirmatively, she clearly indicated that she had heard me. Startled 
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and pleased, I said that I thought she was deaf, adding that the headset 
would make hearing even more difficult. She remo ved the headset 
and turned away, asking me to repeat the names. Again she indicated 
that she could hear. I asked her what word she heard me say, and 
she answered correctly, 'Virginia'. When I asked what the second 
name was, she wrong ly answered, 'Elizabeth'. 
The subsequent session picked up from where this one had left off, 
despite the four-week Easter break between the two. She pulled out 
the hearing test equipment, darkened the room, and administered the 
hearing test. She then insisted that I go with her into the school hall, 
where she directed me to pick a song from several that were written 
on posters hung on the wall and to copy it, while she did the same. 
When we returned to the darkened therapy room, 
She places me in the comer in front of the lamp and turns it on. She wants me 
to sing the song I chose, which I do with the spotlight on me, while she holds 
the music and, after a fashion, directs by signing the words. When we finish my 
song, she swi tches our positions so that she stands in the comer in the spotlight. 
She tells me to sign the words of her song, which I do. Together we perform 
the song together, my inarticulate signing accompanying her flat yet enthusiastic 
tones, the words of the song being all but indiscernible; 'red and yellow and pink 
and green ... ' 
She intently watches my hands while I sign, and sings wholeheartedly, swaying 
rhythmically back and forth from one foot to the other . When we finish, she 
turns and stands opposite to where she stood to sing, and applauds, and has me 
do the same. There is enthusiastic appreciation in the applause - and a curtain 
call. 
COMMENT 
The feelings that were aroused in me by Virginia during these last 
two sessions helped me to understand what was happening not only 
in these two particular interviews, but also how they represented a 
culmination of something that had been developing all along. What 
I felt during, and following, these two sessions was an intense 
humility at the unique privilege of being 'heard' by this deaf child, 
and an exquisitely painful tenderness at being allowed close to what 
felt at the time like her 'primal wound'. These feelings of idealized 
specialness and closeness were opposite to the rejection and worthless-
ness I experienced at the beginning . These important clues enabled 
me later to consider how Virginia's play expressed phantasies she had 
about communicating. 
These thoughts can be summarized as follows . At the time I starte d 
seeing her, Virginia identified with being deaf (patting her hearing 
aid to mean 'I') and this meant to her being unable to communicate 
and being rejected. By the end of the first term, there was evidence 
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in the tiny cushion that the foundations of communication had been 
established between us, and this was accompanied by an improvement 
in her communication skills. The primary means of communication 
had shifted from projective identification to play and semiotics 
(signing). 
When the autumn term started, the development of her phantasy 
not only continued, but gained momentum. It can be described as 
the unfolding (deintegration ) of a complex phantasy of idealized good 
communication, in which there is a close and special togetherness 
with another, without the pain of not understanding or of being 
misunderstood. 
In Virginia's phantasy, ideal communication could only occur if 
one were hearing and, by implication, speaking. Thus, she could 
only 'really' communicate while in projective identification w ith an 
idealized hearing (and speaking) object. From the feelings I experi -
enced at the time, she was clearly in this state of mind in the two 
sessions involving the hearing test equipment. As she had undergone 
actual hearing tests many times, I think that she responded as she 
did because she knew what to expect and not because she could 
actually hear - that is, beyond some residual hearing, which may 
have come to have more value for her. So when she said she could 
hear, she meant she was projectively identified with me as a hearing 
person and felt that she could hear. She also felt that she could speak, 
and this was expressed in singing together with me, while in projec-
tive identification w ith an idealized speaking (singing) object . In that 
feeling state, she could both watch (my signing) and be watched (by 
me and an imaginary audience). 
In summary, I think th at in achieving a state of mind in which she 
felt that she could hear me and felt that she could speak to me, 
Virginia had been able to acquire 'honestly' , that is, by hard work, 
what previously she had only been able to attempt to get by stealing . 
I have so far described Virginia's quest as one for the exper ience 
of being in communication w ith another. However at this point a 
new question arises: if Virginia was deaf from birth and withou t a 
visual languag e until she was IO, how did she know what she was 
missing? Or, put differently, was Virginia stealing something that 
she did not have or retrieving something she once had but had lost? 
To address this question I am turning to infant obser vation. 
INFANT OBSERVATION 
In what follows I am drawing upon notes I made of an infant and 
his mother and other family members during weekly visits to their 
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home. At that time I attended a seminar with other infant observers, 
where my notes were discussed. Several years later I studied my 
notes again under Dr Fordham's supervision, and it was during this 
re-examination that Dr Fordham offered the reflection , which I shall 
point out in due course, which provides the central theme of this 
paper. 
In the following excerpts from my observation notes, I am focusing 
on early exchanges between the baby Toby and his mother. In the 
first observation Toby was 2 1/2 months old, the age at which infants 
and mothers engage in protoconversations. By this time, Toby had 
established a good relationship to the breast , which, I think, is clear 
in the observation. 
He sucked heartil y at the breast for several minutes, making throat y noises and 
moving his cheeks rhythmically. He fed for several more minutes before his 
mother sat him up to wind him. She turned him around with his head resting 
on her right elbow , his eyes watching her . She looked at him inten tly and talked 
to him , her face occasionall y breaking into a broad grin. 
Toby resumed vigorous sucking. After about five minu tes, he pulled away 
from the breast and looked at his mother's face. He began to suck again, but 
more slowly than when he first fed. He then stopped sucking, and she asked if 
he had finished. She pulled him toward her right nipple and held him there for 
a minute. Although he had taken the nipple into his mouth, she told me that he 
wasn't sucking . She turned him around and sat him on her leg to wind him. He 
looked at me and smiled. I noticed again this time , as I had the last visit, how 
he seemed to play with his tongue. It seemed to move within his mou th causing 
his cheeks to move, and occasionally he stuck it out as if savouring it . 
She turned to him and said, 'There now , time to have your nappy changed' . 
Her tone to him was very affectionate and when she talked to him the questions 
she asked were spoken as if he might really answer. She undid his babygro and 
talked to him . He began what she called his 'conversation' . He made a series of 
noises which had the rhythmic inflection of someone speaking. His mother looked 
down at him and smiled, and talked back to him , asking him to 'Say that again?' 
As she spoke, he smiled and looked at her and then away and waved his arms. 
Then he held them out in front of him in the air, first suspended, then moved 
up and down. While he was 'talking ', his face changed expression; he knit his 
eyebrows together with an intent expression , he smiled, and he just looked around 
with raised eyebrows, as if expecting something. These expressions added to the 
sense of his having a 'conversation'. 
In this observation, Toby's relationship to the breast is intimately 
linked to the protoconversation he has with his mother. The mutually 
satisfying feed includes not only taking in milk, but also touching, 
'talking to ' , and looking at one another. Toby lingers at the breast 
after feeding and holds the nipple in his mouth. When he is taken 
from the breast, the nipple is replaced by his tongue and , a few 
moments later, by vocalizations. Thus, for Toby a good feed of 
vanous components is located in his mouth, first as a nipple in his 
mouth, then as his tongue in his mouth, and later as vocalizations in 
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his mouth. The vocalizations are part of a 'conversation' with his 
mother, the 'topic' of which seems to be their mutual enjoyment of 
one another. 
Influenced by Fordham 's model of deintegration and reintegration, 
I view what is happening around Toby's mouth as an early step in 
development. That is, the nipple-in-the-mouth of a good feed is a 
protophenomenon which separates out (deinteg rates) into a number 
of later discrete phenomena, such as container-contained, a good 
intercourse, and, as I hope to show, a word-i n-the-mouth. Thus, this 
protophenomenon is like a simple bud which gradually unfolds into 
a intricately complex flower. 
I shall now turn to an observation when Toby was 6 months, 31/2 
weeks old. Earlier in the observation, Toby was in the kitchen playing 
with various utensils, and I noted that his main preoccupation had 
shifted from people to things. Later his mother left temporarily and, 
when Toby protested, I held him on my lap, which quieted him. 
He sat on my leg and leaned forward and dug his fingers into a hole in the chair 
covering. I noticed that his mouth was pulled in as it is when one forms the 
letter 'B'. I spoke to him, and he looked up at me and then away again. I turned 
him around to face me. He leaned forward and reached out for the front of my 
sweater and breasts, feeling the texture of my sweater. After a while, he lay back 
a bit, half-upright, resting against my body and arm. A couple of times he turned 
his head against my shoulder and breast, as if expecting to suck. I talked to him, 
and he relaxed. I felt I was running out of conversation but that my voice was 
soothing to him, so I began to sing a little lullaby. His lids lowered as he watched 
my fingers rub his tummy , and then he looked away at nothing in particular , 
seeming to concentrate on listening to my voice. He seemed relaxed and pulled 
his right arm around so that he could suck on his fingers and waved his left hand 
in the air. He watched his left hand as he moved it around. He looked up at my 
face and then at my mouth, and then reached for my mouth and touched it as 
it moved when I sang, still sucking on the fingers of his other hand. 
As in the first observation, there is an experience at the breast (reach-
ing for it) followed by an exchange with another. However, there 
are developments in this observation beyond those which were noted 
in the first. His interest has shifted from people, especially his mother, 
to things, which he can manipulate through developing fine motor 
control. This is cons istent with Trevarthen's finding that in the 
middle of the first year the baby, if in the company of the mother, 
prefers objects to people. 
Increased muscular control also applies to Toby's tongue and labi-
als, as his infant cooing, wh ich is made up of primarily vowel sounds, 
develops to include consonants (the 'B' mouth shape). Parallel to this 
is an increased awareness of inside/outside, and fingers are used to 
explore this dimension, for example, the fingers into the rip in the 
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chair covering and into his own and my mouths . (I shall comment 
later on the developing awareness of inside/outside.) 
Dr Fordham's reflection was on Toby's interest in the song/word 
in my mouth, for which he looks and tries to touch. Dr Fordham's 
comment carries the understanding that for Toby the word is a thing. 
Toby reaches for this thing with one hand while simultaneously 
sucking on the fingers of his other hand, so that one can hypothesize 
that there is a link between the fingers-in-the-mouth (which derive 
from the nipple-in-the-mouth of the good feed) and the song/word-
in-the-mouth. 
The subsequent visit supports this formation . Once again, the 
mother had temporarily left. 
He sat on the mat on the floor and started to cry. I picked him up and held him 
on my lap and talked to him. I began singing to him, and he stopped crying and 
looked up and watc hed for a long moment. He then made agitated movements 
before becoming quiet again. He started to 'talk' as if commenting on something 
that was going on, and reached for my mouth. He then made sucking movements 
in his mouth . 
In this observation, my song /wo rd-in-the-mouth is linked , by Toby's 
reach, to his vocalizations-in-the-mouth and his sucked tongue-in-
the-mouth. Thus, what became the song/word-in-the-mouth can be 
traced backward, via vocalizations-, fingers-, then tongue-, to its 
source in the nipple-in-the-mouth of a good feed. All of these thing-
in-the-mouth experiences are inextricably bound up with emotionally 
coloured, that is, meaningful, exchanges with another . This describes 
the mother tongue to which I referred in my introduction . 
In order to follow the forward development of the thing-in-the-
mouth, one needs to keep in mind that Toby's growing awareness 
of inside/outside (exploring the tear in the chair covering and the 
insides of my and his own mouths) occurs alongside the gradual 
discovery of things (the kitchen utensils). Referring to a series of 
observations of children between 18 and 30 months (at least a year 
older than Toby in the previou s two observations), Meltzer writes 
about the 'Buccal Theatre for Generating Meaning' (Meltze r 1986, 
p. 181). He describes the way one child seemed to be playing with 
the sounds in his mouth in a way that paralleled his play with objects, 
'not merely as commentary on that play but as an alternative theatre 
of phantasy manipulation' (Meltzer 1986, p. 179). Meltzer concludes 
that 'the physical space of the oral cavity is utilized as the theatre of 
phantasy and play , a mid-point between external play and internal 
thought . . . [where) the sounds can be manipulated as concrete 
objects' (Meltzer 1986, p. 179). 
To show what had happened to Toby's language development by 
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the time the word was in his own mouth, I am skipping almost 
twenty months to the time when he was 2 years, 2 months, 2 1/2 
weeks, to complete the · picture. 
Toby smiled when he saw me. His mother asked him, 'Who is it?', and Toby , 
having been able to identify me by name for at least a month, said, 'Frances'. 
His mother said it wasn 't Frances, and Toby said 'Elizabeth'. He said something 
I couldn't understand about a story, then repeated, 'Less read a story' . I followed 
him into the sitting room and sat down while Toby brought me a book. He and 
I read it as he stood by my knee. He repeatedly pointed to pictures of mice and 
said, 'Dassa rabbit', but after a bit conceded, 'Dassa mouse '. There was a picture 
of a fly on one of the pages, and I asked him what it was. 'Dassa spider ,' he 
answered. I said I thought it was a fly. 'Issa beliocopter', he declared authoritat-
ively. Later he changed this; 'Dassa fly'. 
By 261/2 months Toby had come to know a lot about langu age. Not 
only did he have a good vocabulary, which he could will to use 
accurately or not, but also he knew about statements, questions, 
and imperatives. He knew about verbal one-upmanship and that his 
'heliocopter' outmatched my 'fly'. He was thus able to use words as 
part of a game. Knowing that at that time he was terrified of spiders, 
I think he was also using the word in his mouth as a toy with which 
he played, helping him to develop a means of managing a powerful 
phantasy and to differentiate internal from external reality, similar to 
the way Meltzer describes. 
I have tried to show how the origins of w hat eventually became 
the richness of Toby's language can be traced to an object (the thing-
in-the-mouth) that was simultaneously a relationship (a good feed). 
I believe that it was this 'mother tongue' that Virginia was trying to 
steal or, more accurately , to retri eve. Before this conclusion can be 
accepted, there is one more point to add. To do this, I would like 
to compa re the part of the first observation that describes the post-
feed protoconversation Toby had with his mother during his nappy 
change with that of a bab y girl just the same age as Toby; 2 1/2 
months. 
Amy looked at me and smi led, waved her arms and legs, and made 'eh' noises 
and raspy syllables in the back of her mouth. I could talk to her when she finished 
her vocalization, so that we had a 'con versation'. In this 'conversat ion ' she made 
single syllable 'ooh', 'eh', and 'ee' sounds and some multi-syllable sounds that in 
my imagination I could make into 'hello ' and 'how are you?'. That is, she had 
in her voice the same song, or inflection, of someone saying this. There were a 
series of waves of smiles, crescendoing with her sounds. These crests were 
accompanied by voca lizations of a variety of human speaking sounds. She 'talked' 
in the crest of the wave, and I talked in the fall. 
The protoconversations between Toby and his mother and between 
Amy and me are virt ually identical; each infant is in relation to an 
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adult via alternating vocalizations accompanied by facial expressions 
and arm and hand movements. In neither case does it matter whether 
words are being used or understood. What does matter is that there 
is a meaningful exchange of ~xpression. The only significant difference 
between Toby and Amy is that Toby is hearing, and Amy is deaf. 
CONCLUSION 
I would now like to return to Virginia and her quest, in which she 
was trying to get for herself the object that is the thing-in-the-mouth 
which is also a relationship in which there is a purposeful exchange 
and a feeling of being together with another in shared understanding. 
In infant protoconversations, which deafness does not preclude, it 
makes no difference whether the utterances have specific meanings; 
it is the emotional quality - the meaningfulness - of the exchange 
that counts. 
It could be argued that Virginia's loss of her mother tongue was 
inevitable. Not untypically, her deafness was not diagnosed until she 
was in her second year . This is well beyond th e second half of the 
first year when babbling develops, and when the mother helps her 
child to establish a preference for certain babbled sound s which 
become phonemes , the 'alphabet' of the sounds of a language. It is 
clear that the baby must be able to hear in order to establish which 
of his or her vocalizations have meaning when he or she babbles . 
This might have been Virginia's first step towards language depri-
vation and, to her, the loss of the mother tongue. 
A more convincing view is that Virginia, for unknown reasons, 
was severely deprived. Most of the other children at the school also 
had hearing parents and late diagnoses of deafness, but did not have 
her difficulty in understanding that language, whether signed or 
spoken, is fundamentally about the exchange of meaning. H ence 
Virginia's deprivation was not simply one of language because of her 
deafness, although I think that in both my and Virginia's minds that 
was where the deprivation was located. It was in the area of deafness 
(play referring to her experiences at the school for the deaf and at 
the hospital audiology department) that feelings of hurt, rejection and 
being excessively controlled could have a place, and it was in the 
area of hearing and speaking that feelings of hope could develop . 
Also, Virginia was very like the severely deprived children 
described by Alvarez (Alvarez 1992). Alvarez's view is that these 
children are burdened with despair of attaining what is meaningful, 
and she argues that the therap y of these children needs to be directed 
to helping them with ' the new hopes and the new development of 
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idealization' (Alvarez 1992, p. 126). Certainly this was the way Vir-
ginia used her therapy . 
What Virginia did with her therapy can be described using Trevar-
then's framework . When Virginia developed a way of managing her 
feelings of rejection and being excessively controlled, she started to 
play that we were friends. I understand this to be her way of working 
toward an attitude that could lead to the fulfilment of an unmet 
longing. What I think she hoped for and temporarily achieved was 
the experience of what felt like a post-feed protoconversation. What 
happened following the play with the hearing test equipment had 
marked similarities to just that ; a duet for eyes, face, and hands in 
an emotionally coloured exchange with a special person. The parallel 
with infancy is that only after the infant's hunger and discomfort 
have been allayed (Toby's feed and nappy change) and there is a good 
object in the infant's mouth (a nipple , then musical vocalizations ) can 
there be a mutual, pleasurable interchange with a 'favourite com-
panion'. 
However , this description is not complete without an analytic 
understanding of the content of our exchanges. Jun g likened th e 
transcendent function to 'a language which is eloquent enough for one 
who understands it, but which seems like deaf-and-dumb language to 
one who does not' Qung 1958, p. 89). The feelings Virginia aroused 
in me served as such a language. Onl y if I experienced, contained, 
and understood the feelings Virginia stirred up in me, could there be 
a relationship in which the fundamentals of communication were re-
established and developed. Because this happened, Virginia was able 
to retrieve an experience of the thing-in-the-mouth that is also a 
relationship of shared meaning. This developed alongside her acqui-
sition of sign language, whereby a word-in-the-hand, which derives 
from the gesture-in-th e-air, could come to serve the same purpose as 
a word-in-the-mouth . 
SUMMARY 
The clinical material in this paper is drawn from the treatment of 
Virginia, a profoundly deaf ro-year-old, who was referred for treat-
ment because she stole things from home and school. This paper 
attempts to address the question of what it was she was trying to 
steal. In formulating an answer, I draw upon the infant research of 
Trevarthen and my own infant observation. I attempt to comprehend 
the clinical material and the infant studies within Fordham's model 
of early development . 
My conclusion is that Virginia was attempting to retrieve, rather 
86 
Out of the mouths of babes 255 
than steal, an experience that lies at the source of a number of later 
developments , including that of language and friendship. 
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' • 'With healing in her wings . . 
integration and repair in a 
self-destructive adolescent 
• • 
ELIZABETH URBAN, London 
SUMMARY This paper describes certain Jungian concepts related to 
integration and repair. Fundamental to chis is Jung 's concepc of the self. 
which Fordham has made the basis of his model of development. To Jung's 
notion of the self as an integrator and organizer of exper ience, Fordham 
has added the idea that the self divides up, or deintegrates. Three corol-
laries of Fordham's model, pertaining ro whole and part objects and rhe 
depressive position, are amplified through infant studies. 
Clinical material from rhe treatment of a pigeon-phobic adolescent is 
presented, which attempts to demonstrate that a sign ificant part of what 
rhe phobia represent ed was an infanti le stare of projective and introjective 
identification with an anxious mother. Treatment facilirared act ions of the 
self that contributed to the integration of rhe experiences represented by 
the pigeons, so that what had been split off became a deintegrare capable 
of being reintegrated. 
The focus of this paper is on the developmenta l as well as rhe patho-
logical. Boch are conceived in relation to the treatment. 
KEYWORDS Primary self; deinregrarion; reintegration; repair; Michael 
Fordham. 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important of Jung's concepts is that of the self 
Although he used the term in a number of different ways, the one chat 
predominates is Jung 's definition of the self as the totality of the person-
ality: mind and body, conscious and unconscious , ego and archetypes 
(Jung, I 971). As a phenomenon, the self is characterized by totality 
© Association of Child Psychocherapiscs 1996 ISSN 0075-4 1 ?X 
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and wholeness, and is the source of meaning. Functionally it is an org-
anizer and integrator, bringing together and structuring the inner world. 
Because the self is the totality of the personality, it contains or, rather, 
transcends opposites. 
For Jung, meaning and the pressure to become whole are the motiva-
ting drives behind development. From his work with adults in mid-life, he 
conceived development as a process, termed 'in dividuation ', in which the 
individual becomes more deeply and truly himself Individuation is on-
going; one individuates but is never individuated. Technically, it is a 
process by which the ego, the centre of perception, time and again con-
fronts conflicting and opposite forces, say between good and evil, or being 
dependent and being separate . The consequence of the conflict between 
opposites is - and here is Jung's optimism (Fordham, 1985a) - a new 
resolution , symbol or insight arising in the ego. Individuation thus 
involves the ego and a pair of opposites, andthis triangulation is a 
cornerstone in Jungian understanding of development (Jung, 1955-6, 
1959; Fordham , l 985b). 
FORDHAM'S MODEL 
Drawing upon Jung 's concept of the self, Fordham postulated a primary 
integrate at or before birth , which he termed the primary self. Taking 
Jung's concept of the self as a psychic integrator and organizer, he added 
his own original concept, that the primary self divides up, or deinre-
grates, in order to relate to the environment. The self then assimilates 
the experience by reintegrating ir (Fordham , I 976, I 994). 
Freud used rhe protozoa amoeba as an analogy for the ego (Laplanche 
and Pontalis, 1973), and it can also be used as a model for rhe deinte-
gracing and reintegrating primary self. The pseudopod of the amoeba 
reaches out into the environme nt and takes in food (deintegration). 
What is taken in is then assimilated into rhe nucleated endoplasm (re-
integration). The pseudopod does not become detached from the rest 
of the amoeba, but remains part of it, just as deintegrares remain part 
of the prim ary self. If the deintegrate (experience) becomes cue off from 
the self, then splitting occurs. In ocher words, according to Fordham, 
splitting refers to experiences that have pathologically become detached 
from the self (Fordham, 1987, 1993). 
Fordham cites a typical example of deincegrarion and reintegration 
in infancy. An infant wakes up from sleep, a stare of integration, and 
relates to the breast during a feed. Following the feed, the baby sleeps 
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again, assimilating, or reintegrating, the milk and the experience 
(Fordham, 1987). A fuller description, which rakes into account che 
interactive dimension of Fordham's model, would be as follows. The 
infant wakes from a state of integration, having an archetypal predis-
position towards that which fills his need (cf. Bion's preconception 
[Bion, 1962)). He gives signals, such as crying, to his mother . The 
mother rakes these signals into herself, does something with them, and 
then responds to her baby, such as putting him to the breast. The baby 
feeds, and takes in not only the milk but something of the mother's 
way of feeding and responding. In assimilating the milk and the expe-
rience, the baby adds something of his own, such as meaning, the way 
the mother added something of her own, such as alpha function , when 
she took in the baby's signals. What is done within the baby is the 
result of actions of the self. I shall return to chis. 
The organizing functions of the self differ from those of the ego. Ir 
is the self that accounts for the overall, archecypally shaped unfolding 
of the personality, and for the organization of the infant's personality. 
However, infants also exhibit rapidly fluctuating states, which Fordham 
understands as evidence of the fragile and unstable infant ego. There 
are bits of ego at birth, because early experiences (deintegrares) include 
birs of perception or awareness. Only in the course of development, 
chat is, as the self deintegrares and reintegrates, do they coalesce into 
a stable ego. 
The unfolding of the personality proceeds in surges, which can be 
understood as periods of massive deinregrarion. The findings of exper-
imental researchers indicate char surges within the first year occur at 
birth, at about two months, to a lesser degree at three co five months, 
and again at ten to twelve months (Stern, 1985; Trevarthen, 1980; 
Trevarthen and Marwick, 1986). 
I should now like to focus on three corollaries of Fordham's postu-
late of a deintegrating and reintegrating primary self, which pertain to 
whole and part objects and the depressive position. I shall attempt to 
expand upon each by drawing upon infant studies . 
FIRST COROLLARY: 
WHOLE OBJECTS PRECEDE PART OBJECTS 
For Fordham, the primary self begins before birth. Unlike Freud's pri-
mary narcissism with its libidinous and destructive energies, the energy 
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of the primary self is neutral. Interaction between archetypally (bio-
logically) determined expectations and the intra-uterine environment 
produces the first objects, which Fordham terms 'self objects' (Fordham, 
1994). These are pre-image iJ.nd pre-symbol , and, as I understand them, 
are what Alvarez is describing when she refers to the pre-objects of 
autistic children (Alvarez, 1992). 
Self objects are imbued with the self, that is, with feelings of whole-
ness, at-oneness, altogetherness, together-with-me-ness . At the beginning 
oflife, these qualities pervade experiences, thus creating states of fusion via 
the processes of projective and introjective identification, early processes 
that initially are probably very close to one another. Foetal swallow-
ing provides a pictur e of how the experience of being at one with that 
which one is inside (projective identification) can be very close to that of 
being at one with that which one has inside (incrojec-tive identification). 
According to Milakovic, the foetus 'at will' swallows amniotic fluid in 
order to regulate the imbalance of fluids in its body (Milakovic, 1967). 
Ir is easy to imagine that, because what provides relief is of minimum 
texture and the same tempe rature as the foetus, what envelops and what 
is taken in is experienced by the foetus as being part of itself 
After birch, early feeds (deintegrat ions) are typified by the infant 's 
total absorption in the experience, eyes closed, body still, and mouth 
sucking rhythmically , as if the breast were the whole of his universe 
and he was giving him self entirely to it. Visual, aural and tactile aspects 
of the mother become incorporat ed into the wholeness characterizing 
early self objects. From the observer's point of view, the baby is relating 
to parts of the mother, but from the infant's point of view, the part is 
rhe whole (Fordham, 1987; Astor, 1989). 
Earlier, I stated that, when the infant assimilates an experience (rein-
tegration), he adds something to it. An example is amodal perception 
and cross-modal fluency. Because the newborn can fluently translate 
amodal experiences from one sense into another, Stern concludes chat 
the 'seen' breast is experienced by rhe infant to be the same as the 
'sucked' breast (Stern, 1985). In Fordham's model, the global, whole 
nature of the infant's perceptions is an expression of actions of the self 
that make them so. According to the infant's experience, self objects 
are whole objects. However, even in infancy, self objects come and go, 
and so do experiences of wholeness and fusion (Fordham, l 985b). 
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SECOND COROLLARY: 
PART OBJECTS ARE A RESULT OF 
DEINTEGRATION AND REINTEGRATION 
Self objects arise out of and represent the satisfied needs of the foetus and, 
later, rhe infant, and quickly develop into good objects. Early on, other 
concurrent sense data, for example, commotion from an older sibling, do 
not become integrated (Stern, I 985; Brazelton, 1991 ), or are experienced 
as not-self If not-self objects are felt to be frustrating or unpleasant, they 
initially are rejected, attacked or evacuated (Fordham, 1976), and can later 
become bad objects. The intensification of and differentiation between 
'good' and 'bad', which can be observed in young infants, is a result of 
early actions of the self, creating pares our of the whole. 
At about six weeks ro two months, dramatic changes occur in 
the infant, indicating a new surge of deintegration. Trevarthen details 
the considerable changes that occur in the area of communication. He 
describes in fascinating detail the intricate, alternating behaviours of 
infant and mother that develop into proroconversations . Later, at three 
to five months and given a secure relat ionship with a present mother, 
the infant turns away from face-to-face conversat ions in order to engage 
with an object animated by the mother (Trevarthen, 1980; Trevarthen 
and Marwick, 1986). Psychoanalytic baby observations show how babies 
this age explore objects on their own through mouthing and handling. 
Taken all together, these observations show how animate and inanimate 
become firmly differentiated. 
Stern describes rhe gradual differentiation between self and other. He 
details how the infant sifts invariant from variant features of experi-
ence and organizes them into dusters of experiences associated with self 
and experiences associated with another , resulting in the infant's sense 
of core self and sense of core other: 'Somehow , the different invariants of 
self-experience are integrated . . . . Similarly, [ rhe different invariants 
of different experiences of the mother] all get disentangled and sorted. 
"Islands of consistency" somehow form and coalesce' (Stern, 1985: 98) 
In Fordham's model, the sorting of invariant from variant features 
and the organization of them into discrete clusters are actions of the 
integrating and organizing functions of the primary self. Fordham would 
consider Stern's description of the coalescence of 'islands of consistency' 
into a sense of self co be a description of ego formation . For Fordham , 
having a sense, a perception or an awareness - no matter how primi-
tive - is a function of the ego (Fordham, 1994). 
The self nor only shapes rhe ego, it also adds something to the cluster 
ing of perceptions. This means that there is a fundamental difference 
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between Fordham's and Stern's concepts of the ego. This can be seen in 
their different views about self-representat ions, which arise in the ego. 
Stern's representations of interactions that have been generalized (RIGS) 
are menta l prototypes oflived experience, that is, memories of actual expe-
riences. For Fordham, the ego 'is born out of the self and despite the grad-
ual boundary chat is built up between them, the self remains partially 
represented in the ego. Hence self representations contain aspects of the 
self, and are more than memories of actual experiences (Fordham, l 985b). 
In summary, through deintegration and reintegration, the original 
wholeness of self objects divides up into parts, such as good and bad, 
inside and outside, animate and inanimate , and self and ocher. 
THIRD COROLLARY: 
INDIVIDUATION BEGINS WITH THE 
DEPRESSIVE POSITION 
At about ten to twelve months there is another surge of new develop-
ments, or deintegracions. In the period Trevarthen terms 'seconda ry 
inm·subjectivity', play between mother and infant becom es a shared 
activity. The baby begins to cooperate with the mother, anticipating 
her intentions and learning from her the purposes of certain objects, 
for instance, what to do with a com b. When the meaning of an object 
can be shared, the object becomes a potential symbol (Trevarthen, 1980; 
Trevarthen and Marwick, 1 986). According to Stern, this is the period 
of establishing a sense of subjective self As the infant discovers that 
inner experiences are shareable, he begins to relate to his mother's mind 
and acquires 'a "theory " of separate minds ' (Stern, 1985: 124) . Thus, 
Trevarthen and Stern demonstrate the enormous potential for cogn itive 
development chat comes out of the bringing together of self/ocher, 
animate/inanimate, and inside (the mind)/outside (behaviour). 
Psychoanalytic baby observations during this period are usually con-
cerned with the infant's final weaning from the breast. An example is 
from the observation of Edward, at twelve months, one week. I am 
grateful to the observer in the BAP training who allowed me to use 
the following extracts from her notes. 
Edward was completely weaned from the breast only a few weeks 
before. At the beginning of the observation, the observer watched him 
being given lunch from a bowl. When the bowl was emp tied and taken 
away, Edward suddenly let out an intense wail, 'mouth open wide and 
crying bitterly so chat he was just exhaling in bursts. He was inconsolable .' 
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His mother offered him the bowl and then juice, which he refused. 
Then she tried to hold him. Each effort on her part to comfort or 
distract seemed to escalate his screams. Eventually the mother took him 
into the lounge and cleared a space for him on the Aoor, while she sat 
close by. 'For fifteen or twenty minutes, he rolled on the floor and 
screamed, [writhing) back and forth.' Throughout this time the mother 
remained close and attentive. 
Slowly the intensity of the screaming eased but did not stop, and 
Edward seemed able to tolerate his mother 's soothing. The screams 
had changed into something more regular and rhythmic, but [even-
tually) they stopped altogether and at last he lay still and quiet. 
... He stared at the ceiling, exhausted .... His mother bent over 
him after a while and he smiled slowly in response. Within minutes 
he was smiling and seemed quite happy. 
The seminar group found this observation quite upsetting, and con-
sidered chat Edward's loss of the bowl might be an expression of his 
loss of the breast. Nothing external in the observation accounted for 
the unreachable depth and intensity of his response; he was responding 
to something internal. In thwarting his mother 's efforts to console or 
distract, he seemed to be 'true' to his experience of his loss and to show 
a depth of character. Eventually and of its own accord , the intensity 
subsided, disappeared, and a good relationship with the mother was 
restored. When his mother went into the kitchen , he played happily 
with the observer, something he had never done before and which 
seemed to mark an increased awareness of reality and affection. Th ese 
are hallmarks of the depressive position. 
The classical Kleinian idea of the depressive position is that che infant 
comes to experience chat the good, satisfying breast is the same as che 
one he recognizes as bad and frustrating and which he attacks . Con-
sequently he comes co feel that he has destroyed chat which he loves 
most (Segal, 1979). Fordham describes the sequenc e that follows: 
He pines and becomes absorbed in himself so that he is inacces-
sible to his mother . After a variable and distressing period of time, 
he gradually recovers; now he has reconstructed the breast inter-
nally. In short, he has accomplished a rather wonderful act of 
reparation. After this sequence, the baby's sense of reality takes a 
step forward and his mental life is enriched. The transformation 
is called the depressive position and, in my view, constitutes the 
first step in individuation. 
(Fordham, 1989: 68) 
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When Fordham states chat the depressive position marks the begin-
ning of individuation, he understands that the opposites of good and 
bad and love and hate are brought together in such a way chat a new 
symbol (an internal breast) is formed, thereby enriching inner life and, 
equally, leading to an increased sense of reality. 
These three corollaries, taken in the order presented here, demon-
strate the development of the internal world. The original wholeness 
of self objects divides up into pans, and then the pares come into rela-
tionship with one another. 
CLINICAL MATERIAL 
The girl I shall call Ruthie was 13 when she was referred because of 
her excessive and irrational terror of pigeons. Ruthie could not walk 
from home to the nearby tube nor from school to the bus stop without 
being frightened chat she might encounter a pigeon. 
A psychoanalytic understanding of a phobia would usually include 
sexuality. Although treatment included the gradual understanding of 
emotional, cognitive and sexual aspects of what the pigeons represented 
to Ruthie, in what follows I shall focus on the aspects of the phobia 
that related to certain states of confus ion. These states were not only 
the subject of much of Ruthie's treatment but also referred to her 
self-destructiveness and what stood in the way of her development. 
I should like to use Ruthie's treatment to describe how Fordham's 
model of development helped me to help Ruthie to integrate the 
experiences represented by the pigeons and how, therefore, splitting 
became deimegration . 
When Ruthi e and I first mer, she reported in detail how abhorrent 
and repulsive she found pigeons. I asked her to draw a picture of one 
and she made an attempt but stopped shore of completing the picture 
because it aroused such strong fear and revulsion. Closing her eyes and 
shaking her head, she shuddered and Rapped her hands while expelling 
repeated 'oohs' of disgust. We established that what was unthinkable 
for her was that a pigeon would fly up on big flapping wings and rush 
into her face. 
Once-weekly treatment started, and Ruthie eventually filled me in on 
some of the details of her external life. She started to become frightened 
of pigeons after her family moved to London from a smaller community, 
when she was about 10. Unhappy and friendless, she remained the 'new 
girl' in school until secondary transfer. 
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Most of the sessions during the first months were detailed, repetitious 
accounts of her day-co-day encounters with pigeons, which left me feel-
ing sleepy, cur off and useless. For her part, Ruthie found me cold and 
unfriendly. When I tried ,co offer an interpretation, she frequently would 
ask me to repeat or to say more. When I tried co do so, I often discov-
ered that I was unable to restate my thoughts coherently; my sentencing 
broke up into nonsense. 
Eventually I suggested that she was frightened of getting into a flap. 
Having had some experience of her mother's anxiety and volatility, I 
felt I could picture what Ruthie might feel like when her mother was 
upset. I wondered if, when her mother got in a flap, Ruthie became 
frightened that the flap in her mother's mind would get into her mind. 
This line of thinking seemed to mean something to Ruthie. She became 
increasingly aware of her worry that my muddle or lack of under-
standing might become her mixed-upness and confusion. She told me 
dreams, and then worried about the parts she could not remember for 
sure. What if I got the wrong idea about the dream and based my 
interpretation on a misconception? She feared that she would then have 
rhis wrong understanding in her mind, and believe in ir. This implied 
rhat Ruthie felr that knowledge and understanding needed to be linked 
to the truth. 
After about five months , Ruthie left for an extended holiday abroad, 
and, when she returned, her mother stopped the treatment because 
there had been no change in the pigeon phobia. The mother arranged 
for Ruthie to see a behaviour therapist , and over a year passed before 
this broke down. The mother contacted me again, thus beginning a 
second period of treatment that, in retrospect, roughly corresponded co 
the school year prior to her taking her GCSEs. 
Ruthie returned to treatment livelier and more motivated, and with 
a positive transference ro me. Mosely she spoke to me of her fear of 
failing her exams, and from week to week she faced one assignment or 
exam after another, fraught with an anxiety bordering on panic. She 
spent more and more time over her studies and turned down invita-
tions to be with friends over the weekend in order to do homework . 
She became exhausted from these efforts, which seemed her only protec-
tion against the dread of failure. 
As her exams approached, any changes in my room were noted 
and treated with deep suspicion. For instance, during a break my con-
sulting room was redecorated , and I moved a vase containing a willow 
branch from a position opposite to one alongside where Ruthie sat. 
She became frightened of this, frequently looking across her shoulder 
97 
INTEGRATION AND REPAIR IN A SELF-DESTRUCTIVE ADOLESCENT 73 
as she spoke. I made a number of interpretations, including that the 
spreading branches were felr by her to be rhe spreading wings of a 
flapping pigeon . Just saying this seemed to vivify and intensify her fears. 
The terror on the streets was now in my room. 
This period of treatment came to an end when she passed her GCSEs 
with virtually all As. The confirmation of the competence of her own 
thinking seemed to parallel her developing confidence in mine. 
A-LEVEL DEVELOPMENTS 
Soon after starting her A-levels, Ruthie's accounts of her anxiety about 
schoolwork began to include fights she had with her mother. The rows 
tended to arise when her younger sister got attention from their mother 
that Ruthie felt was her due. The fights usually occurred at bedtime, 
when Ruthie demanded char her mother see her to sleep. Arguments 
also arose from Ruthie 's demand for a vegetarian diet, different from 
what the rest of the family ace. 
Some of the fights became violent, with Ruthie furiously decanting 
non-vegetarian food from the fridge, throwing things and, occasionally, 
hitting her mother. The emotional violence could keep the family awake 
until the early hours of the morning. Just what occurred was difficult 
co ascertain because Ruthie got confused and forgot what happened. 
Gradually a paccern could be described. As the anger and hate esca-
lated, Ruthi e would tip into feeling our of control, and screami ng, 
hitting, crying, swearing and vomiting. Rage became violence which 
became chaos. 
I did not appreciate the extent of Ruthie's destructiveness at home 
until the parents contacted me, asking to meet. Ruthie had anticipated 
chis, saying she hoped I would see them because they were upset and 
needed my help to understand what was happening. After I heard the 
parents' accounts, I explained chat Ruthie's pigeon phobia represented 
a condensa tion of incense emotions that were now beginning to break 
up and be experienced as feelings in relation to the fami ly. We discussed 
how Ruthie needed boundaries in order to help her manage the violence 
of her feelings and to limit psychological , personal and material damage 
chat she might inflict. By the end of the interview I was impressed 
with the parents ' ability to work together co draw limits that, by the 
mother 's admission, had not before been established. 
When Ruthie and I next met , she was in flap. Her parents had told 
her of che boundaries they were going to ser, and she was overwhelmingly 
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persecuted by the awareness chat her parents were not under her control. 
Ar one point, she spluttered our through her tears, 'I can't stand being 
ordinary!' Tearful, frightened and outraged, she was reluctant to go home 
after her session . In· order to restore her omnipotence, she threatened to 
cut herself. That night she carried out the threat, the first of several 
instances of self-inflicted wounding. 
There was a long period of intense and turbulent emotion, as limits 
became ser and rested both at home and in her sessions. Bur there was 
evidence of change. Her relationship with her father improved, she 
spent more time with her friends, and she used her therapy to avoid 
fights with her mother. From time to time she indicated that her fear 
of pigeons was subsiding . These changes happened alongside evidence 
of her increased dependency on her treatment and the chinking she 
associated with it. For example, there was a crisis during the summer 
break between her first and second years of A-level srndy. She had been 
given homework to complete over the summer, but she got into such 
a state over it chat the family holiday abroad had to be cut short. 
There was a very real question about whether she would be able co 
continue with her A-level work and her sessions were increased to twice 
weekly. Her return to A-level studies was accompanied by heightened 
anxiety about failing because of the incomplete homework. She studied 
increasingly lace into the night, which left her so tired after school chat 
she had to sleep and then wake up in the late evening co begin her 
work. As this pattern became set, rows about her mother putting her 
to bed became replaced by arguments about whether rhe mother would 
wake Ruthie up in time for school in the morning. I pointed out how 
days and nights, holidays and term rimes were all mixed up. 
When studying for her GCSEs, Ruthie had been compelled co check 
and recheck chat she had gathered up all her papers when leaving class. 
She was deeply anxio us char her papers wou ld gee all mixed up, and spent 
considerab le rime sorting chem. With A-levels, her 'obsessionality', as she 
herself called it, increased. If she threw away a wasted sheet of paper, she 
would spend long periods frightened chat she was throwing away good 
work needed for class. Sorting out dirty laundry cou ld cake hours, because 
she repeatedly had co check chat che pockets were empty. 
I had taken a number of approaches co chis material. bur it became 
clearer chat these yet-to-be-understood phenomena had co do with 
mixed-upness and confusion . My comments along chis line seemed co 
produce relevant, guidin g dreams. In one of the first, her mother was 
wearing Ruthie's swim suit while diving into what I interpreted was their 
fused and confusing pool of emotional life. In another dream about the 
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same time, Ruthie was in a house associated with mine talking on the 
telephone to me, who was in the house of one of her best friends. I inter-
preted that the Ruthie in me was talking co the me in Ruthie . Not 
surprisingly, the confusion ' the dream was describing spilled into our dis-
cussion, so that we both had to struggle to disentangle the muddle. 
Following these dreams, new images arose expressing interna l devel-
opment. In one dream, two birds flew into her room, which was at the 
top of the house. They settled, one above her desk and one above her 
bed. Ruthie left and went into the room of her younger sister, whom 
Ruthie had described as a 'go-with-the-flow' kind of person. This was not 
long before a holiday break, and I understood it to be an expression of 
her worry about getting into a flap without her two sessions. What was 
important was that she had another state of mind to which to go. Tha t 
was to the room of the easy-going, that is, unflappable sister. 
In another dream, I was visiting her in her room. She was pointing out 
chat there were two piles: one of a messy stack of schoolwork and the ocher 
of dirty laundry. When she told me the dream , she said she had sorted chis 
laundry over che weekend . What seemed significant was that she could 
cake my thinking into her mind - her room at the top of che house - with-
out the previous worry about being contaminated. Also, there was a 
sorting ouc of internal objects , between school work done during the week 
and household chores done during che weekend. Because I was concerned 
about Ruthie's confusion, I focused on evidence of underdeveloped 
differentiation - the separate piles - rather than on what was in need of 
processing - the messy homework and the unwashed laundry. 
Still another dream pictured her father showing her mother a series 
of lotte ry cards that looked like bingo cards. The mother commenced 
that there were so many cards and so many number s chat ir was con-
fusing and one could not rel! chem apart. I interpreted that ' lottery' 
referred co 'lots and lots', and char the dream was about having lots 
and lots of feelings about her parents and their relationship. In her 
father's hands they were, upon discernment, distinct and separate items. 
Although for her mother these were overwhelming and confusing, there 
seemed co be a new thought - a Bingo! - namely, that there is a differ-
ence between a single mass of confusion and a plurality of distinct 
thoughts and feelings. 
These dreams occurred alongside her increasing interest in my mind, 
which she found calm and settled . Her curiosity was evoked: How do 
I remember what she says? Do I keep notes on her? Are they in the 
filing cabinet across che room? Is chat a dictionary on top of the table? 
Gradually we established chat she perceived my mind as containing 
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th ings that were organized. The filing cabinet was my mind with ordered 
contents, and the dictionary was my mind where everything has a 
meaning, all in ord<;r. Although these were rather sterile pictures of a 
mind, they were a development from the threatening chaos of misper-
ception, wrong understanding and a mind in a flap. 
After the Chr istmas break there were other views of my mind and 
chinking, which arose out of an emerging negative transference. 
Although the apparent trigger for the change in the transference was 
moving one of her session times, there were other factors. Deepening 
supportive friendships and other advantages of being 'ordinary' had 
begun to compensate for the loss of omnipotence over her parents. 
Also, as Ruthie began to see beyond her A-level exams, there was a 
dawning awareness chat going to university meant that she would leave 
home and, of course, her therapy. 
About this time there were two sessions in which her negative trans-
ference was evident. Each was followed by other events, and it was 
noticeable chat those following the second session resulted in a state of 
confusion while those following the first did nor. I should therefore 
like co compare these two sessions and their subsequent events. 
In the first, Ruthie had been squeezing one of her fingers with a 
string, while talking in a teasing and manic way about clever people 
who knew things she wished she did. I interpreted chat she wanted to 
squeeze information out of me that would explain why I was changing 
the session rime. She agreed, and the jokey ceasing and wheedling esca-
lated, until eventually, in answer to her direct question, I said I did 
not intend to cell her why. The giggly mania abrupcly became rage. 
She attacked me with the criticism that I was just like her mother; I 
was inconsistent, sometimes I answered questions and sometimes I did 
not, and session times changed. She exclaimed, 'I never know what co 
expect from you!' 
A week lacer, she briefly referred to what had happened in our session, 
but was preoccupied with somethi ng that had happened at school che 
same day as the giggliness-curned-rage session. She had got into a similar 
ceasing with a teacher, with whom, as with me, she had become friendly 
only after a difficult period. Although chat school day ended in a spirit 
of high jinks, the atmosphere of the next day ( the day after the session) 
was very different. She thought the teacher had become distant and 
disapproving, and that their good relationship was damaged. Yer he also 
seemed still co be interested. Several rimes at school she burst uncon-
trollably into rears, and yearned to talk co him to get the probl em 
sorted out. Lacer at home she again experienced waves of incense pain 
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and episodes of unstoppable crying. When l suggested chat she was 
worried and hurt chat she had damaged our relationship, she denied 
this, protesting char she was still angry at me. 
Not long after, she again became angry at me, for what l thought 
was the changed session. l-{er anger in this session was expressed as 
criticism that I would not make up sessions she intended co miss over 
the summer because she planned to have two summer holidays after 
her A-levels. She cold me that I was stupid nor to make up important 
sessions, and, in the same breath, chat I was coo intelligent co do so 
without a good reason. She demanded to know what it was, and when 
I did not offer one acceptable to her, she again attacked me for being 
inconsistent and irrational, like her mother. 
Following that session, she was scheduled for some minor surgery 
with a doctor she admired. She had broken her coe at Christmas, and 
this required a brief hospitalization. When she lacer cold me about chis, 
she was full of praise for the doctor and rhe hospital staff. She antic-
ipated a similar good experience from the follow-up surgery, bur at rhe 
Jase minute the day of the operation was changed. She had planned co 
stay in overnight, bur this coo was changed, in pare because the expe-
rience had become so 'horrible'. Before going to hospital she had cleared 
up her room in a brief twenty minutes. When she came home, she 
returned to her old obsession of checking and re-checking what needed 
sorting out in her room. Worri ed, she wanted to know why chis was. 
I compared the two sessions I have described here. In the first, a 
clearly perceived bad, injurious me was experienced in contrast to a good 
but injured (by her) reacher. In the second, a similar bad me was expe-
rienced in contrast to what might have been a clearly perceived skilful 
and good doctor , but his goodness had become mixed up with badness 
because he had unpredictably changed the time. That was just what I 
had done co make me bad. The good and the bad had become all 
mixed up and she was compelled to try and sort chem out. This inter-
pretation had a noticeably calming effect upon Ruthie. 
As the end of school approached, and as her exams were eventually taken 
and passed, Ruthie 's material increasingly focused on leaving her family and 
her friends co go co university, and drawing her therapy to a close. 
DISCUSSION 
I have described the treatment of an adolescent girl, who was eventu-
ally able co integrate a split-off part of herself. What was split off held 
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not only unwanted aggressive parts of herself, bur also projective 
and introjective identification with unprocessed 'bi.ts' of an anxious 
maternal mind. Ruthie's fears about psychic contamination had there-
fore to be dealt with first. Ruth ie then faced her anxieties about her 
own destructive phantasies, which were split off from both her loving 
relationships and a primitive form of guilt. I should add that I view 
her Herculean efforts to gee good marks to be a way of warding off 
this primitive superego. 
I have just suggested that Ruthie had split off 'bad' parts of herself 
from 'good' parts, but in another sense 'bad' and 'good' had not devel-
oped into distinctly differentiated qualities. It was as if the distinction 
between bad and good rested on a precariously held foundation. This 
foundation was an infantile state of fusion with a mother-in-a-flap, 
a state of projective and introjective identification analogous to the 
foetus swallowing some if its amniotic environment. When tested against 
the weight of change - of moving to London and of puberty - the 
foundation became split off and the pigeon phobia developed. Although 
her self-inflicted wounding could have become dangerous if not dealt 
with, I consider that it was of secondary importance compared to the 
destructiveness of splitting and states of primitive projective and inrro-
jective identification. Self-wounding was a conscious effort to punish 
her parents, while splitting and confusion were unconscious phenomena 
that interfered with Ruthie's mental processes and development, and 
impoverished her internal world and her external relationships. 
With treatment and consequent deintegration and reintegration, con-
fusion developed into differentiated qualities of experience. When pares 
became distinguishable, they could then come into relation to one 
another, as I think they did when Ruthie's 'bad' therapist came into 
relation with her 'good' reacher. The pain, pining and remorse she felt 
in relation to him, and for which what actually happened did not fully 
account, are reminiscent of little Edward. I viewed my therapeutic role 
to be similar to char of Edward's mother: to allow space, to monitor 
the degree of persecution, and to process the fluctuating states of mind, 
even if the process was sometimes unspoken. 
I should now like to turn to the theme of my paper, Jungian con-
cepts relevant to integration and repair. First, although Ruthie was well 
defended against the part that had become split off, I also chink that 
she was just as drawn to the pigeons as she was repelled by chem. 
In being drawn to them, I chink that she was seeking wholeness. 
According to Jung, wholeness is a characteristic of the self, and the 
pressure to become whole is the motivation behind individuation. It is 
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out of my understanding chat the self seeks to integrate that I have 
titled this paper 'Wi th healing in her wings'. 1 
Second, what was integrated was a self-representation of what I con-
sider to be something like a self object, and thus referred to primitive 
aspects of Ruthie's experience. The image of the pigeons was charac-
terized by wholeness, because they were totally bad. Ruthie was pre-
occupied by pigeons for a long time, and spoke to me of little else, 
which indicates how much meaning they had for her. The image also 
included reference to states of projective and introjective identification 
with a mother who was in a flap, and thus referred to states of fasion . 
As with self objects, the representation conta ined enormous potential, 
which gradually began to unfold. 
What early on was experienced as chaos and confusion was acted 
upon by the self and organized into discernible objects and experiences 
that then developed and complexified. My understanding and handling 
of the dreams of differentiation were informed by my understanding 
of how the self, in the Jungian sense, operates to differentiate and 
organize. I suppose that one could say that these were unconscious 
operations, but for a Jungian it is more meaningful to refer to the self. 
This brings me to the concept of repair. Within a Jungian frame-
work, 'repair' is seen as making whole . Ruthie's personality was ' repaired' 
when the split-off part became a deintegrate and experienced by Ruthie 
as a part of herself. In other words, to use a mode l I described earlier, 
the pseudopod got reattached to the amoeba. This is also what is meant 
by integration in a developed personality, like Ruthie's, in contrast to 
a small infant , for whom integration would refer to states of at-oneness . 
As what the pigeons represented became a deintegration , Ruthie 
became more open to deintegrative and reintegrative processes. In chis 
the ego is just as important as the self. As Fordham writes, 'the ego con-
tributes and ensures that the dynamic sequences in the self [deintegration 
and reintegration] do not prove unproductive and circular, bur are 
changed by ego activity, which in turn increases its strength' (Fordham, 
1994: 73). Hence, the treatment could be seen to have facilitated actions 
of the self that restored the dynamic processes of deintegration and re-
integration, thereby enriching Ruthie's ego, her personality and her life. 
I should like to make a distinction between 'repair' and 'reparation '. 
I understand 'reparation' to arise creatively out of guile, born out of 
the conflict of opposites in the depressive position. With Ruthie, when 
feelings of persecution occurred alongside deep remorse and apparent 
pining in the 'bad' therapisc/'good' reacher episode, her internal organi-
zation seemed close to char of the depressive position. le is difficult to 
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say whether reparation was involved. Fordham points out that in infancy 
the depressive position does not occur 'in a clear-cut form' (Fordham, 
1995: 72), and it is likely chat the same applies to adolescence. 
Finally, having disringuished deintegration from splitting, I should 
like briefly to comment upon 'disintegration'. Fordham holds that, in 
a fundamental sense, the self is indestructible, and points to the persis-
tence of the individual's uniqueness and continuity, which are expressions 
of the self. 'Disintegration' refers to the ego. Ir was Ruthie's ego, not 
her self, chat from time to time disintegrated in the face of over-
whelming fear, rage, persecution and confusion. 
NOTES 
4 Woodchurch Road 
London NW6 3PN 
This paper was originally presented at the Association of Child Psychotherapists' 
Conference, London, March 1995. 
'But unto you that fear my name shall the Sun of righteousness arise with 
healing in his wings; and ye shall go forth, and grow up as calves in the 
stall' (Malachi iv, 2). 
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Developmental aspects of trauma and 
traumatic aspects of development 
Elizabeth Urban, London 
Abstract: In this paper I try to show chat inherent in healthy development are emotional 
experiences that are the stuff of trauma. Failure to reintegrate these exper iences means 
that they can serve as a resonating board for difficulties in later life, adding to their 
traumatic impact. Focusing on global changes that occur at the end of the first year, 
I exemplify these developments with an infant observation and show how a six-year-
old boy's failure to integrate them contributed to his experiencing a normal life event as 
a trauma. I then offer clinical material from the analysis of a man to demonstrate how 
later life events resonated with early experience associated with this period. All are 
linked to a complex pattern of object relations I have come across clinically, whereby 
feelings of grief associated with an idealized object are split off from feelings of griev-
ance against an object experienced as persecutory because of its perceived superior status. 
Key words: developmental perspective, Fordham, humiliation, infant observation, 
Melanie Klein, shame, Schore, theory of mind, Trevarthen. 
Introduction: the developmental perspective 
From its beginning psychoanalysis has held a developmental view of the mind. 
Analytical psychologists, on the other hand , have been ambivalent about 
taking a developmental perspective, for a long time eschewing it as 'reductive'. 
It was Michael Fordham who was the first Jungian to appreciate that 'if the 
archetypes are universal they must be demonstrable in childhood' (Fordham 
r 944, p . 5 ). Over more than fifty years of clinical experience and observation, 
he worked at shaping a model that centres on Jung's concept of the self and 
encompasses early development. This concept of the self, in contrast to the 
sense of self, is outside direct experience, expressed in individuality, the capacity 
to adapt, and continuity of being (Fordham 198 5a). It is the continuity of 
being, in particular, that makes a developmental approach a study of the self 
in the Jungian sense of the term. 
Fordham postulated a primary self and its paired processes of deintegration 
and reintegration. He intended deintegration to describe the means by which 
the infant relates to the environment in an archetypally patterned way. 
Reintegration accounts for the incorporation of experience into the personality, 
© ~003. The Society of Analytical Psychology 
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which, in turn, triggers complexification and further structuring. Failures to 
reintegrate have an effect on the capacity to deintegrate and hence to develop. 
Trauma, which is an experience that cannot be assimilated, can thus be seen as 
a failure of reintegration that impedes further deintegration. 
The primary factors determining trauma are the nature of the external 
event, the nature of the internal world and how the two interact. Trauma is 
thus subjectively defined, whether the external event is a major disaster, like 
war, or a more ordinary life event, like the breakdown of a relationship'. In 
what follows I shall be linking archetypally laid down developments in infancy 
that have failed to become reintegrated with later events in life that appear 
quite ordinary but are experienced as traumatic. I shall be drawing on analytic 
work with a man, whose dreams and transference expressed a particular, but 
not uncommon, inner constellation of problematic object relations associated 
with a certain developmental period. 
In taking a developmental perspective, I am not viewing the earlier happen-
ing as the cause of the later one, but rather looking at how the later resonates · 
with the earlier, intensifying and making more pervasive the effect of it within 
the personality. Put another way, I do not understand the difficulties within 
the highly complex adult to be 'really' or 'only' infantile phenomena; however 
I do believe that experiences in later life trigger those in infancy and child-
hood. This can be seen particularly in analysis, which can help the patient with 
an understanding of these resonances and thereby extend and deepen the sense 
of self. 
Having said this, the role of infancy in later mental life remains controversial 
(see Wolff 1996; Green & Stern 2001). For those who do take a developmental 
view in analytic work, their understanding must take into account how infants 
actually develop. There are no commonly held conclusions about this. How-
ever in the past few decades developmental psychology and, more recently, 
neurobiology, have made significant advances in our understanding, although 
the implications for analytic theory and practice are still being worked out. 
Early surges in development and the contributions of developmental 
psychology and neuroscience 
Fordham most commonly described deintegration and reintegration as they 
occur red in daily episodes of feeding, bathing and play. Only occasionally did 
he refer to the archetypally programmed surges of deintegration and reintegra-
tion that occur at various points within the life span and, more specifically, 
' My definition of trauma is based on Freud's, whereby trauma is nor viewed by objective 
standards such as childhood sexual abuse. Rather it is understood to be defined subjectively 
according to the individual's 'incapacity to respond adequately to [the intensity of an event], and by 
the upheaval and long lasting effects chat it brings about in the psychical condition ' (Laplanche & 
Pontalis 1973, p. 465). 
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during babyhood (Fordham 1993). That deintegration and reintegration occur 
in this way is clear from developmental psychologists. As Daniel Stern describes 
this, 
Development occurs in leaps and bounds ... During these periods of change, there 
are quantum leaps in whatever level of organization one wishes to examine, from 
electroencephalographic recordings to overt behaviour to subjective experience. 
Between these periods of rapid change are periods of relative quiescence, when the 
new integrations appear to consolidate. 
(Stern 198 5, p. 8) 
Developmentalists have clarified the endowments and limitations of infant 
capacities, especially perceptual ones, and have identified waves of develop-
ment during which the infant constructs qualitatively different senses of self 
and of other. (In Fordham's model these 'senses' refer to the ego, so that these 
surges can be viewed as the way the ego emerges out of the primary self.) 
Firstly the infant senses perceptions and emotions occurring within him, which 
are probably experienced as 'happening ' to him (birth to two months ). Then 
he senses himself and others as being bodily different {two to six months ), 
followed by the sense of himself and others as having different minds and 
purposes (nine to eighteen months). Lastly, with the capacity to symbolize, the 
baby can stand aside from himself and see himself not only as a subject, but 
as an other upon whom he can reflect (eighteen months to two years). These 
domains of senses of self and relatedness, what might be thought of as qualita -
tively different consolidations of consciousness, remain once established. 
However until they are established, the infant's focus of operations is limited 
to the domain or domains in which he is, or has passed. For instance, a newborn, 
experiencing and consolidating his direct awareness of his perceptual and 
emotional aliveness, perceives his mother as being separate, but that is not 
relevant to him until he enters the next developmental realm of experience. 
Thi s paper will focus on developments that occur at the end of the first year, 
which produce revolutionary changes. These include what Stern calls the 
infant's sense of intersubjective self, the emergence of attachment proper 
(Bowlby 1969 ), the beginnings of a theory of mind (Bretherton etal. 1981; 
Bremner 1994), and significant shifts in self-regulating processes in the brain 
(Schore 1996). To this I would add a new level of awareness of the difference 
in status between self and other, that is, of the generational difference between 
self and parent. 
In order to appreciate the vastly complicated nature of these changes, one 
needs to know something about what has gone on before. I shall briefly sum-
marize some of the changes that are relevant to my subject . 
Trevarthen has researched the foundations of language development, describ-
ing periods of change at two to six months and at ten to twelve months, which 
he terms the periods of primary and secondary intersubjectivity. During the 
first period , consequent to significant physiological, motor and neurological 
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changes, the infant is drawn to his mother's face in a new way, concentrating 
on it, initially, with an awestruck expression. These intense and emotionally 
rich face-to-face engagements lead to carefully synchronized protoconversations 
in which the baby takes the lead. The mother naturally softens her voice by 
lifting the pitch and making it slightly breathy, a universal response called 
'intuitive morherese', her vocalizations alternating in a slow adagio with the 
baby's utterance of an undulating 'a-ghu'. These behaviours are hardwired , 
universal and innate, that is, archetypal. According to Trevarthen, the relation-
ship between mother and baby during this period is marked by companionship 
(Trevarthen 1988). In other words, there is a quality of the relationship in which 
there is an assumed equality of status between the partners. This is because the 
mother's status as a 'superior' is not relevant to the infant's domain of experi-
ence; what is relevant is her awesome, fascinating, numinous otherness. 
During secondary intersubjectivity this changes markedly. By the end of 
the tenth month the baby begins to regard the mother in a new way, and the 
mother senses this and changes her responses to him. At this point , and not 
before, the baby lets the mother take the lead and she begins to teach, and to 
become a socializing agent . 'Before the change, the infant has no interest, no 
comprehension of what is wanted' (Trevarthen 1988, p. 193) . However with 
the surge of development at the end of the first year the baby begins to antici-
pate his mother's motivations and 'to take a gesture and a spoken message as 
an instruction' (ibid ., p. 193). For instance, if a mother points to something, 
a very young baby will look at her hand, while an older baby will follow the 
direction of the point, aware that the mother is making a gesture that conveys 
her intention that he looks at something. The infant's capacity to glean that the 
mother has an intention enables cooperation between them. This leads to new 
developments in play, in which there is a sharing of objects and through which 
the mother will introduce cultural elements, for instance naming toys as she 
and the baby play with them. Hardwired patterns of communicating that have 
existed prior to this , such as 'intuitive motherese' , give way to expressions 
shaped by culture, such as the mother reinforcing certain babblings to 'teach' 
her child the phonemes of the mother tongue used in that particular family. 
Thus an important element of the period of secondary intersubjectivity is 
the baby's dawning awareness that behind his companion's face is a mind with 
intentions, thoughts and aims that are different from his. The baby's newly 
developed capacity for what will become a 'theory of mind' combines with 
other developments, such as establishing an internal 'schema, a mental image 
of the mother, especially her face' (Schore 1996, p. 68), meaning that he 
becomes more sensitive to the subtlety of his mother's expressions. Accompa-
nying the increased awareness of others is increased self awareness. Trevarthen 
notes that by ten to twelve months the baby shows gender and age awareness 
(Trevarthen & Marwick 1986), so that the baby can recognize that he is like 
some who are his age and gender, and unlike others who are not. At this point 
status becomes relevant to the infant. 
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Trevarthen points out the heightened, positive energy that accompanies the 
infant's growing sense of autonomy. He calls this prestance, from the French 
for having a 'commanding deportment ', a subjective state that analysts might 
view as omnipotence. Schore, a psychoanalyst who also works within the 
field of psychoneurobiology, is particularly interested in this period because it 
is when the infant shifts from being dependent on ·the mother for the regula-
tion of his internal states to beginning to acquire the capacity for emotional 
self-regulation. The 'highs' that are notable during this period need to be 
self-regulated by 'lows' that balance them. Schore states that shame, which is 
known as 'the primary social emotion' and which emerges later in this period 
at fourteen to sixteen months, plays a role in this: 'Shame, a specific inhibito r 
of the activated ongoing affects of interest-excitement and enjoyment-joy, 
uniquely reduces self-exposure or exploration powered by these positive affects' 
(Schore 1996, p. 69). 
The experiments on which these discoveries are based have their limitations; 
for instance, they focus on particular areas to be tested, leaving out others, and 
many are carried out only when the baby is in a state of alert inactivity. The 
results, valuable as they can appear to be, must also be seen as having limita-
tions, so that one must not assume that 'companion' or later 'teacher' are the 
only ways to describe the mother 's relationship to her baby. Having said this, 
I think psychoanalytic infant observation supports the hypothesis that there 
are vast changes at the end of the first year, when, in my view, the baby begins 
to perceive differences in status between himself and his mother in a new way. 
One of the most common expressions of this change is when the mother 
starts telling the baby 'No' . It will have been experienced all along, for 
instance, in the implied 'No' of an interrupt ed feed and various stages of 
weaning, to which a baby can have very strong reactions. However it is a very 
different experience for the infant when he becomes aware that his mother 
intends to oppose him, and to take this in he will repeatedly test her during 
toddlerhood to discover whether she means 'No' when she says it. This repre-
sents the emergence of a more comp lex, qualitatively different way of being, 
perceiving and relating. 
An infant 's experience of being told 'No' 
In the following two excerpts from an infant observation, I shall contrast 
subtle changes in the way a baby girl reacted to an explicit 'No'. The first 
excerpt is at nine-and-a -half months, just on the cusp of the vast changes that 
occur at the end of the first year. Baby Anna is interested in a set of keys, and 
the mother has dropped them on the floor in order to show the observer how 
Anna can craw l. Anna does just that, clutching the keys when she reaches them. 
With the keys in her grasp Anna shifted her weight back and by ttial and error pulled 
one leg under her so that she could sit back. She immediately put the keys in her 
111 
Elizabeth Urban 
mouth after looking at them briefly. She took them out of her mouth, waved her 
arms up and down and bounced herself vigorously on her seat, banged the keys on 
the floor and put them back in her mouth. The mother said 'No' firmly, but Anna 
just looked at her with them in her mouth; the mother again said 'No ' and gently 
and firmly pulled them away from her mouth. Anna did not protest but waved her 
arms up and down, bounced and put the keys back in her mouth, chewing and suck-
ing them. Again the mother took them out and again after waving her arms and 
bouncing, Anna put them back. 
In the second observation, just two weeks later, the mother once again sets 
Anna on the floor. 
After sitting still for a few moments Anna set off to crawl to the back of the room 
but the mother quickly called out 'No' firmly, and indicated the other direction, 
which was towards Anna's area, her bookcase, coys, etc. Anna hesitated, looking at 
her mother, before starting again in the 'wrong' direction, and the mother again said 
'No' and talked to her about why she had to go in the other direction. Anna hesi-
tated again, then sat looking at the area just around her. She 'bounced' a bit, kicked 
and stretched her legs and waved her arms, touched the floor with both arms/hands 
once or twice, then without looking at her mother set off in the 'right' direction. 
Anna came towards me on the settee, looked up and sat nearby. Her mother gave 
her a rag doll baby. Anna took it and threw it away - about a foot away from her 
and within reach. The mother gave it back, and she threw it away again, reached 
forward to pick it up again and threw it away again. The mother gave it back and 
pressed it against Anna's chest as though suggesting that Anna should hug it. Anna 
tossed it up in the air lightly, looked at it on the floor, picked it up and banged it on 
the floor once or twice, felt it and squeezed it, threw it away and picked it up again. 
But she would not hold it close. 
[My emphases] 
In the first observation Anna seems unaware of what her mother means when 
she says 'No ', even though the mother demonstrates by taking the keys out of 
her mouth. In the second Anna seems to know her mother has an intention 
when she says 'No', and discovers by trial and error that her mother intends to 
prevent Anna from going in the direction she wanes to go. In response, Anna 
gets cross . 
A child's experience of being told 'No' 
I should now like to turn to Barnaby, who was six when he was referred 
because of behaviour problems. His difficulties started when his little sister 
was born, when he was a one-and-a-ha lf years old . Being told 'No' made 
Barnaby not just cross but enraged. In contrast to Baby Anna, who expressed 
her crossness directly, Barnaby usually conveyed his anger by having the 
person who told him 'No' feel furious. I was to experience this on several 
occasions over the twelve brief therapy sessions I had with him, sometimes on 
his own and sometimes with other members of his family . Typically Barnaby 
would do something he knew I did not allow, like investigating the contents of 
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my desk drawers. Then he would ignore my asking him not to do this, and 
I would feel angry, understanding this to be his anger. However on two occa-
sions, something else happened as well. 
The first of these two sessions included his mother. He provocatively asked 
her if he could have a Happy Meal from McDonald's, something that for diet-
ary reasons he knew would be refused. His response to his mother giving him 
a mild, almost kindly 'No' was dramatic. He slumped over the picture he had 
drawn, would not answer his mother's, nor my expressions of interest in him, 
and slipped down onto the floor and curled up in a ball. A moment later he 
slid under my chair. I spoke to him, saying when mummy said 'No' it hurt him 
deeply and made him feel he was no good and just bad. I asked about his pic-
ture, which had disappeared with him, and a moment later a wadded up ball 
flew across the room . I said he seemed to feel like rubbish when Mummy said 
'No'. As we had previously discussed how his behaviour had changed at the 
time of his sister's birth, I linked his feeling of worthlessness to her arrival and 
his wondering why his parents wanted another baby when he was their baby. 
Barnaby's behaviour was melodramatic, but I think there was something 
genuine in what Barnaby was enacting of his low self-esteem. It reappeared 
several months later, when Barnaby provoked me to say 'No' . After he had 
been given his own box of toys, he opened a toy cupboard and proceeded to 
empty what was viside onto the floor. When he ignored my request not to do 
this, I became firm and he stopped. Barnaby then became withdrawn and sat 
at a small table and quietly drew two pictures. The first was of a large head 
with a large, long body, and the second was of a head only. 
While he was drawing, I acknowledged that I had had to say 'No' and wondered 
how it made him feel. When he finished the pictures, he pushed himself away from 
the table, eyes cast downward and looking despondent. I asked who the pictures 
were of, and Barnaby pointed to the one with the long body and said it was Father 
Christmas [it was July]. There was a pause and I pointed out that the other was of 
a head but no body; it was a no-body. I said the Father Christmas was me because 
both Father Christmas and I had lots of toys for children, while the no-body was 
himself, who felt like a no-body when I told him 'No', that he could not take the toys 
out of the cupboard. 
Barnaby makes it clear that being told 'No' can be not only infuriating, but 
also painfully and despairingly humiliating . I have understood this to be his 
continuing struggle with his awareness of the fact that he and his parents, 
along with his teachers and therapist, live on different sides of a generational 
divide, a difference fundamentally marked by status, with expanding ripples of 
implications, such as his parents' sexuality and their capacity to create new life. 
So far in this paper I have described how at the end of the first year the baby 
moves toward a new awareness of the difference in status between self and 
other, about which there may be negative feelings, and illustrating this with 
Baby Anna. I then described Barnaby 's reaction to the same realization, point-
ing out not only feelings of anger, shared to some extent by Anna, but also 
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feelings of shame, worthlessness and despair. I linked these feelings to what 
was for him the fraumatic birth of his little sister, which I see as epitomizing 
the difference in status between him and his parents. 
Clinical work with an adult 
I should now like to look more closely at ·trauma in my work with a depressed 
man, whom I shall call Charles, who was in his late thirties when he came for 
treatment. I shall try to show how Charles expressed, in dreams and in his 
transference to me, the dilemma that can accompany changes at the end of the 
first year, when a 'companion' becomes a 'socializing agent'. If the loss that is 
part of this change cannot be processed, then grief becomes grievance as one 
struggles with what are experienced as persecutory 'superior' objects. 
It was loss that brought Charles into his first treatment, following the break-
.down of a long-standing relationship. This occurred about the same time that 
his freelance work dried up, leaving him dependent on an unsatisfying part-
time job in a large organization. He saw a psychotherapist weekly for several 
months, but stopped going following the first long summer holiday, from 
which she returned with her new baby. About that time he became involved in 
a new relationship with a woman , Donna, falling into debt by taking her out 
to expensive places in order to impress her. They had started to live together in 
a more modest life-style, but by the time I first saw him this relationship was 
also failing. He acknowledged that Donna was disappointing when he com-
pared her to the girlfriend who had left him. I had the clear impression that he 
felt he wanted to get out of the relationship because he felt Donna was not 
quite good enough. 
Charles and I concluded that as the non-intensive therapy had not worked, 
it made sense for him to have four times weekly treatment. He did not want to 
start until he had settled some matters, including separating from Donna and 
moving back into his own flat. When he did begin analysis, he surprised me 
by describing the break up as if Donna had left him because he was not good 
enough. In particular, it was because of what he called his 'na'ivete', by which 
he seemed to mean a lack of mental manliness. He grieved for Donna for 
a long time in his analysis, but the grief was more like a stuck record than 
a process that developed and then allowed him to move on . 
By his own accounr, Charles had been traumatized when his parents' mar-
riage broke down when he was nine. Before chis happened, his parents had 
been socially prominent, frequently leaving the children in the care of their 
nanny. They held high ambitions for Charles, the only son in the family, and 
had chosen a career for him. When they separated and the father went to live 
on the Continenr, the mother and children were left in considerably reduced 
circumstances. Despite this, Charles started having private tuition to set him 
off in this career. Coming to see me sometimes reminded Charles of going to 
these lessons. It was, he explained, because my consulting room is close to 
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where he went to see one of these teachers. Thinking of his inner situation, 
I understood him to be saying that coming to see me after the loss of Donna 
placed him in the same internal neighbourhood where he found himself after 
the loss of his father, left with the pain of his absence, resentful of the presence 
of a 'teacher' who limited and made demands upon him. This inner situation 
was conveyed in a dream he had early in the analysis: 
I'm walking along a high street with my mother and sisters, carrying a heavy burden. 
I asked them if we can take public transport or a car because the burden is so heavy. 
They wouldn't answer; they kind of teased me with not telling. I got angry and set 
the burden down and crossed the street, and as I was doing this, a man about 40-50 
yards away threw a stone - a pebble - which hit me in the face. I got angry and went 
over to the man and said, 'If you're going to throw stones, don't hit people'. 
Here I should like to focus on how Charles's loss of Donna resonates with the 
earlier crisis of the break up of the parental relationship and, with it, family 
life. The burden he carries is experienced as the weight of his loss after his 
father left home . The help he asks for, I think, is having a family, complete 
with father, which Charles imagines to be the vehicle for his development, that 
is, growing up and feeling like a man. When his request for help is ignored, 
Charles gets angry and sets down the burden, as if he is unprepared to struggle 
with the pain of his loss. 
Charles crosses the street to another internal position, where he becomes 
aware of a man who has projected something at him. I think this refers to 
Charles's sense of the ambitions his father had projected onto him, and hence 
to the tutors to whom Charles was compelled to go. It was as if the absence of 
a valued father became the presence of a rather persecutory, teacher father. In 
the dream this figure wore thick glasses, like, as Charles explained, Mr Magoo 
in the comic. Like, in fact, Charles, who wore similar glasses and felt himself 
to be similarly nearsighted, or, as he called it, na:ive. Here we have the image 
of a naive, that is, baby-like, son mixed up with that of a teacher-father. 
I think this indicates that internally Charles has not differentiated his inferior, 
filial status from his father's superior paternal status. 
Here I should like to recall what Trevarthen tells us about the period at the 
end of the first year, when the primacy of the baby 's view of the mother as 
companion is lost to a more complex view of her as teacher and socializing 
agent . Charles's analysis indicated that he was struggling with just this adjust-
ment and the loss it entailed. As this developed, his material took on Oedipal 
dimensions. 
Charles continued to be full of grief over the loss of Donna, to whom he 
often referred as 'a kind of angel'. Six months after the Mr Magoo dream, over 
a weekend break, he had the following dream, in which, alongside his grieving, 
lay deep grievances. 
I was in a village by the sea, a village I've dreamt about before. The village is on 
a peninsula, by a hill and the sea. I am walking along with Tom, Donna's current 
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boyfriend, whom I'm sure Donna was seeing before our relationship ended. Tom 
and I happen to look into a pub we pass. It reminds me of the pub in Islington where 
Donna used to meet with her friends, at the Angel. Inside the pub, Donna, who has 
her back to us, is talking with another man in an intimate way, and I know she is 
having a relationship with him. Donna is wearing glasses with gold wire rims. I'm so 
upset with Donna that I rush away from the pub, through King's Cross, and off in 
the direction where I live. 
The setting of the dream is a familiar place, what I understand to be his trau-
matized internal world. However the location for what is happen ing is on 
a peninsula, as if by this point in his analysis the feelings that had been split off 
are experienced as having some connection with the mainland of Charles' s 
personality. 
The dream can be seen to be about Charles's growing emotional awareness 
of the difference between himself and his parents. From this perspective it is 
significant that the figures referring to the internal mother and father each 
have dual aspects . The dual aspect of the mother is her ideal nature and her 
duplicity; she appears to be an angel, while inside her Angel mind she is having 
thoughts about another. Here is Charles's theory of mind in operation . The 
father has two aspects too. He is both a familiar companion , Tom, who 
accompanies Charles's awareness of his internal mother 's duplicity, and also 
a rival, that is, the one with whom Charles fears Donna has had a liaison and 
who provides the identity for the stranger in the dream who is having the inti-
mate exchange with the mother. Equally important, the figures in the dream 
depicting the internal parents - Charles 's superiors - are in external life his 
peers. 
Despite the continued blur of generational boundaries, a distinction is 
beginning to be drawn between relationships in which there is no difference in 
status between self and other, and relationships in which this difference is of 
utmost importance. However the dream depicts that this development is 
undermined. What Charles does see of the generational divide is unbearably 
painful, and this pain is masked by anger and omnipotence; the King's cross, 
and it seems a very cross, belittled king who returns to 'where he lives' in his 
internally fortified castle. 
Spectacles feature in both dreams, Mr Magoo's in the first and the gold-
rimmed glasses Donna is wearing in the second. I think both refer to Charles's 
theory of mind about his own and his object's insight and reflective capacities, 
and how their two minds relate. There is little sense of sharing between them, 
in part because there is so much distance between them. Charles senses his 
own mind to be diminished (short-sighted ), while his object's is idealized 
(gold-rimmed). There is a transference link here as Charles openly confessed to 
feeling 'in awe' of the way he felt my mind worked. Looking at a session in 
detail reveals more about Charles's theory of his object's mind. 
Charles occasionally referred to a male friend with whom he had an ambiva-
lent relationship, and once, when they fell out, he had felt deeply upset. 
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We discussed this over a number of sessions one week, and then the next, after 
a weekend break, the subject suddenly changed to what had been happening 
at work. One of his most important responsibilities had been shared with 
a colleague. However, Charles had recently been asked by his manager to 
undertake this work on his own. Charles felt 'paranoid', as he put it, that this 
would result in his being seen to be a fraud. 
Just before the next session the following day and in anticipation of his 
arrival, I found myself thinking about Charles and feeling resentful because of 
how and what Charles paid me, which I need to explain. Charles could not 
afford to have private intensive treatment, and I was seeing him under the 
auspices of the C. G. Jung Clinic, which is a charitable clinic set up for those 
who need analysis but cannot afford it. The Clinic arrangement is that the 
analyst sets the fee with the patient, which due to Charles's circumstances 
were the minimum fee. The fees are then paid via the analyse, who passes them 
on to the Clinic. Ordinarily I would have billed Charles at the end of each 
month, but , despite the low fees, he wanted to pay at the end of each session in 
order to avoid getting into debt, as he had done when he started to see Donna. 
There was something of a ritual to the way he paid me on his way out of each 
session. He would get up from the couch, step toward me, then pause and 
dig deep into his pockets and pull out pound coins. Standing so close to a man 
of over six feet, ~ often felt dwarfed. 
That morning I found myself feeling belittled by his height, and, while 
dwelling on that, it suddenly occurred to me I was being paid 'po cket money' 
for my professional efforts! In retaliation I wanted to raise his fees, remind him 
that I did not get paid anything for seeing him, and demand that he pays 
monthly by cheque or banker 's order. In short, I felt furious and retaliatory at 
what I experienced as Charles's diminishment, undervaluation, and humiliation 
of me. 
When he arrived he said that he had been so engrossed in a mental argument 
with his colleagues that he had missed my street. He was furious that the 
people who planned the change at work earned twice as much as he, and that 
they wanted him to do this work all on his own. He wanted to leave his job, in 
fact, he thought he needed to leave. I menta lly noted that if he did leave 
his work, he would also have to leave his analysis. He went on about how 
impossible the job would be single-handed, and was clearly intensely anxious 
and struggling against despair. 
I commented that he seemed to be dreading what he felt sure was going be 
a failure, and how he felt singled out, as he may have done as the only son in 
the family who was expected to achieve what seemed like impossibly high 
demands from his parents who gave him so little emotional support. He said 
he did indeed feel singled out, adding that he felt he would be watched. I said 
that he seemed to feel that his manager would be looking out for his inadequa-
cies. Drawing on my transference experiences just before the session, I added 
how he felt frighteningly and humiliatingly small in comparison to his manager, 
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while at the same time enraged that he was being undervalued by him. This 
seemed to settle Charles somewhat. In a less angry tone of voice he said he 
thought what might happen would be that he would stay at his job, but 
become cynical, and not take his work personally. I privately noted he had 
stepped back from his threat to leave, and said out loud that cynicism would 
protect him from caring about what his managers thought of him. 
He said he admired people who make something out of nothing, which he 
could not do. Some were given a lot. People had told him he was gifted and 
had been given a lot, and he could see that he just could not use these gifts. 
I sensed that the matter had shifted more into the transference, and said that 
he felt I was giving him a lot because he was coming four times a week and 
under a special arrangement. I added that he appreciated this, especially when 
he experienced me as understanding how he felt, so he wanted me to know 
that he was aware that he was not using what was available to him in his 
analysis (which I too felt was the case). I continued that the reason for this was 
because he could not help feeling resentful that I seemed to have so much, like 
the managers who earned twice as much as he. In a tone of self-flagellation he 
answered that he turned this resentment against himself. I answered that when 
I just referred to how much he felt I had, he experienced this as me saying how 
much I felt I had . This made him angry because be felt I was flaunting what 
I had, but he took his anger out on himself rather than me. 
Following this, toward the end of the session, he talked about another 
friend, Edward, describing their relationship as one of unequal dependency. 
In this he, Charles, was dependent on Edward, but Edward could not see any-
one's wishes other than his own. Edward had lots of money, but did not even 
repay Charles what Charles had loaned him. I commented that Charles felt he 
was in a similar relationship with me. Not only did he feel that I was more 
concerned with myself and my own needs, but also that I did not appreciate 
his good feelings toward me, like admiration, which from time to time he 
expressed. He felt I used his valuing of me mainly to make myself feel better 
about myself rather than fonder of him, and this made him feel exploited. 
I suggested that he might feel particularly sensitive to such feelings as the 
weekend was coming up. 
This session contained the theme evident from early in Charles's analysis: 
grief over the loss of someone (the friend with whom he fell out), followed by 
grievance against persecutors associated with superiority and authority (his 
manager). However in the course of the analysis there had been developments 
on this theme, such as a growing range of feelings about a more clearly delin-
eated status-differential between Charles and his parental objects. These feelings 
included resentment, rage, envy and the pain of not having his good and ideal-
izing feelings reciprocated because his object was felt to be self-centred and 
narcissistic. In relation to his internal 'superiors ' Charles felt not only na1ve 
but humiliatingly inadequate, with persecutory fears that these inadequacies 
would be seen and he would be unmasked as a sham. This is more complex 
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than what Barnaby described as being a 'no-body'; it is a no-body pretending 
to be a somebody and caught out at wishing to be so. It is a double shame. 
Discussion 
Charles's intense ambivalence towards his objects and the way they had 
become split into 'bad' and 'good' are the most noticeable aspects of his 
personality . The conflict between idealized good objects and persecutory bad 
objects is at the core of what Klein calls the depressive position 2 • This is 
a process beginning in infancy that can lead to a more realistic awareness and 
appreciation of other and self, a process that recurs throughout life (Klein 
I935). Jung, too, referred to an on-going process involving the conflict of 
opposites which can lead to a more realistic sense of oneself and the other: 
individuation. Michael Fordham used Klein's concept, which applies to 
a process of mourning in infancy, to extend Jung's idea of individuation into 
babyhood, thereby integrating the depressive position into a Jungian concept 
of development that covers the life span. 
Moving on from Fordham and combining analytic observation with contri-
butions from developmentalists and neurobiology, I consider that there is 
another dimension to mourning in infancy which is an inherent part of early 
development. I consider that loss is involved in the shift from 'companion' to 
'teacher'. Here i am using the two roles in a diagrammatic way to describe 
how one generalized way of relating can be experienced as lost to another in 
the course of development. 
What I have in mind is related to, but not the same as, the loss in infancy 
with which Kleinians are concerned . Margot Waddell captu res the nature of 
the loss to which I refer when she describes it as a 'nostalgia for a state of 
being which can never be "home'' in quite the same way again' (Waddell I998, 
p. 57). Ron Britton refers to this loss as that of an 'idea of a relationship' 
(Britton etal. 1989). That to which both are referring is the infant's 'idea', held 
separate from affectively quite different 'ideas', that he and his mother have 
• Developmentalists disagree with Klein about early splitting, whereby isolating 'bad' from 'good' 
feelings is considered one of the earliest defences. Stern and Gergely conclude that th.e very young 
infant does not have the developmental capacity to split in this way (Stern 1985; Gergely 1991). 
However they describe how feelings serve as invariants that bind experiences together into repre· 
sentations . This process can be seen ro provide the structuring for the internal grouping of 'good ' 
and 'bad' experiences which Fordham consider ed to be part of norma l development. Post-
Kleinians call this 'normal splitting' whereas Fordham reserved 'splitting' for pathological states 
(Fordh am 198 5a). 
Klein dates the depressive position at six months, and Fordham seemed reluctant to note that it 
was not evidenced in the observations he discussed (Fordham 1989). However, he describes 
aspects of the depressive position in a thirteen-month old baby, and I have done the same using 
an observation of a similarly aged infant (Fordham 1985b; Urban 1996). My view is that the 
processes associated with the depressive position arise out of the surge of deintegration at the end 
of the first year. 
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an exclusive, mutually significant relationship which has an assumed primacy 
over all other relationships. Although this 'idea of a relationship' is not the 
same as Trevarthen's notion of early companionship, it does seem very similar, 
especially as Trevarthen also referred to this as being 'best friends'. 
Britton and Waddell link the loss they describe to processes involved in the 
depressive position . Here the loss is the consequence of destructiveness, and 
the developmental move from part to whole objects. In contrast, I associate 
the loss not only to the struggle to integrate affectively charged perceptions 
and experiences held, up until that point, in separate coexistence. I also associ-
ate it with the struggle to integrate new emotionally laden perceptions and 
experiences, when the mother starts to behave differently in archetypal 
response to her changing baby, and with how the new way of being threatens 
the loss of the old. These conceptually different losses may be linked if one 
considers that an infant may regard the changes in his mother as she subtly 
shifts from 'companio n' to 'socializing agent' as her changing from being 
a good to a bad object. This is what seemed to be happening with Charles, 
whose mind shifted between grief and grievance. 
Compounding factors may intensify the feelings. As the baby becomes more 
aware of his own inter subjectivity with another, he becomes increasingly aware 
of the intersubjectivity between others. This becomes the basis of the Oedipal 
conflict, which Klein emphasizes 'develops hand-in-hand with the develop-
ments that make up the depressive position . .. ' (Britton eta!. r 989, p. 84). 
According to Klein, the struggle between loving and hating can arouse 
concern for the object and guilt at the destruction done by hate. Out of this 
arises the wish to repair. The infant's reparation to the mother helps to restore 
his sense of his own goodness, and this brings mourning to a close. With repar-
ation in mind, I am returning to the observation of Baby Anna, which left her 
feeling cross, and banging and throwing the doll her mother had given her. 
What happened next was that the mother gave Anna another doll, which 
Anna accepted and held. The mother seemed to know that Anna was upset 
with her and that she (the mother) needed to do something to repair matters. 
Here the mother seems to be helping Anna with the 'idea' of reparation by 
being reparable. 
The part Anna's mother takes in this is an examp le of how Allan Schore 
regards reparation in infancy. In contrast to Klein, he emphasizes the import-
ance of the mother's repa rat ive role rather than the infant's, and holds the 
position that the mother's restoration of good feeling is necessary to the baby's 
development: 
Although re-regulating repair transactions begin in the first year, they are essential to 
emotional development in the second. Under the aegis of a caregiver who is sensitive 
and cooperative in this reparative process, the infanr develops an internal representa-
tion of him/herself as effective, of his/her interactions as positive and reparable, and 
of the caregiver as reliable ... [They] permit the infant to develop the capacity for 
anticipation of relief and a sense of his/her own efficacy. 
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The child's experiencing of an affect and the caregiver's response to this particular 
affect are internalized as an affect-regulating, symbolic (as opposed to earlier 
presymbolic) interactive representation. 
(Schore 1996, p. 71) 
In the observation the mother is helping Anna's brain to self-regulate emotions 
by modifying a drop from 'high' - Anna's heightened sense of can-do - to 
'low'. To repeat what was said at the beginning of the paper, later on in the 
same developmental shift, the drop is accompanied by shame, a specific inhibi-
tor of the 'highs'. Anna's mother, through her act of repair, can be seen to be 
offering a way for Anna to 'come down' softly that anticipates helping Anna 
manage later shame without too much humiliation. According to Schore, ordin-
ary play such as this can establish lasting bridges both in the parent-child 
relationship and in the brain. 
Barnaby and Charles did not seem to have internalized in a secure way this 
repara tive link between companionable moments and brushes with a thwarting 
au thority3. This left them vulnerable to overwhelming feelings of humiliation 
and affected their confidence in their own capacity for reparation, both of 
which interfered with recovering from the loss of their good objects. Britton 
links the inability to give up, or lose, the 'idea' of this very early relationship 
with 'the failure to establish a securely based good mat ernal object before 
encountering the vicissitudes of the Oedipus complex' (Britton etal. 1989, 
p. 94). When Barnaby was an infant his mother was depressed, and Charles's 
material indicated that his internal maternal object was narcissistic, a charac-
teristic consistent with the picture he drew of his mother when he told me 
about his contact with her during the course of his analysis. 
Both Barnaby and Charles exper ienced my analytic understanding as having 
reparative aspects. To show this in relation to Barnaby I shall return to what 
happened after we had talked about his picture of the No-body . He then drew 
a picture of me smiling, then a man with large feet, who he said was 'Daddy'. 
I told him that when he felt I was interested in the way he felt about my saying 
'No', he felt as big and important as Daddy. This was followed soon after by 
Barnaby saying in a soft but very determined voice that he wanted to go to the 
lavatory. After only a moment he returned, lively and pleased with himself, 
with a toy from the waiting room. He opened the toy cupboard door and 
placed it with the set to which it belonged that he had discovered during his 
ransacking. The completeness of the set had been restored and a part reunited 
with the whole, although it was done in a spirit of making a power play; 
J It should also be noted that Anna was only entering into the deincegrative surge chat begins at 
the end of the first year and continues, with changes building on one another, to the middle of the 
second. In relation to being told 'No', Schore writes: 'At xo months, 90% of maternal behaviour 
consists of affection, play and caregiving. The mother of the 12.- to 17-month old toddler 
expresses a prohibition on the average every 9 minutes' (Schore 1996, p. 68) . 
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he had tricked me into believing that he was going to the lavatory when he 
intended to do something else. My comments had restored not only our good 
relationship and his esteem, but also his self-inflation. 
Charles, like Barnaby, struggled against feelings of belittlement and shame, 
especially in the session I detailed, and my understanding of this helped to 
restore his self-esteem and re-establish a good relationship between us. As with 
Barnaby, the effect was not simply benign. It led on ro an opening up of 
various aspects of what had been split off, what might be described as a 
persecutory inner relationship between humiliating insignificance and a rather 
grandiose superiority. Both were traits of Charles. His humiliation was clear in 
the session I detailed, and his inflated superiority was evident from early on, 
for instance, in his attitude of being too good for Donna. Although my under-
standing in the session went somewhere toward resroring a good internal rela-
tionship, as we have seen, Charles would not make fuller use of it because my 
having 'something' aroused his resentment and envy. Acknowledging this led 
to thoughts and feelings he had about being in a relationship of dependency 
with a narcissistic other who provoked resentment and envy. This object rela-
tionship seemed to be a vicious circle, but over time it was modified as Charles 
experienced my motives as benign rather than self-serving. 
Klein has pointed out the important role of guilt in the achievement of the 
depressive position, and Schore has discovered the role of shame in the devel-
opment of the infant 's frontal cortex; which fundamentally influences the way 
the baby will experience himself and others. I have linked these two by bring-
ing them together as aspects of a complex surge of deintegration at the end of 
the first year. It is then that the infant 's dawning awareness of his status, like 
that of his newly acquired upright stature, is less than that of his parents. 
There is a sense of the loss of an earlier relationship in which these matters are 
irrelevant and so seemed not to exist. The Joss fuels the intensification of 
ambivalence that can lead to guilt. Parallel ro this, the baby begins ro experience 
shame as his sense of his own 'size' oscillates like that of Alice in Wonderland, 
as does his sense of importance in the eyes of others. 
If leading up to this the baby has not been supported by the sense of well-
being that comes from an adequately sensitive and attuned 'companion', then 
he may not be able to bear the loss of an assumed 'equa l' relationship, nor to 
work out a new relationship in which differences in status between self and 
other can be tolerated . The effect is considerable. There is a last ing sense of 
overwhelming shame and humiliation, which stands in the way of accepting 
the reality of the generational gap between self and parent, and impairs the 
capacity for empathy , concern and self-reflection (Britton eta!. 1989; Schore 
1996). The re are also lasting difficulties with the achievement of the depressive 
position, and therefore with individuation. 
I have drawn attention to clinical phenomena I believe are linked to devel-
opmental processes at the end of the first year. My understanding of the 
material draws upon psychoanalytic concepts, yet it differs in that I see the 
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child's struggle at the end of the first year to be with a broad range of implica-
tions arising from perceived differences in status between himself and his 
parents, including but not necessarily centering on sexual differences. Clinically, 
that means that I see developmentally linked connections between such clinically 
diverse phenomena as the patient's grievance about my setting holiday dates 
independently of the patient, sensitivity to withholding information about my 
personal life in contrast to the patient's revelation of intimacies, and jealousy 
when I am perceived as being with others. What each has in common is a 
heightened sensitivity not just to differences between patient and analyst, but 
the patient's perception of differences in their status. 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have tried to show how emotional experiences that are the stuff 
of trauma are inherent in healthy development. Failure to reintegrate them 
means that they can serve as a resonating board for difficulties in later life, 
adding to their traumatic impact 4 • Trauma involves a wound to both the self 
and the sense of self, and both must be addressed in treatment. The wound to 
the ego means the sense of oneself is susceptible to unbearably low esteem, and 
to omnipotence that can mask not only helplessness but also humiliation, as 
clinical material with Barnaby and Charles illustrates. Helping the patient manage 
feelings of shame is essential to further development. The woun d to the self, in 
contrast to the sense of self, is an impairment of reintegration , resulting in part 
of the self being split off from the personality, affecting further deintegration 
and therefore impeding the individuation process. 
I have also tried to convey that development entails complexity; what for 
the infant was being cross, for the boy was being furious and humiliated , and 
for the man, furious, envious and doubly shamed . What they have in common 
are certain experiences arising out of a shared, archetypall y-shaped unfolding 
that they gather into themselves in their individual ways. 
4 Donald Kalsched describes how self-care defences can build up around trauma. Fordham 
referred to these entrenched, pervas ive and 'rota!' defences as defences of the self (Fordham 1974 ). 
They are commonly linked to borderline psychotic phenomena, which is well-exemplified in 
Kalsched's paper in this same issue. 
I consider that these defences are not established until after a period of development at the end 
of the first year. However , I believe there is an important link between this period, when the 
beginnings of what will become shame begin to emerge, and rhe development of defences of the 
self. Defences of the self serve to protect a vulnerable and unstable sense of self from overwhelming 
shame and the threat to an individual's sense of agency, which is a fundamental expression of 
the self. Interestingly, Steiner and Schore associate overwhelming shame with borderline personal-
ities (Steiner 2001; Schore 2002.). 
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TRANSLATIONS OF ABSTRACT 
Dans cet article j'essaie de montrer que certains des vecus emotionnels qui donnent 
matiere au traumatisme sont inherents au developpement normal. Une non reintegration 
de ces vecus fera que ceux-ci peuvem servir de tremplin vibratoire devam des difficultes 
rencontrees plus tard dans la vie, cet effet vibratoire accentuam alors !'impact trau-
matique de l'evenemenc. Je decrirai Jes changemencs normaux qui ont lieu a la fin de la 
premiere annee, en les mettant en lumiere a ('aide de !'observation d'un bebe, et montrerai 
chez un enfant de six ans comment le fait qu'il n'ait pas pu integrer ces changements 
de la premiere annee contribue a ce que son experience d'un evenement normal de la 
vie soit vecu comme un traumatisme. Puis, a partir d'elements cliniques provenant de 
('analyse d'un homme adulte je moncrerai comment des evenements de la vie survenus 
plus tard entrent en resonnance avec des vecus de cette periode de la petite enfance. 
Tous ces vecus sont relies a un agencement complexe de relations d'objets que j'ai vu a 
]'oeuvre dans la dinique, par lequel des sentiments de perte associes a un objet idealise 
som dives des griefs ressemis vis a vis d'un objer vecu comme persecutif du fait du 
statut superieur qui Jui est octroye. 
In dieser Arbeit versuche ich zu zeigen, da.B zur gesunden Enrwicklung ernotionale 
Erfahrungen gehoren, die das Material von Trauma sind. Gelingt es nicht diese 
Erfahrungen zu re-integrieren, konnen sie als Resonanzboden for Schwierigkeiten im 
spateren Leben dienen, was ihre traumatische Wirkung noch verstarkt. Indem ich mich 
auf die generellen Veranderungen konzentriere, die am Ende des r. Jahres geschehen, 
demonstriere ich diese Entwicklungen mic einer Baby-Beobachtung und zeige, wie das 
Nichtgelingen der Integration dieser Erfahrungen bei einem sechs Jahre alten Knaben 
dazu beitrug, ein normal es Lebensereignis als Trauma zu erfahren. Ich bringe dann 
klinisches Material aus der Analyse eines Mannes um zu zeigen, wie Ereignisse im 
spateren Leben eine Resonanz erzeugten mit fri.iher Erfahrung, die mit diesem Zeitraum 
zusamrnenhangt. Alie sind verbunden mit einem kornplexen Objektbeziehungsmuster, 
<las ich klinisch gesehen habe. Dagegen sind Trauergefuhle in Verbindung mit einem 
idealisierten Objekt per Spaltung getrennt von Gefiihlen des Grolls gegen ein aufgrund 
seines iiberlegenen Status als verfolgend erlebtes Objekt. 
In questo lavoro cerco di dimostrare che le esperienze emotive che sono ii fondamento 
de! trauma sono inerenti a un sano sviluppo. II fallimento nella reintegrazione di queste 
esperienze significa che esse possono costituire una sorta di "camera di risonanza" per 
le successive difficolta della vita, aurnemando cosi ii loro impatto traumatico. Focaliz-
zandomi sui cambiamenti globali che occorrono alla fine de! primo anno, esemplifico 
tale sviluppo con un'osservazione infantile e mostro come in un bambino di 6 anni ii 
fallimento dell'integrazione di tali esperienze ha comribuito a far s'i che ii bambino 
sperimentasse un evento di vita normale come un trauma. Offro poi del materiale 
clinico dall'analisi di un uomo per dimosrrare come eventi di vita successiva risuonano 
con l'esperienza precoce associata a tale periodo. Si legano tutti a un complesso modello 
di relazioni oggettuali cui mi sono imbattuta nel lavoro clinico, laddove sentimenti di 
dolore associari con un oggetto idealizzato si scindono dal rancore nei confronti di un 
oggetto sperimentato come persecurore perche percepito come di stato superiore. 
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En este trabajo tratare de mostrar que el desarrollo saludable posee experiencias 
emocionales inherentes que constitu yen la esencia del trauma. La falla en integrar estas 
experiencias puede significar que ellas puedan servir como caja de resonancia para que 
surjan dificultades en la vida futura. Focalizandonos en los cambios globales que ocurren 
al final de! primer aiio, ejemplarizo estos desarrollos con la observaci6n de infantes y 
muestro como la falla para integrarlos en un niiio de seis aiios de edad contribuye para 
que vivencie eventos normales de la vida como experiencias traumat icas. Yo entonces 
presento un material clfnico de un hombre para demostrar como eventos tardfos en la 
vida resuenan con las experiencias tempranas asociadas a este periodo . Todas ellas estan 
ligadas a un complejo patron de relaciones objetales, me he encontrado clfnicamente 
donde los sentimientos de pena asociados a un objeto idealizado son separados de sen-
timientos de humillaci6n contra un objeto experimentado como persecutorio debido 
a que es percibido como perteneciente a una condici6n superior. 
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Fordham, Jung and the self: a 
re-examination of Fordham's contribution 
to Jung's conceptualization of the self 
Elizabeth Urban, London 
Abstract: This paper is about Fordham's contribution to Jung's studies on the self. It 
opens with the epistemological dilemmas inherent in the subject, before moving on to 
an account of Fordham's research into the incompatible ways Jung used the term 'self'. 
There is a description of Fordham's model, which covers his concepts of the primary 
self, deintegration, reintegration, self objects, self representations, and individuation in 
infancy. There is a section which discusses areas in which Fordham apparently diverged 
from Jung, including how these we.re reconciled by Fordham's developmental 
approach. These areas include the definition of the self as totality or archetype, the 
mind-body relationship, the 'ultimate', the origins of the archetypes, and the primary 
self, the self and the sense of self. It concludes with an extension to Fordham's outline 
of a resolution to Jung's incompatible definitions. This draws upon the concept of the 
central archetype of order and how its unfolding is evidenced towards the end of the 
first year of infancy. 
Key words: archetypes, central archetype of order, deintegration, infant development, 
Michael Fordham, primary self, reintegration, self representations. 
This paper is about Fordham's contribution to Jung's studies on the self. He 
was well aware that the self is a 'special case' because the subject studying is 
also the object studied and, moreover, that the observing ego is only a pan of 
the total subject of investigation : ' ... a concept of the totality is particularly 
difficult to construct', he noted; 'Indeed it is impossible' (Fordham 1985, 
p . 2.1). 
Any study of the self presents fundamental dilemmas. In philosophy the self 
is included under the 'complementarity principle'. Here Heisenberg's uncer-
tainty principle is extended beyond quantum physics to encompass philosoph-
ical situations involving properties that appear as particular pairs of opposites, 
termed canonical conjugates. 'Heisenberg deduced that when this relationship 
[of canonical conjugates] holds, ... the more determinate or 'sharp' the value 
of one of the quantities, the less determinate ( or more 'unsharp') its value for 
the other quantity' (Bullock & Trombley 2.000, p. 893). In Michael Frayn's 
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play Copenhagen, the character Heisenberg discusses the 'application of com-
plementarity' to the self (Frayn 1998, p. 69): 
Heisenberg [to Bohr] ... Exactly where you go as you ramble around is of course 
completely determined by your genes and the various physical forces acting upon 
you. But it's also completely determined by your own entirely inscrutable whims 
from one moment to the next. So we can't completely understand your behaviour 
without seeing it both ways at once, and that's impossible. Which means that your 
extraordinary peregrinations are not fully objective aspects of the universe. They 
exist only partially . . . as our minds shift endlessly back and forth between the two 
approaches. 
(ibid., pp. 69-70) 
The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy defines the self as 'the elusive "I" that 
shows an alarming tendency to disappear when we try to introspect it' (Black-
man 1996, p . 344). Warren Colman referred to the elusiveness and endless 
shift he encountered in the course of his own study on the self. 
Trying to think about the self was like trying to grasp a jelly that keeps slipping out 
of your hand. Someone pointed out to me that mercury would be an apt image of 
this and I suddenly understood why Mercurius holds such a central position in 
Jung's thinking. 
(Colman 1999) 
Another expres~ion of the elusiveness is the way the concept-an abstrac-
tion-shifts easily into reification, and the self becomes a 'thing' rather than an 
idea. Jung had resisted this in his work on religion, 
by claiming that all he could know is that psychology could explain much of religion 
and denying that psychology could be used as an instrument to tell whether God 
really existed apart from man. This is not a psychological issue at all and could only 
be tackled by philosophy . 
(Fordham 1985, p. 179) 
Fordham had tried to be clear that his and Jung's researches pertained topsy-
chological theory and phenomenology, not ontology . However, as the reader 
may find, this distinction can easily be lost when studying the self. 
Fordham's studies of the self 
Fordham regarded himself as a scientist. Late in life he reflected, 'I never really 
wanted to become a doctor, but rather, after studying natural sciences at 
Cambridge, was interested in the application of science to medicine' (Fordham 
1988, p. 7). Fordham entered child psychiatry in 193 3, just as he was 
beginning to become involved in Jungian psychotherapy. His earliest papers 
(1937-1943) reflected his conviction that children are individuals rather than 
products of parenting, and identified archetypal phenomena in rhe play, 
- -- -----
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dreams and drawings of the children he treated. By 1947 he had observed 
clinically how alternating states of integration and disruption produced ego 
development in small children and, within ten further years, he had established 
a model of development based on a deintegrating and reintegrating primary 
self (Fordham 1957) . Fordham 's work on the self culminated in Explorations 
into the Self, published in 1985. The volume is a tour de force of comprehen-
sion, intellect and Fordham's particular kind of vision, and it is disappointing 
that the editing of this volume did not match the quality of the author's work. 
Following Explorations there were numerous papers and two other volumes; 
however these were refinements to rather than major revisions of his model. 
The first chapter of Explorations, titled 'The self in Jung's works', is prob-
ably Fordham 's most condensed and complex paper . The chapter opens with a 
notable understatement: 'This first chapter is lengthy and somewhat heavy 
going ... ' (ibid., p. 5 ). Essentially it is a research project attempting to clarify 
what Jung meant by the self. It originally appeared in I963, not long after 
Robert Hobson had published his brief study of how Jung used the term 
'archetype' (Hobson 1961). Fordham's study revealed inconsistencies in the 
way Jung used the 'self', and he sets out to explain how they arose and how 
they can be resolved. 
In the introductory summary, Fordham contends that these incompatible 
definitions ' ... stem from the interlacing of primitive experience and the 
abstractions fr9m them' (ibid., p. 8). Jung's data were subjective affective 
experiences, symbols and myths derived from clinical experience and compara-
tive studies. When making hypotheses from this data, 'Jung kept his abstract 
formulations related to empirical affective experiences' (ibid., p. 2.5) in order 
for his theory to convey the wholeness for which it was supposed to account. 
To achieve this, Jung used metaphors. Hence his conceptualization combined 
directed thinking (the logical form underlying theoretical thought) and undi-
rected thinking (thought, like metaphors, influenced by archetypal processes). 
Added to this, over time Jung 'ran up against the lack of adequate [scientific] 
language' for expressing the wholeness of the self, so that later on in his writ-
ing he 'relied more and more on paradox ' (ibid., pp. 8-9 ). Fordham criticizes 
Jung's mixing myth with abstract statement because it devalues the role of the-
ory, when 'theories have advantages over myths in scientific studies . . . ' (ibid., 
p.,4 .8 
Fordham then reviews Jung 's data and points out that the clinical popula-
tion from which Jung had drawn was not representative . Rather, those 
involved tended to include exceptional individuals who were introverted, 
schizoid and some apparently mildly depressed. Jung's data also excluded ref-
erences to relationships with the external world and internal objects. Lastly, 
'there is a signal lack of attempt ' to bring in 'material related to childhood let 
alone infancy' (ibid., p. 17) . 
Fordham next considers Jung's theories of the self, first as it is defined as the 
totality of the personality , and then as an archetype. The totality definition 
- --------
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derived from references in Eastern mysticism to states of at-one-ness. However 
using this as the datum for defining a concept of totalit y comes up against the 
epistemological dilemma to which I referred earlier. •If the self is the whole 
psyche, then it cannot be observed intrapsychically' because the observing ego 
is only a part in the whole (ibid., p. 21). Furthermore, as much as Jung needed 
to base his theories on experiences. 'The difficulties in taking the primordial 
experience to represent the totality of the psyche are many, but the greatest so 
far considered is that experiences in solitude, however important in them-
selves, leave out the organism's adaptation to external objects whether per-
sonal or otherwise' (ibid., p. :?.2). 
As for the archetype definition, Fordham notes that it accounts for a range 
of phenomena related to wholeness (archetypal images) and, in fact, is closer 
to the data than the totality definition. However this data 'cannot also be the 
totalit y' because it excludes the ego, which Jung differentiated from the arche-
types. For instance, in Answer to Job, Jung (1954) used God to refer to the 
unconscious (a totality) yet God needs man (the ego, which is not an arche-
type) to become conscious. Fordham concludes that although ' . .. this defini-
tion [self as archetype] is nearer the phenomena described, ... the experience 
of wholeness is not a reliable basis on which to construct a definition of the 
self' (Fordham 1985, p. 23) . 
He then turns to others who have studied the same phenomena . He cites 
Perry, who observed self images in schizophrenia and considered them in rela-
tion to a 'central arche type' (ibid., p. 24). Fordham comments that all the 
images associated with the central archetype suggest a 'powerful integrative 
influence', whether in schizophrenia or a well-developed individual (ibid., 
p. 26). 
Fordham's conceptua l ana lysis concludes by returning, full circle, to the 
introductory comments about Jung's methodology. He asks whether it is 
acceptable to run two incompatible theories alongside one another: 'Is it 
enough to say that it is effective [sic: affective], pre-logical experience that 
counts and then play down theory?' (ibid., p. 29). Fordham thinks not. While 
he app reciates Jung's efforts to maintain the links between the concept and the 
data it was intended to describe, Jung's 'often graphic word-pictures ... are 
theoretically confusing' (ibid., p. 2 5 ). 
In a highly condensed paragraph at the end of the section on 'Genera l Psy-
chology' (p. 30), Fordham disentangles Jung 's 'interlacing of myth and model' 
(ibid., p. 7). To summarize it, I shall draw upon the distinction in logic 
between contradiction and paradox. A contrad iction can be stated: A is B and 
A is not B. It is unresolvable, inasmuch as • ... true contradictions indicate 
some conceptua l (theoretical) error>l. In contrast, a paradox is an apparent 
contradiction, the resolution to which can be worked out. When Jung used 
' I am grateful to John Adkins of Jesus College for rhis concise statement. 
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paradoxes to capture the nature of experiences of the self, he was referring to 
contents with in a whole, which includes opposites. From this position one can 
make paradoxica l statements such as 'the whole (images and experiences of 
totality) is in the part (the ego, the observer)' and 'the part (the ego) is in the 
whole'. However Jung seemed to regard experiences of wholeness as if they 
were actually of the totality , ignoring that the whole is beyond experience. 
Fordham's point is that the ·as if metaphor (undirected thinking) blurs logical 
distinctions (directed thinking) that are necessary when defining concepts used 
in a theoretical model of the self. Theoretical models require clear definitions 
and logical consistency. In effect Jung was saying that the self is the totality 
and the self is not the totality (it is a pare, an archetype}. This, Fordham points 
out, is a logical contradiction within a theoretical scheme, not a paradox. 
Having identified Jung's incompatible concepts of the self, Fordham asks, 
'Can a hypothesis be formulated closer to the experiences accumulated and 
capable of being t~sted by or used to organize them? ' (ibid., p. 31). Here lies 
Fordham's resolution to the dilemma . I shall develop this later on. 
The model 
The model as it stood in its most mature form drew upon several concepts: the 
primary self, deintegration, reintegration, self objects, self representations, and 
individuation. 
Jung had conceived of the self as a way of accounting for certain, particularly 
mystical, phenomena in adulthood . Fordham shifts the function of the self 
within the theoretical model so that it accounts for development, postulating a 
primary self as the starting point . Certain processes are defined as integral to 
the central postulate, which account for how development proceeds and 
contents and structures are formed. These processes, structures and the rela-
tionships between them are then used to account for subjective phenomena, 
including the states of integration for which Jung sought an explanation. 
Implied in what Fordham writes is that the primary self is also a period of 
development. 
Fordham 's starting point is before and beyond all phenomena, and hence 
refers to a phenomenon-less state . As a postulate, the primary self is a psycho-
somatic integrate, that is 'empt y' of phenomena, so that it is 'nothing but' 
potential. Rosemary Gordon has described the primary self as 'a simple 
totality ... a matrix of all those potential faculties of the organism which await 
the process of "deintegration" and "reintegration" in order to become opera-
tive and so actualize themselves' (Gordon 1985, p. 267) . Mario Jacoby also 
associates the primary self with potential, describing 'the primary self as the 
original potential' (Jacoby 2003 ). Elsewhere I have commented that the prim-
ary self might be seen as analogous to the egg at the instant (if there is one) of 
fertilization, at a moment conceptually held in time (Urban 199 2). Astor 
describes it as 'somewhat analogous to the potential in DNA but probably 
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without its hereditary constituents' (Astor 1995, p. 50 ). Unlike the egg at the 
moment of fertilization but like the cosmic egg to which Fordham had earlier 
associated it (Fordham 1957), the primary self is a mystical concept, referring 
to the 'nothing that is everything'. Although the primary self has no represent-
ations, there are subjective states associated with it, such as those in early 
infancy following a satisfying feed, as well as later on, such as mystical states 
that refer to the 'pregnant absence' expressing the potential that is the essence 
of the primary self. 
The concept implies that the infant is an individual from the start, and that 
development begins from within, given of course an adequate environmental 
background. A physiological analogy is the onset of the embryo's heartbeat. 
As the embryo 's first observable activity, at about three weeks, the heartbeat 
'initially originates within the heart itself ... it is not a response to an external 
stimulus' (Bremner 1994, p. 25) . 
Inherent in the concept of the primary self is its dynamic, the complement-
ary processes of deintegration and reintegration that, taken together , Fordham 
terms actions of the self. Both concepts refer to processes that underlie 
development. The alternating disruption and stability of deintegration and 
reintegration can be recognized in a summary hypothesis offered by Thelen 
from her studies of motor development in early infancy . 
. . . in order ro understand development we have to understand tha t complex systems 
are self-organizing: they 'prefer ' stares of equilibrium. How ever they can be pushed 
towards new states of equilibrium by particular forces, acting from within the organism 
or from the external environment. Thus development is understood as a progression 
through a series of stable states. 
(Bremner 1994, p. 4 7 ) 
As the earliest period in development, the primary self is assumed to operate 
from before birth . This is substantiated by, amongst others, Piontelli, who 
made ultrasound observations of foetal development. Her studies show foe-
tuses exploring their intrauterine home, playing with the placenta, touching 
themselves and, in twinships, their foetal sibling through the membranes that 
separate them (Piontelli 1992). 
Fordham conceptualized deintegration and reintegration in order to account 
for developmental processes before structures and contents became estab-
lished. For example, internalization is development of deintegration and 
reintegration, involving repeated engagements with an experience (deintegra-
tion) and assimilating these time and again into the personality (reintegratio n). 
He held that initially these actions of the self create a particular state, termed 
primitive identity, which is meant to account for states of fusion. Recent neuro-
scientific studies into right brain function have contributed to an unde rstand-
ing of how this state comes about. 
Researchers have discovered that it takes 30 millisecond s for .rn iniam to 
apprai se facially expressed emotional cues, roo millisecon ds r1-1 dcce.:r and 
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carry out complex processing of change within a human face, and 3 00-400 
milliseconds to mirror and synchronously match the affect of an emotionally 
expressive face. The same applies for recognizing and matching the emotional 
qualities of voices (termed 'prosody'). Within this split second , what is per-
ceived by the infant triggers affect and concomitant bodily responses that are 
innately connected to expression. So "' reading " another's emotional expres-
sion' entails decoding by 'actual felt [somatic] emotional reactions to the 
stimuli ... ' (Schore 2002, p. 27 , quoting from Day & Wong 1996 , p. 651). 
Schore emphasizes how instantaneous perceiving and matching are occurring 
within both mother and infant engaged together . This results in a mutual map-
ping process comprised of a 'very rapid sequence of reciprocal affective trans -
actions [co-constructed] within the intersubjective field' (Schore 2002, p. 19 ). 
These are experienced subjectively as a state of fusion. 
Deintegration produces deintegrates, which are early proto-structures and 
contents. 2 Deintegration and deintegrates are conceived as processes, struc-
tures and experiences that remain part of the self. An analogy is the relation-
ship of the pseudopodia (deintegration and its contents, deintegrates) to the 
amoeba (the primary self). Early deintegrates are structured within the self via 
reintegration, which shapes experiences along archetypal lines, that is, within 
universal human patterns. In time, these proto-structures, which are made up 
of fragments of similar kinds of experience such as good, bad, 'I' and 'not-I' , 
coalesce into more stable structures that develop into a.n;hetypal forms and the 
ego. As they all begin as deintegrates, they maintain a fundamental link with 
the primary self. The neurological understanding behind this is that experi-
ences provoke firings in the brain that over time become wired together, and 
these wirings, if repeated often enough, become patterned, that is, integrated 
within the brain into generalized phenomena. 
As I have noted, the subjective experience of states of ident ity is a state of 
fusion with the other, producing an object Fordham termed a self object. Self 
objects contrast with ' realit y' objects: 
When the object is mainly a record of reality, it may be called a reality object; when 
it is mainly constructed by the self and so records states of the self, made out of 
exteroceptive and introceptive sense data, then it may be called a self object ... Ir 
appears that self-objects increase in affectively charged scares, whilst in quiet contem-
plative exploring activities real objects predominate. 
(Fordham 1985, p. 56) 
Conceptually, self objects are closely related to self representations, and 
Fordham 's use of each has become confused with how other theoreticians 
have used these terms. Stern describes the infant's developmental experience 
i The term 'deintegration ' has proved difficult for rhose unfamiliar wirh Fordham . In part th is is 
because it seems to connote an undoing of a negatiYe nature. Fordham intended it to be seen as che 
unfolding of an integrate thar does nor un-do development, bur instead is an essentia l part o f it. 
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from the point of view of the emerging ego, beginning with the sense of emer-
gent self. Over time a more coherent sense of self begins to emerge, indicating 
that the ego has taken on some preliminary form and that menta l represent-
ations of the self are becoming established. Fordham's position contrasts with 
developmental theorists who hold that the baby's self representations are 
derived fundamentally from internalizing the experiences of and with the 
mother (Stern 1985; Fonagy eta!. 2.002). In Fordham's model self represent-
ations are understood as expressions (representations} of the wholeness of the 
primary self occurring in the developing ego, that is, conscious awareness. 
Because it is a product of deintegration and reintegration, the infant's sense of 
self derives from the infant as well as from interactions with the mother. 
To give an example of what is meant by the emergence of self representations 
in the ego I shall turn to a brief observation. It is of two babies about the same 
size, although one was five months old and the other eight months. They were 
sitting near one another on the floor when a large doll was placed between 
them. Each explored it simultaneously and it began to topple from one to the 
other. Occasionally when the younger one had the doll, the older one seemed to 
want it and pulled it his way. The younger one did not get distressed but 
seemed perplexed that the doll was 'going away', and watched it go with some 
surprise, clearly unaware that another person was removing it. The younger 
one never tried to pull away the doll when the older one had it, while the older 
one did this several times from the younger. The impression is that the older 
one had a stronger sense of himself, his agency, his wishes and what he felt to 
be his, while the younger one had not yet reached this point of self-awareness. 
Fordham links the infant's developing sense of himself with individuation. 
He holds that the infant is an individual from the start, so that 'indiv iduation 
becomes realization of his condition through the development of self represent-
ations' (Fordham 1985, p. 54). This is another way of saying that the infant' s 
ego is developing a gradually more discriminated sense of his individualit y 
and wholeness, realized through evolving expressions of the primary self. 
These expressions are not directly of the self, but via representations of a psy-
chosomatic unity beyond experience, let alone consciousness. In this process 
the infant's experiences involving various senses of himself are incorporated 
around a sense of having a centre. Fordham links this centredness back to the 
original state, re-experienced during early infancy in the sense of wholeness 
that occurs with, say, pleasurable feeds. 
As deintegration and reintegration continue, more stable internal structures 
and processes develop, leading to greater complexity as these in turn de,·elop. 
For example, at the end of the first year, the baby begins to understand that 
when the mother points, she intends for him to look at something. This is the 
beginning of what developmental psychologists term a ' theory of mind', 
whereby the baby is able to perceive that the mother has her own motives, 
intentions and thoughts, in short, a mind behind her face, and this matches a 
growing sense of his having a mind of his own. 
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Discussion 
Although Fordham's work is based in Jung, some elements diverge from Jung. 
Fordham 's developmental approach often reconciles apparent differences, as I 
hope to explain. 
The definition of the self concept-t otality or archetype 
Fordham had pointed out (1963, 1985) Jung's 'incompatible definitions' 
of the self. Fordham consistently defined the self as the totality of personality. 
I shall try to give an example of what Fordham meant by the infant being 
a psychosomatic totality by giving a brief observation of a baby, whom I shall 
call Jake. 
Jake and his mother had been referred for parent-infant therapy and I saw 
them when Jake was just over a month old. Throughout the session Jake was 
asleep while his mother and I were talking. From time to time I noticed Jake 
and what he was doing, which gave the impression of a progression, or 
unfolding, of development in relation to what was happening around him. 
Just as I was entering the room to join Jake and his mother , the door 
slammed behind me with a loud bang. Jake was asleep in his sling cot on the 
floor in front of his mother, and he startled at the noise. His whole body 
jerked forward reflexively as if to curl up protectively, although he did not 
wake up. A bit later I noticed Jake begin to squirm and buckle forward-a 
variation of the reflexive curling into himself-after which he stretc hed out 
w ith his arms raised in front of him . He slept sound ly again and then wrig-
gled a bit, his face puckering as if working up into a cry, his head gently turn-
ing from side ro side as if expressing 'no'. He then stretched his arms forward 
and upward, his fingers extended with palms outward. It appeared as if he 
was pushing something away , what I presumed was the 'badness' of the 
noise. 
A bit later, as he drifted again into lighter sleep, the pushing away move-
ment was clearly directed toward me, and what I guessed was the ' badness ' of 
my felt presence, which might have been Jinked with the bang followed by my 
unfamiliar voice. Still later I observed him making similar yet quite different 
motions toward his mother. He stretched his arms out toward her but with his 
fingers exten ded and palms held downw ard rather than up, so it looked as if 
he was reaching rather than pushing away. As I watched, his gestures seemed 
quite different depending on the direction of his arms; towar d me, he pushed 
away and toward his mother, he reached out. 
Here we see a baby relating to what is happening around him in spite of 
being asleep. It is difficult to say what level of awareness he has, but he is cer-
tainly not conscious in the sense we ordinarily mean it. In fact the distinction 
between conscious and unconscious is irrelevant, and it is useful to consider 
what is happening in terms of the self. Jake's self is a psychosomatic self, 
135 
Elizabeth Urban 
whereby bodily actions convey that experiences are being internally organ ized, 
or differentiated, into 'me' and 'not-me', and 'good' and 'bad' experiences. It is 
however not an observation of the primary self, only of its expressions via 
deintegration and reintegration, functioning in a unified way within a separate 
'unit' r esponding to what is going on externally and internally. Furthermore, 
the experiences are of sensations rather than of mental images. 
I am trying to show how Fordham recognized a unity and personhood of 
the infant . However, might this observation also be seen as an example of the 
self regarded as an archetype? I shall come to this later in the paper. 
The mind-body relationship 
Jung seemed divided on the issue of mind and body. Fordham notes, 'At one 
time Jung conceived the archetype as the psychic representation of instinct 
only, but he often writes as if they were purely psychic forms' (Fordham 1985, 
p. 162). In Psychological Types Jung defines the self as the psychic totality; 
' the self is the subject of my total psyche which also includes the unconscious' 
(Jung 1971, para. 706; my italics). Also, Jung considered psyche and soma as 
opposites : 'Mind and body are presumably a pair of opposites and, as such, 
the expression of a single entity whose essential nature is not knowable either 
from its outward, material manifestation or from inner, direct perception' 
(Jung 192.6, para. 619). 
Undoubtedly Jung was aware of a mind-body link because his experimental 
researches depended on this. These researches drew upon the James -Lange theory 
of affect, which distinguished between 'emotion' and 'feeling': 
I take emotion as affect, it is the same thing as 'something affects you'. It does some-
thing to you-it interferes with you. Emotion is the thing that carries you away: You 
are thrown out of yourself; you are beside yourself as if an explosion had moved you 
out of yourself and put you beside yourself. There is a quire tangible physiological 
condition which can be observed at the same time. So the difference would be this: 
feeling has no physiological or tangible physiological manifestations, while emotion 
is characterized by an altered physiological condition. 
(Jung 193 5a, para. 46) 
Jung's statement is in line with the thinking of the contemporary neurologist 
Anthony Damasio, whose research has drawn upon the same theory of affect: 
In a typical emotion, then, certain regions of the brain, which are part of a largely 
preset neural system related to emotions, send commands to other regions of the 
brain and rn almost everywhere in the body proper ... The result of these coordi-
nated chemical and neural commands is a global change in the state of the organism. 
The organs which receive the commands change as a result of the command, and the 
muscles, whether the smooth muscles in a blood vessel or the striated muscles in the 
face, move as they are told to do. But the brain itself is changed just as remarkab ly. 
(Damasio 1999, pp. 67-8) 
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According to Damasio, the brain spontaneously makes a primary mapping of 
these 'changes in the body state that are induced in myriad organs' (Damasio 
r994, p. r39). In contrast to emotion, feeling is the imaging of these changes, 
called secondary mapping. Just how this happens is unknown , although sec-
ondary mapping (feelings) might be said to be more clearly psychic than 
psychosomatic . If the self is considered the psychic totality, then by logical 
extension the concept would exclude emotions, and this makes no sense. If 
emotions are included in the notion of psyche, then the body is necessarily 
involved. According to Damasio, to 'feel the feeling', consciousness as well as 
primary and secondary mapping are required, that is, consciousness is based 
on psychosomatic elements. 
Fordham addresses the mind-body question developmentally. He regards 
the self as a psychosomatic entity, which over time deintegrates and reinte-
grates into mental and physical functioning. 'In treating these twin concepts, 
psyche and soma, as deinteg rates, their origin in the self is not lost sight of, nor 
is their adaptive value left out of account' (Fordham r98 5, p. r70). When Jung 
states (in places), and other Jungians imply, that the self is 'only' psychic, it 
may be because they work primarily with adults. Throughout Fordham's 
career he worked with children and was aware of how bodily their expressions 
are-touching, running, stroking, climbing, biting, hitting and spitting. His 
developmental model was intended to cover the continuity between childhood 
and adulthood, and the bodiliness of the mind throughout life was integral to 
his thinking . 
The 'ultimate · 
Both Jung and Fordham commented on a state to which they referred as 'the 
ultimate'. Jung's reference is in Memories ., Dreams, Refl.ections, when he is 
describing his experiences following the break up with Freud. He wro te, 'On ly 
gradua lly did I discover what the mandala really is: "Formations, Transfo rma-
tions, Eternal Mind's eterna l recreation" ... In them I saw the self-that is my 
whole being-actively at work ... [in them]. I had attained what was for me 
the "ultimate" ' (Fordham r985, p. r2, taken from Jun g 1963, pp. 187-8 ). 
Fordham 's comment on 'the ultimate ' is as follows: 
... a reflection on 'the ultimate'. I take it to represent a state in which there is no 
past and no future, though it is present like a point which has position by [sic: but) 
no magnitude. It has no desires, no memory, no thoughts, no images but out of it by 
transformation all of these can deintegrate. There is no consciousness so no uncon-
scious- it is a pregnant absence. 
(Fordham r985, p. 33) 
The 'ultimate' described in each quote refers to mystic states, which both Jung 
and Fordham studied. Jung's work was extensive and well known, while 
Fordham's lesser known studies focused on the experiences described by 
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St. John of the Cross. As Astor describes, Fordham saw similarities (as well as 
important differences) between the process described by the saint (the scala 
mystica) and individuation (Astor 199 5 ). Noting that 'the past never disap-
pears it is transformed', Fordham traces 'ultimate' union with God to its 
sources in infancy (Fordham 1985, p. 197). This primitive object relationship 
involves an experience of a good feed leading to the image of a good breast. 
This occurs developmentally before the infant's capacity for differentiation, 
thus involving projective and introjective identification. This account explains 
the subjective experience of union and views the mystical state as a transform-
ation of the earliest state of infancy. Fordham notes, 'That state is nearest to 
the whole self' (ibid., p. 198). 
Fordham's comment on the 'ultimate' comes at the end of the first chapter 
of Explorations into the Self and seems tacked on to what precedes it . In fact, 
the paragraph was not included in previous editions of the paper (Fordham 
1963; Fordham et al. 1973 ). Why did Fordham add it? I believe that he did so 
because states of integration were central to Jung's conceptualization of the 
self and Fordham wanted to include an equivalent state associated with his 
model. Drawing upon Bion, Fordham refers to a phenomenon-less state, a 
'pregnant absence', which presents a contrast to Jung's idea of the 'ul timate'. 
For Jung, the 'ultimate' is the individuated self experienced as a unity that 
transcends the multiplicity of object relationships. For Fordham, the 'ultimate' 
is the primary self, which precedes but contains the potential for and predis-
position to develop a multiplicity of objects and relationships w ith them. 
The 'origins' of the archet)'pes 
The old conflict between nature and nurture for a long period divided psycholo-
gists into opposing camps of 'na tivists', who came down on the side of 
innateness, and 'empiricists ', who came down on the side of the environment. 
Within the nativist camp, distinctions were made between 'p reformationism ', 
whereby 'structures underlying behaviour are there from birth', and 'pr edeter-
minism ', in which structures develop during childhood through a predeter-
mined sequence of differentiation and elaboration' (Bremner 1994, p. 5). 
Although Jung and Fordham held that both nature and nurture played a role 
in development, the distinctions between preformationism and predeterminism 
may help to clarify a difference between them regarding the 'origins' of the 
archetypes. 
Jung had stressed that the archetypes were a priori, as was the archaic 
substrate of the collective unconscious. To use Barbara Wharton's metaphor 
(personal communication) archetypes are there from the beginning like a dry 
river bed ready to receive water and then flow. Jun g wrote, 
So far as I know, there is no inheritance of individual pre-natal, or pre-uterine, mem-
ories, but there are undoubtedly inherited archetypes which are, however, devoid of 
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content, because, to begin with. they contain no personal experiences. They only 
emerge into consciousness when personal experiences have rendered them visible. 
(Jung r935b, para. 846 ) 
Here it is implied that the archetypes and the collective unconscious are con-
ceived to be 'there' as innate, 'pre-formed' endowments. 
In relation to Jung, Fordham can be seen as a 'predeterminist' (although 
only in this specific sense). He holds that structures, including body, mind and 
the structures and processes of each, unfold out of the primar y self via deinte -
gration. He writes, ' ... in infancy the archetypal forms are derived from the 
self through its deintegration ' (Fordham I985, p. 45). 
To expand upon this, I should like to turn to an observat ion in a video pro -
duced by Johnson and Johnson, entitled The Amazing Talents of the Newborn 
(Johnson & Johnson 1998) . It shows a series of stills of Andrew, forty minutes 
after his birth. Andrew has been dried but not washed or given various treat-
ments, so that the smells of the amniotic fluid are still with him. He has been 
placed on his mother's abdomen and slowly starts climbing towards his 
mother's breast and face. The narrator relates that as he does so, the move-
ment of his feet stimulates her uterus to 'clamp down' so that the bleeding 
stops. while also producing the ' love hormone ', oxytosin, resulting in powerful 
feelings of love. Then it is noted how Andrew looks from her face to her right 
nipple and back to her face again, and, in the little pauses in between, he sucks 
his fingers. The narrator describes how there are similarities between the smell 
and taste of the amniotic fluid and what Andrew will smell and taste of his 
mother's milk. He continues to look from face to nipple and back again, and 
then, lifting his head to look at his mother's face, he is put just in the right 
position to latch on to the aureole, which he does. This awesome interpla y of 
nature and nurture is a good way to exemplify what is meant by early arche-
typal phenomena and its relation to deintegration. 
Bremner points out that behaviours like Andrew's may be viewed as innate, 
or 'pre-wired', 'if we take birth as the starting point, [but] the fetus's activities 
in the womb may have been involved in the "wiring up" process' (Bremner 
I 994, p. 3 6). For instance, the stepping movements that Andrew uses to crawl 
are now known to be foetal movements, which may be important in prevent-
ing the organism from becoming attached to the side of the uterus. Bremner 
adds, 'So instead of there being just one dramatic neura l reorganization fol-
lowing birth, it seems more plausible that, starting in the fetal stage, there are 
a series of discontinuities brought about as successively higher regions of the 
brain become functional' (Bremner 1994 , p. 37). This can be seen to describe 
Fordham's idea of how a phenomenon-less , 'empty' primary self develops even 
before birth. 
The observation of Andrew shows the meeting point of nature and nurtu re. 
Fordham held that the match between them need not be perfect . Although 
newborns like Andrew may be capable of what is termed the 'breast crawl', it 
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is not the actual experience of many babies, in spite of the fact that they do 
adapt, survive and thrive. Developmentalists refer to this as the newborn's 
'flexibility in the range of his affordances', that is, how he makes use of the 
environment . Fordham believed that the infant also contributes to the environ-
ment, and Andrew's stimulation of oxytosin in his mother's bloodstream is a 
good example of what he meant. However Andrew also contributed to his 
own development even before birth because foetal stepping produces neural 
activity and organization in the foetal brain. 
If archetypes are the result of deintegration and reintegration, how does 
Fordham account for the collective in childhood? Firstly, it should be clear by 
this point that he does not believe that the infant is born with a wealth of col-
lective images which then become projected onto the mother. Nor does he 
believe that 'The unconscious psyche of the child is trul y limitless in extent and 
of incalculable age' (Jung 1931, para. 9 5 ). Instead Fordham turned to Jung's 
likening of archetypal phenomena to a spectrum coyering, at the one end, 
instinctual life (as with the example of Andrew) and, at the other, spiritual life. 
For Fordham, expressions of the collective in infancy are best understood in 
terms of a body mythology , as Melanie Klein had understood and described. 
As for the spiritual pole, the child's predisposition to 'develop archaic ideas, 
feelings and fantasies ... are influenced and refined by education which in 
turn, as in feedback systems, provides suitable imagery through which the 
unconscious archetypes can find expression in consciousness' (Fordham 1976, 
p. 6). The growing child discovers images around him that cont ribute to the 
imagery expressive of the collective. Images become available via the culture at 
large, such as children's books, television, films and-the therapist's curse-
video games. Miranda Davies has referred to the one-sidedness of most of 
these popular images, and the imbalance of power, speed, and violence at the 
expense of smallness, dependency and loss (Davies 1993 ). 
Fordham adds, 'In contrast to the instinctual drives, which are relatively 
fixed and few in number, the fantasy (or spiritual) component has wide and 
flexible application' (Fordham 1976, p. 6). 
The primm·y self, the self mtd the sense of self 
What is the difference between the primary self and the self? Rosemary Gor-
don had noted that the primary self 'is a primitive form of the self' (Gordon 
1985, p. 267 ). To this I have added that the primary self is also a period of 
development. This raises such questions as when does the primary self begin 
and when is the self no longer primary? In this section, I shall divert in order to 
clarify certain matters , including Fordham's position in relation to current 
conflicts amongst Jungians who also rake a developmental perspective. 
Fordham would not be pinned down in dating the beginning of the primary 
self, other than to say it occurred before birth. It is important to keep in mind 
that Fordham postulated a psychosomatic integrate. Carvalho warns against 
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'the danger particularly when the idea of the "self"' is pushed back prior to the 
formation of a nervous system and its function of apperception , [because] 
the idea invites theologizing, idealization and inflation' (Carvalho 198 5, 
pp. 237-8 ). Using ' the formation of a nervous system' as a guide, one might 
consider the primary self to have beginnings as early as fourteen days after 
conception, with 'the formation of the primitive streak and therefore the 
beginning of the development of the nervous system' (Piontelli 1992, p. 109). 
If one includes apperception, that is, the cognition of a perception, this may 
change the dating, to say, around seven weeks, when external stimuli to the 
peri-oral area will produce a response, indicating neural connections have 
begun to become established. ·1 Bremner considers that 'in practice it is often 
hard to draw a clear line between perceptual and cognitive processes' 
(Bremner 1994, p. 52). The same is likely to be the case with the beginning of 
the primary self. 
Carvalho is reluctant to use the term 'primary self 'unless talking about the 
primary integrate after the stage at wh ich it has developed a mind and the 
functions of mind' (Carval ho r985, p. 237; my emphasis). He states that 
"'se lf" as a term implies some notion of reflectiveness and therefore of mind 
and awareness' (ibid., p. 23 6),4 a position shared by Louis Zinkin. Within 
Fordham's model, both Jungians are referring to the sense of self. 
Fordham distinguished between the self and the sense of self, and for him 
the difference was major . In 1986 Zinkin published a paper in the Journal of 
Analytical Psychology, in which he criticized Fordham's notion of the primary 
self; 
Because Fordham is deeply concerned with babies and how they come to have a 
sense of self, a sense of an inside and outside, he posits an original self . . . which 
seems to be quite undifferentiated which he sees as deintegrating through an act of 
spontaneous division. 
It is here that I have rhe greatest difficulty with his theory ... the baby is at no time 
undifferentiated even when it is a foetus [sic zygote] consist ing of only one cell. As a 
model or a hypothesis of what takes place in infan cy I cannot accept th at the re is an 
original self ... . I can agree with it only as a postulate like ' initial conditions' in 
systems theory language but would regard such a state as preceding rhe birth of the 
individua l. 
(Zinki n r986, p . .302) 
The article was controversial. James Astor, who is and was at the time 
an authority on Fordham's work, wrote a letter to the Journal, stat ing, 'The 
·' The peri-oral area is the first part of the body m come 'on-line'. The onset of the response marks 
the point the embryonic period ends and the foetal period hegins (Bremner r994. p. 2.5). 
4 The word 'self is of Anglo-Saxon, Old Saxon and Old Norse origins, and Damasio notes that 
the term does not occur in romance languages except in the reflexive, such as 'self-reflective', ·self-
centred" (Damasio 1999 ). Nor, I am told, does 'self' occur in the Eastern languages of Hindi and 
Gugerati. 
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Winnicottian idea that the original self is undifferentiated is not one that 
Michael Fordham subscribes to ... ' (Astor 1987 , p. 57). 
Zinkin's misunderstanding of Fordham extended to other elements of 
Fordham's position. Fordham had not postulated a primary self simply in 
order to account for the sense of self. It was to account for the fundamental 
unity of the infant before an ego is formed, including the capacity of the infant 
to relate to and make use of the environment, particularly its human compo-
nents, as we saw with Jake . Secondly, Fordham had explained that the sense of 
self arose as self-representations became part of the ego, so only indirectly did 
it come from the primary self. Thirdly, whether the self is differentiated or not 
depends on what is meant by differentiation. The sleeping infant Jake could 
differentiate between his mother and me, but it is unlikely that he had formed 
stable internal differentiation in terms of self, good, not self and bad. 
Following this paper, Fordham initiated a personal correspondence with 
Zinkin that lasted from Januar y to June of 1987. In his initial letter Fordham 
wrote: 
... you [Zinkin] cannot conceive of a self without a sense of 'I' or 'myself', but Jung 
persistently denies that his 'self' is that and he regularly distinguishes the ego from 
the self .... I was quite horrified at the symposium on the self in the Journal [Vol. 30, 3, 
in wh ich Carval ho's paper had appeared] to see how far our members had departed 
from Jung in this respect. 
(Zinkin 1998, p. 13 6)5 
Zinkin responded and Fordham wrote back, enclosing some notes he had 
made about foetal deintegration and reintegration. They include the following: 
Cons idering the accumulation of data it would seem wrong to assert, as has been 
widely done and still is in many quarters, that a foetus has no menta l life and so no 
ego even in the later part of gestation, say after five months when his brain is fully 
formed. Even before this it would be daring to assert that there are no physical ele-
ments from which mental life will emerge. 
(ibid., p. 139) 
Here however Fordham seems to be regarding the primary self as a concept 
beyond time and space and therefore existence, at the same time as making 
efforts to date it (in his notes). 6 The correspondence does make clear the 
strength of his opinion that the self is not the same as the sense of self. 
~ Daniel Srern and Anronio Damasio have in rheir respective ways also studied the self. Srern and 
Damasio are careful to use phrases such as 'sense of' or ·feeling' of self, while not gett ing into the 
thorny issue of what the self is. Each holds their respective ideas, whethe r explicit or implied, 
ahout an 'emergent ' and ·core self (Stern 1985 ) or ·proro-self' (Damasio 1999). These ~re 
not equivalents to the primary self, but they refer to the same dynamic entity that Fordham 
postulated. 
6 Fordham's attempts to date the beginning of the primary self imply that the concept also refers 
ro the period of development. 
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An extension to Fordham's resolution to Jung's incompatible definition 
I shall now return to Fordham's attempt at a resolution of the contradictory 
meanings Jung attributed to the self. In so doing, I shall address the question 
of when the primary self is no longer primary. 
Fordham concludes his study in the first chapter of Explorations with an 
overly condensed section entitled 'The nature of the self'. I shall expand on 
this section, which is a reworking of a previous paper (1963, republished in 
1973). The chapter was being revised when Fordham was still recovering from 
a serious illness, when his wife and colleague, Frieda, had become quite infirm 
and dependent, and while he was under pressure to complete what was 
undone in his life's work. His purpose in this section of the chapter is to 
answer the question, 'Can a hypothesis [about what is meant by the self] be 
formulated closer to the experiences accumulated and capable of being tested 
by or used to organize them?' (Fordham 1985, p. 31). Fordha m's purpose here 
would be clearer if he had retained the original section heading: 'Attempt at a 
solution of the theoretica l quandary'. 
Essentially Fordham's resolution lies in a development approach. Develop-
ment begins with the primary self, that is, the potential for an individual being 
with psychosomatic continuity and the capacity to adapt. Deintegration and 
reintegration lead to the development of stable structures, both somatic and 
psychic, including an embodied mind and conscious sense of self. This involves 
the emergence of archetypal struct ures and forms, and one of particu lar 
importance to Fordham's model is the central archetype of order. The term 
identifying this archetype seemed to be Fordham's way of dealing with the 
'problem of nomenclature', that is, the term 'self' had been used to refer to 
both the archetype and the totality of the self. If a distinction was needed in 
the conceptualization, one was also needed in the terminology. Fordham had 
clearly intended the term to be an alternative to wha t Jung had meant by the 
archetype of the self. In the original version of what became Chapter 1 in 
Explorations he wrote, 'The central ego has a special relation to what, with 
some hesitation, may be called the central archetype of order (archetype of the 
self, in Jung's terminology)' (Fordham 1963, p. 20). 
The 'cent ral archetype of order' had been used by Jung and Perry. To my 
awareness, Fordham had first used the term in a 1962 paper, 'Ego, self and 
mental health ' (Fordham 1962.). It is republished in Explorations as Chapter 
7, 'M ental Health' , where he states, 'Turning to the possible ways the arche-
types may be related to each other, we at once think of the possibility of a hier-
archy subserv ient to a central organizing system, as Jung suggested when he 
referred to the self as the centra l archetype of order' (Fordham 1985 , p. n7). 
Fordham again used the concept in his 1963 research study on Jung's mean-
ings of self, in which he pointed out that Perry had used the term to account 
for images of who leness in schizophrenia. Fordham expanded on this, drawing 
out the integrative function of the central archetype, which is evident in the 
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individuation process as well as apart from it (in psychosis ), and in early 
development. Fordham also used term in a 1964 paper, 'Th e relatio n of the 
ego to the self', revised as Chapte r 6 in Explorations. In the revision he writes, 
'If the "lch Geflihl" be considered from the dimension of the ego , then the self 
appears as part of the ego. But looked at from that of the self, then it would be 
conceived as manifesting the central archetype of which the ego is a part ' 
(Fordham r985 , p. 108). 
It seems that Fordham used the concept of a central archetype of order 
during the early 196o's, at a time when he was consolidating his model of 
development. He then dropped the term. It does not appear in eithe r Chil-
dten as Individuals ( I 969) or The Self mid Autism ( 1976), yet it reappears in 
Explorations in the chapters that are revisions of the 196o's papers. Why 
had Fordham revived the term in Explorations and why, once revived, did he 
not develop it? I suggest that after Fordham started to use 'central archetype 
of order', he became more involved in, amongst other activities, his clinical 
research into autism. In his research, Fordham used the concept of self 
objects to describe the lack of self/other differentiation that was so evident in 
his clinical studies. He did not need the concept of an archetype distin-
guished by its function of integration because he was thinking of autism as a 
problem primarily of deintegration. Why was the idea of the central arche-
type revived but then not developed? I consider this may be because he real-
ized that the central archetype enabled him to resolve Jung's contradiction 
via his developmental model and needed to remain. Fordham ma y not have 
had the energy to develop it as he progressed into old age, when he needed to 
prioritize his efforts around the two volumes and numerous reviews, papers 
and chapters he wrote during the last ten years of his life . He may also not 
have considered he had the data to develop the concept of a central arche-
type of order. 
I should like to extend the concept as he presented it. To begin, Fordham 
clearly meant for the central archetype of order to distinguish a particular 
archet ype that has special integrative functions in relation to the archetypes 
and to the ego. He describes the archetype as follows: 
Integration is the main function of the self ([that is,) the archetype of order) . . . That 
central archetype can be thought of an [sic: as] an organizer of the unconscious: it 
contributes significantly to the formation of the central ego in which it finds expres-
sion especially in conscious experiences of selfhood . .. In this formulation, the central 
archetype, being a part system in the total self, can be introjected, projected, can 
assimilate other unconscious elements. identify with the ego, be the source of 
religious experience, the source of the central ego, and function mostly in the uncon-
scious in a compensatory manner until it gets realized, i.e., largely integrated into 
the ego in individuation ... At the same time, room is left for the personal life of the 
individual and his relation to the external world as a whole, within the self conceived 
of as the superordinate totalit y. 
(Fordham 1985, pp. 31-3) 
144 
Fordham, Jung and the self 
How might the notion of the central archetype be viewed developmentally? By 
the end of the first year, most infant researchers agree there is a surge of signi-
ficant developments. These changes include the beginning of attachment 
proper, when there is an enhanced awareness of the singularity and signifi-
cance of the attachment figure, accompanied by the infant's new consciousness 
of his own individuality and value. Also there are the dawning awarenesses of 
a theory of mind, mentioned earlier, and the capacit y for empathy (Schore 
2002). This period corre lates with Stern's domain of subjectivity (that is, of 
the subjective sense of self), and might be seen as the point at which there is a 
shift from what Edelman calls primary consciousness, which is shared by most 
mammals, to secondary consciousness, which includes a basic awareness of 
one's subjectivity as well as that of another (Edelman 1992) . Thus this arche-
type could be seen to be that of subjectivity, as Young-Eisendrath concludes 
(Young -Eisendrath & Hall 1991 in Colman 2000). In his study of the self 
Warren Colman notes, ' ... it is possible to think of archetypal processes 
directed towards wholeness and of a "central archetype" whose centring func-
tions involve the organisation and integration of the psyche as a whole' (Col-
man 2000, p. 8, my italics). Following on from this, I am putting forward that 
the central archetype of order organizes and integrates psychic deintegrates. 
In summary, there is towards the end of the first year a vast array of evid-
ence indicating a predominance of integrativ e processes within the infant's 
emerging mind, leading, amongst other developments, to a new awareness of 
the sense of self as an individual. This evidence indicates activities of what 
Fordham conceived as the central archetype of order, which has a special role 
in shaping and consolidating the ego. By the end of the first year the emerging 
archetype becomes shaped via deintegration and reintegration into a more 
coherent processing structure, resulting in numerous new capacities in relation 
to subjectivity and mindedness. These include a nascent unified sense of self, 
such as was seen with the two babies and th e doll. In this light, what Fordham 
termed 'representations of the self' might more accurately be considered repre-
sentations and pre-symbolic expressions of the central archetype of order. As I 
conceive it, the archetype arises from early actions of the self, perhaps begin-
ning in utero and being amongst the earliest to deintegrate, and perhaps based 
in the physiology of the brain and the way it wires together (integrates) circuits 
that fire together. 
This conception of the archetype means that it is intimately linked to the 
primary self. Yet they differ in two important respects. The central archetype 
is a part of the whole and, as such, it can be projected , introjected and so forth 
as Fordham described (Fordham 1985, p.33) . Its primary function is to inte-
grate. In contrast, the pr imary self and its successor, the self, refers to the 
whole and functions as an integrator and deintegrator . 
When is the primary self no longer primary? Conceived as a period of devel-
opment, I view the primary self to refer to a period of early development that 
is predominated by deintegrates, that is, primitive part objects. Through 
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deintegration and reintegration, contents become both differentiated and con-
solidated into a more stable ego and internal objects. As the infant begins to 
have a sense of his own mind and his mother's, internal objects take on a 
three -dimensional quality and become whole objects in the Kleinian sense. As 
the changes that begin at the end of the first year develop through the second, 
one may begin to refer to the self and to its contents and structures by their 
specific term s within the theoretical model, such as 'ego' or the 'central arche-
type of order' and so forth. Hence as more clearly defined archetypal structur-
ing occurs, the self moves beyond being primary, although its processes 
continue throughout life as new deintegrates appear . 
Conclusion 
This paper began with some of the difficulties inherent in a study of the self. 
Jung referred to his circumambulations of the self, and Fordham had his own 
experiences of the elusiveness of his subject. In their correspondence, Zinkin 
had written to Fordham , ' . . . when you avoid dating the original self it is not 
simply that we don't know the date and one day we might find out, but that it 
has no date. In this sense I entirely take your point that it is an abstraction' 
(Zinkin r998 , p. 142). Fordham answered : 
I certainly think that dating the original self is not important and am struck and 
attracted to your idea that 'it has no date'. That seems the obvious conclusion now 
you have suggested it. If that is so, and I am persuaded that it is, then can we speak 
of the self as existing? Against that we put Jung's idea, and that of others, which cov-
ers cosmic experiences extending to the limits of space and time. That is what I am 
talking about, following Jung. 
(ibid., p. r43) 
Here Fordham seems co find himself caught in the rapid and endless shifts that 
accompany thinking about the self. He has made it clear ro Zinkin that the 
primary self is an abstraction, or concept. He then slides into wondering if the 
self is a 'thing' that exists, before shifting rapidly back to it being a mystical 
concept accounting, as Jung intended, for cosmic and mystical experiences. 
Over all Fordham was able to keep his conceptual bearings because of the 
value he placed on theoretical constructs to further understa nd ing. He wrote 
during the long period in the twentieth century, when psychoanalysis was 
defining itself through theor y. Fordham apprec iated the need to steer a course 
through the muddles that came from the proliferation of theory that was 
occurring, and had the clarity of thought to do so. Hence he developed his 
model in a way that led him to sharpen one aspect, theory, while leaving 
another, phenomenology, ·more unsharp'. This has begun to change, and ana-
lytic thinkers are working to balance theory with human experience, so that 
they are reaching to literature to expand upon their conceptualizations 
(Britton 199 8; Canham & Satyamurti 2003; Williams & Waddell 1991). 
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Recently Jean Knox has made a p lea to re-estab lish this 'heart of our theory 
and practice ', and James Astor has presented a paper to the Society of Analy-
tical Psychology Analytic Group, in which he argued that literary descriptions 
of fictional characters ma y offer something more authentic about what hap-
pens subjectively within and between analyst and patient, than do clinical 
accounts (Knox 2004, p. r; Astor 2004). 
The enormous changes in developmental psychology and neuroscience that 
challenge our theories and offer hope of leading forward, can also be seen as 
part of an endless shift: 
... On a huge hill, 
Cragged, and steep, Truth stands, and he that will 
Reach her, about must, and about must go ... 
(Donne 1633, p. 163f 
TRANSLATIONS OF ABSIBACT 
Cet article s'inreresse a la contribution que Fordham a faire aux etudes sur le soi de 
Jung. II s'ouvre sur Jes dilemmes epistemologiques inherents au theme, avant de pour-
suivre en rendant compte de la recherche faire par Fordham sur les differentes manieres 
done Jung a utilise le terme 'soi' et l'incompa tibilite de ces differences significations. Est 
faire une description du modele de Fordham, qui recouvre ses concepts de soi primaire, 
de deintegration, de reintegration, d'objet du soi, d'auto representations, et de !'indivi-
duation dans la petite enfance. Puis une partie explore les zones dans lesquels Fordham 
apparemmenr divergeait de Jung, parrie qui comporte un expose de comment Fordham 
a trouve un moyen de reconcilier ces divergences par son approche developpementale. 
Ces zones comprennent: la definition du soi comme etant une totalite ou un archetype, 
la relation corps-esprit, I' «ultime », Jes origines des archetypes, et pour finir le soi pri-
maire, le soi et le sens de soi. Pour conclure, !'auteur poursuit les propositions faites par 
Fordham pour resoudre l'incompatibilite des definitions de Jung. Ceci s'appuie sur le 
concept central de !'archetype de l'ordre er sur !'evidence de son developpement vers la 
fin de la premiere annee de l'enfant. 
Diese Arbeit befasst sich mir Fordhams Beitrag zu Jungs Studien iiber das Selbst. Die 
Autorin beginm mit den erkennmistheorerischen Problemen, die mit diesem Thema 
verbunden sind, um dann einen Dberblick iiber Fordhams Forschungen und dariiber zu 
geben, wie Jung den Terminus 'Selbst' in manchmal unvereinbarer Weise benutzt. 
Fordhams Modell wird beschrieben: Es umfasst seine Konzepte von Primiirem Selbst, 
Deintegrarion, Reintegration, Selbstobjekten , Selbstreprasentationen sowie Individua-
tion in der friihen Kindheit. ln einem Abschnitt werden Bereiche diskutiert, in welchen 
die Ansichten Fordhams von denen Jungs offensichtlich abweichen, dann aber <lurch 
Fordhams entwicklungspsychologischen Ansatz wieder in Einklang gebracht werden. 
- I should like ro express my appreciation to Da\·id Crosher for pointing out these lines. 
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Zu diesen Bereichen zahlen die Definition des Selbst als Ganzheit oder als Archetyp, die 
Beziehung zwischen Geist-Seele und Kerper, das 'Ur-Eigentliche' {the 'ultimate'), die 
'Urspri.inge' der Archetypen und das Primare Selbst, das Selbst sowie die Wahrneh-
mung des Selbst. Zurn Schluss wird auf Fordhams Skizzierung einer Zusammenfi.ihrung 
von Jungs unvereinbaren Definitionen hingewiesen. Sie beruht auf dem Konzept eines 
zentralen Archetyps der Ordnung und darauf , wie sich dessen Entfaltung gegen Ende 
des ersten Lebensjahres darstellt . 
Questo lavoro riguarda ii conrributo di Fordham agli studi di Jung sul se. Si a pre con i 
dilemmi epistemologici inerenti al soggetto, prima di proseguire con un resoconto della 
ricerca di Fordham sui modi contraddittori in cui Jung uso ii cemine 'se'. Vi e una 
descrizione del modello di Fordham, che copre i suoi concetti di se primario, reintegra-
zione, deinregrazione, oggetti-se, rappresentazione del se e l' individuazione nell'infan-
zia. C'e una sessione che discute delle aree nelle quali Fordham apparentemente diverge 
da Jung, includendo anche ii come queste si ricompongono nell'approccio evolutivo di 
Fordham. Tali aree comprendono la definizione del se come totalita o archetipo, la 
relazione corpo-mente, la 'ca usa ultima ', le origini degli archetipi, ii se primario, ii see 
ii senso de! se. Si conclude con un ampliamento delle linee tracciare da Fordham per 
una soluzione alle definizioni contraddittorie di Jung. Cio porta al concetto 
dell'archetipo centrale dell' ordin e e al come ii suo emergere si evidenzia verso la fine de! 
primo anno dell'infanzia. 
Este crabajo es sobre las contribuciones de Fordham a los estudios de Jung sobre el Self. 
Se inicia con los dilemas epistemol6gi cos inherentes al sujeto, antes de proseguir en un 
recuento de las investigaciones de Fordham sobre las vfas contradictorias en las cuales 
usaba Jung el termino, Self. Se hace una descripci6n de! modelo de Fordham , este cubre 
sus conceptos del self primario , desintegraci6n, reintegraci6n, objetos de! self, represen-
tacione s de! self, e individuaci6n en la infancia. Hay una secci6n donde se discuten 
areas en las cuales Fordham aparentemente tiene divergencias con Jung, incluyendo 
aquellas que fueron replanreadas por Fordham en su aproximaci6n desarrollista. Esras 
areas incluye a la definici6n de! self como rotalidad o arquetipo: La relaci6n mente 
cuerpo, lo 'ultimista', el origen de los arquetipos; y el self primario , el self y el sentir de! 
self. Esto concluye con una ampliaci6n de la idea de Fordham para resolver las definici-
ones incompat ibles de Jung. Ello trae a colaci6n el concepto de arquecipo central y de 
como su desarrollo se hace evidente hacia el final de! primer aiio de la infancia. 
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The 'self' in analytical psychology: the 
function of the 'central archetype' within 
Fordham's model 
Elizabeth Urban, London 
Abstract: This paper concerns the self as Fordham came to conceive it after a conceptual 
analysis of Jung's use of the term. Fordham identified a contradiction in Jung's usage, 
and resolved it by reserving 'self' for a definition of the psychosomatic entirety of the 
individual, and using a separate term for referring to expressions -of the self in human 
experience (e.g. symbols). Fordham tentatively suggested char the latter be termed the 
'central archetype', although this was neither developed nor dropped. I explore the 
value of this term from a developmental perspective and, more specifically in terms 
of the deintegration of psyche out of an early psychosomatic unity. This draws upon 
infant research and an observation of a r 4-monch old boy. Finally, further developments 
are briefly described and illustrated, whereby pre-symbolic expressions of the central 
archetype become symbolic and come to reflect what was for Jung, the 'ultimate', 
'Formation, Transformation, Eternal Mind's eternal recreation' . 
Key words: brain development, central archetype, emergence, infant observation, infant 
research, self 
Fordham once commented that the term 'self' would not have been used when 
he was studying medicine at Cambri dge during the late r 92o's, implying that it 
was not 'scientific enough'. He gives credit to Jung, who earlier the same decade 
introduced his formulations on the self (Jung 1921) and was, in Fordham's 
estimation, 't he first to evolve a method where by the self could be systematically 
observed and experienced' (For dham r98 5, p. ro2). Fordham noted that it was 
not until mid-twentieth century that psychoanalysts, such as Federn, Winnicott, 
Hartmann , Kohut, Scott, Klein and Bion, began to become interested in the 
self, often describing 'the psychology of the self whether or not they have used 
the term' (Fordham r987, p. 345). Not long after, scientists too were using the 
'self', as developments in brain science drew neurology to philosophy over the 
mind-brain question, producing such volumes as that cited by Ford ha m (r987), 
The Self and its Brain by Popper, a philosopher, and Eccles, a neurologist ( r977) . 
Thus in the course of the twentieth century, it was as if the re was a converging 
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sense of need to find a term that captured the unity of the individual, while at 
the same time suggesting human subjectivity. Even twenty years ago it was with 
some understatement that Fordham wrote, 'So now there is a complex and often 
confusing literature to digest' (Fordham 1987, p. 345). 
This paper sets out to examine how Fordham addressed the complexi ty 
and confusion surrounding the 'self' within Jungian psychology. This entails 
exploring an idea that Fordham suggested with such tentativeness that it has 
been all but lost, yet is, I maintain, useful. I shall be looking at his idea of a 
'central archetype' from within the conceptual framework of his model, covering 
development from infancy to adulthood. 
The 'self' in analytical psychology 
Within analytical psychology, Fordham disputed whether the 'self' could apply 
both to the global unity of the human being as well as to subjectivity. 
He considered that the self was one thing, and the sense-or awareness or 
experience--of the self was another. The basis of Fordham's thinking rested 
upon Jung's uniquely extensive and elaborate studies of the self, which drew 
upon data from adulthood. Fordham realized very early on tha t, 'if archetypes 
are universal they must be demonstrable in childhood' (Fordham 1944, p. 5). 
His earliest published work identified archetypal phenomena and imagery in 
childhood but said virtually nothing about the self, presumably because he did 
not expect to find it there as Jung had maintained that the self became manifest 
only in mid-life . As Fordham's interest began to focus on ego development, he 
came, via clinical observations of two children under age two, to the conclusion 
that early ego development was related to the self in childhood (Fordham 1947). 
Between 1947 and 1957 he wrote three seminal papers (1947, 1951, 1955). 
These became the core of New Developments in Analytical Psychology (1957), 
which contains the basic model that has remained : the postulate of the primary 
self that deintegrates and reintegrates, and accounts for development from foetal 
life to old age (Ford ham 1957). 
Because his new model was based on the 'self', Fordham not long after began 
to research the ways that Jung used the term 'self', which included the data 
upon which Jung's ideas were based (Fordham 1962b). He published his study 
in this journal, entitled 'The empirical foundations and theories of the self in 
Jung's work' (1963). This study enabled Fordham to recognize a contradiction 
in Jung's think ing; Jung used 'self' to mean both the totality of the personality 
and an archetype . Fordham suggested this arose from Jung's 'concept of two 
kinds of thinking f directed and undirected] co mean that theory and myth are 
analogues ' (Fordham 1963, p. 3 ). Drawing upon directed thinking, Jung arrived 
at a definition of the self as a totality: 'the self is "my rotality" ... [andl hence it 
fsic: also] include s the unconscious. It 'embraces and includes the ego' as well' 
(Fordham 196 3, p. 11, citing from Jung 1921 , in Baynes 1923, p. 540). However 
Jung was also concerned to capture the nature of the experience of wholeness 
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linked to the term, derived from undirected thinking. Here Jung was referring to 
the self considered as an archetype, ouather , archetypal expressions in symbolic 
imagery and metaphor referring to the tota lity of the individual. Jung's thinking 
thus interlaced myth and model , which Fordham disputed: 'The advantages of 
theories over myths in scientific studies cannot be contested ... ' (Fordham 1963, 
p. 3). Moreover, Fordham argued, the two main ways Jung used 'self' were 
'mutually incompatible' concepts because archetypal phenomena referring to 
the self's totality are, within the theoretical system, only a part of the 'whole' 
self. For examp le, in Psychology and Alchemy, Jung writes: 
I call chis centre che 's elf', which should be understood as the totality of the psyche. 
The self is not only the centre, but also the whole circumference which embraces both 
conscious and unconscious; it is the centre of chis totality, just as the ego is the centre 
of the conscious mind. 
(Jung 1944, para. 44) 
Logically this does not work : how can the self be the totality and also the 
centre (only a part) of the totality? This does however work as a metaphorical 
statement about subjective experience that Jung associated with an archetype 
of totality. Fordham was not arguing about Jung's data, but rather looking for 
logical coherence within the theoretical system. His explanation of Jung's logical 
inconsistency is that Jung's mind moves back and forth between directed and 
undire cted thinking, and the metaphorical and the theoretical. 1 
Fordham proposed a resolution to the contradiction in the theory, by which 
'self' would refer to a concept that defined the psychosomatic whole of the 
personality. Another term would be needed co account for the functioning, 
imagery and subjective experiences of who leness that Jung had ascribed to the 
self when he used the term to refer to an archetype. Because it would confuse 
matters to call this the 'archetype of the self', Fordham suggested the term 
'central archetype' . 
The term comes from John Perry, who used 'central archetype' to refer 
to particular integrative psychic processes that were not necessarily part 
of individuation, like those processes compensatory to ego states evident 
in schizophrenia (Perry r9 57). Perry's understanding was that these images 
belonged to 'one class I of primordial images] that describes a centre of order 
and circumference of delimitation which Uung] called the self (Jung 1928, 
et al)'. In other words, Perry's use of 'central archetype' was synonymous with 
'archetype of the self'. 
' In his biography of Jung, Vincent Brome noted that Jung 'imagined himself to belong to the type 
called Logos- or thinking-dominared man, bur in facr rhe intuitive-sensation functions came first and 
the Logos last' (Brome r980, p. 125). In concrasr Fordham was a very fine conceptual thinker, who 
greatly admired Jun g's inruiri\'e powers, so evident in the way he gleaned ideas of the tra nsference 
from the Mysteriwn Co11iw1ctio11is. 
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In his r963 'Empirical foundations ' paper, Fordham wrote that, besides Perry, 
Jung had also suggested a centralizing archetypal organizer closely related to 
the ego: 
With reference to schizophrenia Perry suggested that another rerm be given to the 
archetype lying behind the images. He used the term 'central archetype'. Jung seems to 
have considered it also for he refers (19 58, p.137) to' ... a central archetype ... which 
I have called the archetype of the self'. 
(Fordham 1963, pp. 14-15 ) 
It is clear from this that Fordham believed that Jung used the term because he 
cites what he considered to be the source. 'Central archetype' does not appear 
in the index of the Collected Works, which does not mean that Jung did not 
use the term, just that its occurrence did not merit indexing. However further 
investigation shows that the term is not in the source cited, in the bibliog raph y 
of 'The transcendent function' (1958). Instead his citation, ' (1958, p.137)', is 
closer, although one year off, to the Perry paper than in anything found in Jung." 
There Perr y wrote : 
Since I use the term self-image regularly ... , I wish to avoid confusion of terms 
and call the former the perso11,1! self~im,zge and the latter the central ,1rchetype; this 
archetype is here conceived as making its appearance at all phases of life and in all 
kinds of stares of integration and disintegration [that is. schizophrenia I, and thus 
is nor always associated with the conscious experience of selfhood, in the sense of 
being an achieYement requiring long and arduous work of spiritual or psychological 
de\·elopmem specifk:ally designated by Jung the individuation process. 
(Perry 195 7, p. 137) 
Fordham may have wished to find the term in Jung in order to lend it authority 
when applied to his own objectives. However Fordham would certainly not 
have suggested ·central archetype' if it did not connote what he understood 
to be Jung's meaning of 'archetype of the self' which, as a central organizing 
and integrating principle, could also be considered the 'archetype of order ' 
(Jung r944 , 1950, 1951 , r954, 1958). Although 'central archetype' did not 
in all likelihood come from Jung, but from Perry, Perry's ideas about it served 
Fordham's purposes. It was important to Fordham to have intellectual clarity 
and consistency in the theoretical system and this required distinguishing the 
definition of the self as the totality from usage referring to an archetype; 
Fordham's model rested on the totality definition. Added to this, at the time 
Fordham was working on this matter , he had not yet regarded individuation 
as beginning in childhood. -' Hence it would have been useful for him to have a 
0 1 eirnmined the 1 960 and r928 \'t'rsions of rhe 'Tht' rranscc:ndenr function '. as well as searched 
orher possihle sources in The Collected \li'orks. 
3 Ir was nor until r965 that Fordham came to be con\'inced that individ ua tion applied ro childhood . 
Up until chat rime. ·1 a rgued that because oi the differences between rhc relation of the ego to the 
self in childhood and later life. indi1·iduation did nor rake place in ch ildhood . . ." (Fordham 1985, 
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concept of an archetype intimately related to selfhood and the ego, and not part 
of individuation but applicable to ego development in childhood. 
In the last edition of his study,~ Fordham gave a thumb-nail sketch of the 
distinguishing properties of the central archetype: 
• Its primary function is integrative; 'the central archetype ... transcends and 
unites opposites.' (Fordham r 98 s, p. 3 3 ). This primary function discriminates 
the central archetype from the self, as, according to Fordham, the self 
integrates and deintegrates. 
• The central archetype has a special connection with the ego and its devel-
opment. 'The main body of the ego, sometimes called the central ego, has 
a special relation to the archetype of the self. That central archetype can 
then be thought of [sic: asj an organizer of the unconscious: it contributes 
significantly to the formation of the central ego .. .'. I It is J the source of the 
central ego· (Fordham 1985, p. 32). That is, the operations of the central 
archetype pertain to psychic functioning and organization. 
• In regard to subjective experience, the central archetype 'finds expression 
especially in conscious experiences of selfhood ... · (Fordham 198 5, pp. 3 r-
3 3 ), whether these expressions are 'spiritual ecstasies or being down to earth 
and quite ordinary' (Fordham 1986). 
The ·central archetype' does not appear in any of Fordham 's writing after 198 5, 
which included several papers about his model , some of which refer to the 
contradiction in Jung's usage of 'self' as well as modif ying certain deta ils to his 
earlier thinking. Hence Fordham did nor eliminate the term, nor did he develop 
it. 
I am proposing that Fordham's idea of a central archetype is useful within 
his developmental model. I shall argue that it is helpful conceptually, not only 
because it helps to refine terminology. which was Fordham's orig ina l intention 
in using it. It can also describe in Jungian terminology the deintegration of 
psyche out of the psychosomatic unity of the early infant self, a process implied 
in Fordham's statement, 'In treating these twin concepts, psyche and soma, as 
deintegrates, cheir origin in the self is not lost sight of .. .' (Fordham 198 5, 
p. r70) . 
To follow this through. I shall need to identify what could be conceptualized 
as early manifestations of the central archetype, which would be the early 
p. +f). His <.:ondusion first emerged in a paper entitled 'Individuation in childhood'. which Fordham 
presented to rhc Third JAAP !ntern3tiona l Cong ress I 196 5 }. It was puhlished in J. B. Wheelwright's 
.:ompilation of rhe proceedings ( Wheelwright 19681. It appe~red with minor alterations as Chapter 4 
In The Self .i11 d Autism, where he wrore. 'B1· the age of nvo. therefore, an infant can achieve every 
essential demenr of indi,·iduation in rhc sense rhar Jung rnulc.l haw accepted" {Fordham 1976, 
p. 4 0). 
4 The 196:; paper was reprinted in A11,1'ytic,1/ PsydJOlogy, A Modem Scie11ce 119-:-3) and then revised 
to he the firsr cha pter in F.xplor,7tirms i11to tbe Self ( 1985). 
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development of consciousness and 'conscious experiences of selfhood ' (Fordham 
198 5, p. 3 2). This will require turning to developmental studies . I shall also need 
to provide suppo rt from clinical and observat ional material, which comes from 
observations of a 14 month-old boy, whose behaviour in relation to me can 
illustrate how the central archetype can express itself in the deintegration of 
psyche. 
The deintegration of psyche and developments at the end of the first year 
In order to examine the emergence of the central archetype, I shall be looking 
for the early development of consciousness and evidences of expressions of self-
consciousness, self-awareness, and early mentalization relating to the sense of 
self. I shall begin with a relevant statement from Fordham: 'the self being the 
whole, subjectively there's nothing to describe it with. It's only when a certain 
amount of deintegration occurs that you can get an ang le observed, and of 
course what you 've observed isn't the whole self, but you can infer the existence 
of a whole self' (Fordham 1986; my italics). This raises the question as to when 
infants begin to make inferences . 
This capacity comes with other new developments that begin to appear 
between nine and fifteen months. During this period there are significant 
developments in infant capacities indicating new intimations of the awareness 
of awareness, and consciousness of consciousness . As Stern puts it, 
(There] is a quantum leap in rhe sense of self [that] occurs when rhe infant discovers 
that he or she has a mind and that other people have minds as well. . . . This discovery 
amounts to the acquisition of a 'theory' of separate minds .... The potential properties 
of a self and of an other have been greatly expanded. Selves and others now include 
inner or subjective states of experience .. . . At this stage, for the first time one can 
attribute to the infant the capacity for psychic; intimacy. 
(Stern 1985, pp. 124-26) 
The new organizations within the infant lead the psychologist Gavin Bremner 
to describe the changes as a shift from knowledge based on direct perceptual 
and environmental input, to that based on representations, including those of 
self. 
In psychoanalytic and Jungian terms, these changes represent ego develop-
ment. Although still unstable, the ego by the end of the first year has become 
more or less consolidated and, within it, representations of the self begin to 
appear, experienced as the new sense of self to which Stern refers. Although 
there is a new consciousness of the sense of self, early on in this period it is 
probably best conceived as 'pre-"I'", and lacks the conscious coherence of a 
two-year-old, who can refer to himse lf as 'I' . 
This new surge in ego development between nine and fifteen months can be 
regarded as evidence of the central archetype, which 'contributes significantly 
to the formation of the central ego'; that it is 'the source of the central 
ego', and is expressed 'in conscious experiences of selfhood' (Fordham 1985, 
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pp. 3 2-3 3 ). Put differently, because Fordham conceived the central archetype 
to be the source of the ego and expressed in conscious experiences of selfhood, 
ego development during this period-the new consciousnesses of consciousness, 
including that of self-can be regarded as manifestations of the central 
archetype. 
The complexity of the changes that mark this period can be seen in the 
wide-ranging fields of research from which our understanding now draws. 
They include studies of language development (Trevarthen 1986, 1988), neural 
development (Schore 1994; Chugani 1998), affective neuroscience (Schore 
1994, 2002; Panksepp 1998), emotional development (Sroufe 1995), social and 
cognitive development (Stern 198 5, Fonagy et al 2002), affect regulation (Schore 
1994), attachment (Fonagy et al 2002), and autism (Hobson 2002 )-t o name 
but a few of the sources. 
This period is but one of several that occur during infancy. These are now 
considered to be manifestations of the serial progression of the wiring up of 
the brain. Harry Chugani discovered that the development of synapses in the 
individual infant brain follows the evolutionary path of the species; that is, 
development moves from the primitive brain stem to the midbra in (which 
includes the limbic system), and then to the frontal cortex. His research was 
based on the link between synaptogenesis, which soars just after birth, and 
glucose uptake in the brain, which can be measured. He discovered that glucose 
uptake in the newborn is highest in the reptilian core, which regulates primitive 
vital functions. At two to three months there are increases in the 'o ld mammalian 
brain ' , which 'mediates social emotions' (Panksepp 1998 p. 43 ). Then 
between eight and twelve months, the dorsal and medial frontal regions also show 
increased glucose utilization .... By approximate ly one year of age, the infant's pattern 
of glucose utilization resembles qualitatively that of the adult. 
(Chuga ni 1998,p. 7) 
In other words, the wiring up of fundamental functional parts of the brain has 
been accompl ished by the time the infant is about a year old. This marks the 
point at which there is mind-to-mind communication, at the heart of which are 
joint co-operation and shared play (Trevarthen & Hubley 1978). Toward the 
end of the first year, shared play is possible because of neural developments 
at this time, and neural developments occur because of shared play during this 
time. As Trevarthen entitled one of his papers, 'Sharing makes sense' (Trevarthen 
1988) . 
The research team including Peter Fonagy have investigated the development 
of mentalization, or reflective capacity (Fonagy et al 2002), which is the 
capacity to reflect upon oneself. An early step towards this is the 'social-
cognitive revo lution' that occurs in relation to attachment at about nine 
months. Thi s revolution is marked by the acquisition of what they term the 
'teleolog ical stance', when the infant develops a new awareness of the relation-
ship between means and ends. This is accompanied by a 'naive ' rationality, 
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whereby infants assume that 'agents pursue their goals in the most rational 
or efficient manner available to them given the constraints of physical reality' 
(Fonagy et al 2002, p. 224). These developments are accompanied by 'a ser of 
qualitatively new communicative behaviours; goal-directed, coordinated activi-
ties . . . involving joint attention to objects or situations' (Fonagy et al, p. 22 5; my 
italics ). 
Earlier Trevarthen, in his research into the foundations of language develop-
ment, had observed the infant's new capacity for joint cooperation. He described 
significant developments at the end of the first year in the infant's ability 
to perceive his own and other's intentions, and co bring together previously 
separate ways of relating co people and to objects . 'Before this, objects are 
perceived and used, and persons are communicated with - but these two kinds 
of intention are expressed separately' (Trevarthen & Hubley r978, p. 184 ). But 
toward the end of the first year, during the period of 'secondary su bjectivity', 'a 
deliberately sought sharing of experiences about events and things is achieved for 
the first time' (Trevarthen & Hubley 1978, p. r 84). Trevarthen emphasizes the 
importance of shared play because it is the means by which the broader culture 
becomes passed on in various ways, such as conveying information (what a 
telephone is for), cognitive skills, social mores, language and all that language 
brings with it. 
Shared experiences depend upon shared intentions, and shared intentions rest 
upon a capacity for making inferences, because intentions lie in the mind and 
cannot be directly perceived. At this time and not before, if a mother points 
to an object the infant will follow the direct ion of the point. Stern notes how 
infants, 'not only visually follow the direction of the point but, after reaching 
the target, look back at the mother and appear to use the feedback from her 
face to confirm chat they have arrived at the intended target' (Stern 198 5, 
p. 129 ). Trevarthen concludes, 'Before the change, the infant has no interest, no 
comprehension of what is wanted ... ' but at the end of the first year, he is able 
'to take a gesture and a spoken message as an instruction' (Trevarthen 1988, 
P· 193). 
Being able to infer is inextricably linked co being aware of another's awareness. 
Peter Hobson researches into autism, which he considers to be a failure in the 
development of mind. ·1 Following Trevarchen's work into secondary subjectivity, 
Hobson 's studies have led him to explore the origins of chinking and mindedness. 
He notes how at the end of the first year: 
[The infant] is becoming aware of the ocher person's awareness of things, conscious of 
the other's consciousness. [The baby) is inrerested in and responsive co what the other 
person does with things and feels roward things. 
(Hobson 2.002., p. 63) 
.< This is ..:onsisrenr wirh rhe ..:ondusion char Fordham drew from his stud ies inro autism. namely. 
that aurism is a failure of dcinregrarion and reintegration. 
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As this occurs, the infant enters into triangulations. As Hobson points out, these 
are comprised of infant, other (e.g., mother), and object (e.g., toy) or event 
(e.g., a strange sound) or another person (e.g., Daddy), along with the infant's 
sense of the relationships between them. Each tr iangulation, to be tripartite, 
requires psychological space between the self and the other components of the 
triangle. Time and again through play the infant will, step by step, encounter new 
perspectives in the ever-changing relationships between the elements making 
up the triangulation. With each shift of perspective, there is a slightly new 
awareness. Judith Woodhead, when describing triangulations involving 'the 
father', has referred to this dynamic as 'tria lectic' (Woodhead 2004). Here, I 
am expanding the notion of 'tria lectic' process to include objects and events as 
well as others. 
To summarize, developments begin to manifest at nine to twelve months, 
which include the emergence of the capacity to infer along with the dawning 
of a new awareness of one's own and another's attention and attitudes. This 
does not mean that these new awarenesses involve conscious thinking. Only 
later can the baby reflect upo n himself to another ('Mummy, I'm hurt ') or to 
himself (Tm naughty ') . When this occurs toward the end of the second year, 
'This represents someth ing new, which doesn't happen until the other aspects of 
the relatedness triangle have been in place for some time' (Hobson 2002, p.108). 
It is at this point when the trialectic includes self-reflective function-thinking 
about, understanding and interpreting one's own feeling states and those of 
others. But before that time, toward the end of the first year, one can see the 
emergence of the components of this highly important capacity, which provide 
the foundations for the links that Ron Britton has made between the Oedipal 
triangle and three -dimensional thinking (Britton 1989 ). 
In summary, around the end of the first year there is a new consciousness of 
consciousness and capacit y for mind-to-mind sha ring. These developments lead 
to varying triangulations and new perspectives, which provide the foundat ions 
for symbo lization, langu age, thinking and theory of mind. It is this which leads 
Trevarthen to say, 'The mysterious, forward-looking, innate determination of 
psychic growth is here manifest in a most elaborate form. Indeed , psychological 
functions that remain centra l to the highest intellectual and moral achievements 
of adults in society are exp ressed in a one-year-old on the threshold of spoken 
language ' (Trevarthen & Huble y 1978, p. r 84). Within Fordham's model and 
my expansion of his idea of a central archetype, this can be regarded as the 
emergence of manifestations of the central archetype, the deintegration of 
psyche, and the beginning of having a mind . 
A clinical observation: Vejayan 
This section aims to provide support from clinical and observational experience 
for evidences of manifestations of the central archetype, detai led in the previous 
section. 
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The boy I shall call Vejayan was fourteen months old when I observed him 
playing with his mother in a mother -baby in-patient unit where some of my NHS 
work is based. His mother had suffered a severe depression after Vejayan's birth, 
and he had spent much of his young life in the unit. They both attended a mother-
baby group I run, where, earlier in his babyhood, his mother seemed crushed by 
the weight of her depression. This was evident from the overall sense of deadness 
she bore and wore upon her face. There was little physical or emot iona l contact 
between them; during baby massage, her hands stilled or were withdrawn to 
her lap , and making eye contact required prompting and encouragement. For 
his part, Vejayan too was still and avoidant. When he was old enough to sit 
up , he wou ld squirm on her lap, leaning and reaching away from her, wriggling 
toward others in the group, persistently trying to distance himself from her 
and her depression. Gradually her depression diminished and she emerged as 
a pleasant, rather passive, woman, who showed courage in addressing serious 
domestic problems. Throughout the time Vejayan and his mother were in the 
unit , various nurses cared for and played with Vejayan when his mother was too 
withdrawn to do so. By the end of his first year, Vejayan had become attached to 
her and, as he entered toddlerhood , he became a lively and popular baby in the 
unit . I often came across him stomping hurriedly and unsteadily along a corridor, 
grinning and wildly waving his arms, with a good -natured nurse in pursuit. 
The videos I took of Vejayan arose from a regular staff group discussion of 
infant observations and studies•. When possible, we use videoed observations , 
given that the mother is well enough and willingly gives consent. 7 When staff 
and I watched the video with Vejayan and his mother, I became concerned about 
two things. The first was that there was virtua lly no truly shared play between 
them, which I knew to be essential to development. As one person in the group 
commented, 'The play doesn't go anywhere'. 
Vejayan plays with a ball, kicking it about aimlessly, chirpily chattering and sometimes 
stumblin g as he moves alongside a shelf of toys, occasionally holding onto it. If the 
ball came her way, the mother would kick it back in his directio11, but not being aimed 
especially for him to catch, and his attention not being aimed at receiving the ball, it 
bounced off elsewhere. He seemed quite happy playing essentially on his own. Only 
once did he look at his mother, glancing up at her briefly with a serious, rather worried 
expression on his face. 
Afrer a while, Vejayan goes to her and she pulls him up on her lap, where he stands up 
facing outward, holding ,1 plastic skittle, looking chuffed and crowing as he knocks 
the skitt le against his other hand and then his head. His mother smiles up at him and 
he knocks the skittle against her temple . Smiling and affectionate, she says, 'Naw, 
6 The video was thus intended for observational purposes , which Vejayan's mother understood, and 
does not represent an inte raction primarily intended as parcnt-infanr psychotherap y as it is usua lly 
carried out. 
7 Each video recording requires informed consenr obtained within procedures establis hed by Health 
Trusts, which Vejayan 's mother understood and granted. 
160 
Function of the 'central archetype' within Fordham's model 339 
naw '. He imitates her, emphasizing the end of each word with a slight uplift: 'Naw-
uh, naw-uh' , and pressing his face against hers, cheek to cheek, with each utterance. 
Playfully, but a bit roughly, he sways back and forth as they alternate their singsong 
'naws', first away from her then back against her face, pushing his 111ottth against it. 
He starts to roar excited!)~ and stands tall and swings the skittle up and down in the 
air until it's thrown onto the floor. He returns to swaying back and forth, smearing 
her face with gooey 'kisses', the 'naw-uh' becoming an aggressive 'ooo-UH', when his 
face comes up against hers. She ob;ects when the 'kisses' are replaced with pinching 
fingers. He turns away and gives an excited call, whereupon l, is voice changes and 
becomes whiny, increasingly becoming more complaining and grating. Euentually she 
softly intervenes, 'Vejayan ... Vejayan . .. naught)' boy' as he swings back and forth 
against her. She clearly had had enough of the persectttory tone of his whingeing. 
It is evident that Vejayan and his mother are affectionate with one another, 
although their interchanges do not get beneath the surface. As if pursuing a 
'de liber ately sought sharing of experiences ... ' (Trevarthen & Hubley 1978, p. 
184), he tries to touch upon both their minds with the skittle, banging it first 
against his head and then hers, as if he knew there were thoughts inside to which 
he wanted access. He smears her face with gooey, sticky 'kisses', a kind of relating 
that Esther Bick and Donald Meltzer called 'adhesive' and 'two-dimensional' 
(Bick 1986; Meltzer 197 5 ). Their exchange, despite its warmth, remains face-to-
face rather than mind-to -mind, before dissolving into his persecutory whingeing 
and her soft admonition. 
Left with a sense that ther e was a mind behind his mother's face that was not 
available to him, Vejayan was not only frustrated but also without something 
to engage the focus of his attention. So he flitted from one thing to another, 
the brevity of his concentration being noticeable and worrying. Overall, I was 
concerned that Vejayan functioned primarily in a two-dimensional way, and it 
was unclear whether he had the capac ity for shared play, three dimensionality 
and mind-to-mind relationships. If he did nor , there was cause possib ly for 
serious concern, indicating autistic tendencies and/or the beginning of behaviour 
and relationship problems. 
I was also concerned that most of the nurses watc hin g the video considered 
that, given his liveliness and the warmth of their interaction, Vejayan and his 
mother were playing norma lly. I wondered if the nurses might become more 
aware of play that 'went somewhere', and the group agreed to ask Vejayan's 
mother if I could do a second video, when I would play with Vejayan. 
My aim was to see if I could engage Vejayan by following his interest and th en 
invite shared play. To begin , he engaged with me, and he engaged with toys, but 
these did not come together into a triangulation of conjoint activity that could 
'go somewhere'. His concentration shifted quick ly from one thing to another, 
and he became excited and aggressive. 
Vejayan bangs a bucket aro1111d noisily and aggressh1ely. His mother tries to quieten 
him but he bangs 011 it until he throws a small ball my way. I catch it up and ask him 
if he would like to play b<J!I. He throws the bucket in my direction and his mother 
protests . I carefully roll the ball back to him. When the ball reaches him, he brings 
161 
Elizabeth Urban 
it back to me rather than rolling it. I reach for the bucket and invite him to p1-1t the 
ball into the bucket, II/hereupon Vejayan forcefully throws it inside. He squeals in 
over-excitement and throws the ball willy-nilly. His concentration bounces around as 
much as the ball, and his excitement and aggression escalate. When he throws the ball 
toward his mother-clearly intentionally-she firmly tells him 'No' . 
This persisted for what seemed a long time, and I became discouraged and began 
to sense that my plan may fail. Vejayan, now playing on his own , drifted off 
behind a small Wendy house, perhaps in his retreat just as dejected as I was. His 
mother and I conversed as much as we could, given the limitations of language. 
Eventually Vejayan seemed interested and we encouraged him to come and play 
again. He came to us, on his way picking up the lid to a small plastic carry out 
cup. 
Near us was a large, mushroom-shaped, toy house, into which various shapes 
fit through corresponding slots in the hemisphere of the roof, with a door at 
the bottom of the 'stem' from which they could be removed. On the surface of 
the roof were objects that spin, turn or could be pushed, with which he and his 
mother had previously banged against in a two-dimensional way. 
His mother tries to suppor t my efforts to play with him by drawing his attention to the 
mushroom house, banging on its surface apparatus. H e slips down and fo llows her in 
this two-dimensional play, becoming excited and throwing the plastic lid at the house, 
a11d then grasping the knob on the house top and leaning over it, as if trying to grasp 
and conquer something about it. 
From what followed I now think that what he was trying to grasp was its interior 
quality. Rather than get frustrated he begins to string together something like a 
series of thoughts. 
Vejayan is clearly getting frustrated and his mothe r hands him the skittle. He tries to 
put tl,e skittle into one of the holes on the roof but can't get it to go inside. He turns 
and with intention looks aroun d for something, then finds the plastic lid and inserts it 
into his moi1th. Alm ost instantaneously he inserts first his hand, and then the nal'row 
end of the skittle, into the hole. 
For just a brief moment he explores perspectives on 'container -conta ined' . There 
is the direct experience of 'container', when his mouth encapsulates the lid, and 
the direct experience of 'contained', when his arm goes inside the toy. Lastly 
there is the projection of a part of himself into a container when he inserts the 
skittle inside the toy. 
Finally Vejayan dropped the plastic cap into the house, where it disappeared 
and became a 'no-b reast'. He tried unsuccessfully to retrieve it through the slot 
where he dropped it: 
Speaking to him, I offer to help him find it, and look at and point to the door at the 
base of the toy, from which he can retrie11e the lid. I feel hopeful that here we have a 
chance for shared play, b11t Veiaya11 seems unable to follow the line of my gaze or my 
pointing. Curiously, rather than (of/owing my ga::;e and point, he retraces them back 
to my face, behind which fies my intention. He stoops in order to look ttp and into my 
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face, poking at it. I smile and say, 'That's nzy face, Vejayan!'. But he seems frustrated 
that he can't make out what's going on. He tries to put the bucket over my head ,md, 
when I prevent this, he puts it over his own head, when his mother intervenes. He seems 
to be blocking out mind-to-mind communication, as he can't infer what I'm trying to 
convey. I encourage him time and again to look down at the door, and his mother 
tries to help, but he just doesn't 'get it' so I retrie11e it for him. His frustration throws 
him off balance, and he tumbles over and cries in emotional hurt and frustration. His 
mother distracts him by pounding on the top surface of the roof. He does try again 
u•ith the lid, but soon giues up and goes to his mothe1: 
Feeling discouraged, I find myself examining the toy ,md discovering that the roof has 
an ottter shell that turns and must be in place for partiwlar objects to fit through their 
corresponding slots. When I 'get ' how the to,, worked, my left hand, which turned 
the knob on the top, atttomatically lifts with a flick in a brief unconscious f/.ourish 
of satisfaction. Vejayan meanwhile stands next to his mother with one hand on her 
knee, watching what I am doing without distmction. When I notice this, I repeatedly 
show how the lid can go into the top and then come out the bottom, telling him so as 
I demonstrate. He studies the situation for several moments, then leans forward just a 
bit, looks at me and makes a little sound. 
It is a musical, not a speech vocalization, purely expressive and hence rather like 
the unconscious flourish of my hand when I had 'got it' how the toy worked. 
He takes a step toward me and the toy, I hold out the lid to him and ask, 'Do you 
want to do it?·'. He takes the lid and inserts it into a hole in the roof and then stoops 
down and opens the door. The lid's fallen to the back of the base of the toy, out of 
sight, so I tip the tO)' so that it falls Ollt and be picks it up. 'Well, brillim1t!', I say and 
he immediately inserts the lid through the top again and retrieves it with out help from 
behind the closed door at the bottom. He repeats this several times. 
The play at last had gone somewhere. Vejayan had eventually been able to see 
what I had in mind , which, despite being as invisible to him as the lid was 
inside the house, was, like the lid, reachable. What was curious was the little 
song-note he emitted, just when he clearly 'got it'. I conferred with Miranda 
Davies, who is a singer and now a retired child analyst, who identified the pitch 
of Vejayan's song-note as the C above middle C. She noted tha t when I told him 
'Well brilliant', my 'Well', was also the C above middle C. Hence Vejayan and 
I were metaphorically singing from the same song sheet. 
Self representations and the emergence of the central archetype 
I should now like to turn to the two barely noticeable eureka moments in the 
observation, which would not have been evident if they had not been caught 
on videotape. The first was the flourish of my hand , dance-like rather than 
gestural, when I discovered how the toy 'worked'. The second was Vejayan's 
song-note, song-like rather than a communicative vocalization, when he inferred 
what I was implyin g. The words 'eureka' and 'heuristic' are related, and refer 
to finding out, or discovering something for oneself. This is not the same as 
imitation , projective identification or a state of identity. 
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Vejayan's frustration toppled him externally and internally, and he reverted 
to two-dimensional functioning, banging on the surface of the toy. But when he 
recovered and stood at his mother's knee, he turned his attention back to the 
toy and me. From that perspective he entered two triangulations: of himself, his 
mother, and the situation, and of himself, the toy, and me being interested in 
the toy. We can assume from what followed that he integrated his perceptions 
into a new thought, but this was not simply a cognitive phenomenon. It is 
heralded by a 'song-note' , which I see as an expression of what Fordham 
ca lled a 'self-representation': 'A self representation is that which gives rise to a 
preconscious sense of self and other' (Astor r995, p. 59). It is a 'sense of being 
oneself' (Fordham r98 5, p. 120), which is an early, pre-symbolic representation 
of the self in the ego; 'self representations ... [require] some degree of ego 
development ... and are obviously partial ... though something of the primary 
self clings to them' (Fordham 1976, p. r 3 ). '[S]ome of them refer ... to the total 
self as Jung maintained' {Fordham 1976, p. 56). 
Thus the song-note, like the movement of my hand, can be seen as an 
expression of a sense of self of which there is some consciousness. In our 
respective eureka moments, each of us felt, 'I found it!', and the 'I' to 
which we referred is a pre-conscious inference, of a taken-for-granted unity 
of our respective beings. This was accompanied by spontaneous, irreducible 
phenomena that were purely expressive-merely an announcement of a new 
reinteg rat ion of th e self. When a new thought (but not thinking) emanated out 
of this, Vejayan grasped it as his own. He could successfully act on this new 
thoug ht because he now possessed it. Despite my gestures and efforts to share 
my idea, when Vejayan infers what is in my mind, he feels it to be his thought, 
not mine. 
These eureka moments represented a fleeting, momentary awareness of the 
unity in our respective senses of self, which referred to the wholeness of the 
self, defined by Fordham. s It is true that very young infants are no strangers 
to musicality and rhythmic movement. I have heard a newborn less than a 
day old vocalize distinctly musical notes as her family talked about her, and 
seen babies on ly a few weeks old 'dance' as they watch the movement of a 
mobile above them. But these are direct responses to the world and are different 
from Vejayan's song-note and the flourish of my hand. Our eureka moments, 
with their accompanying self representations, required the achievement of an 
awareness of our respective selves, an awa reness not yet available to young 
infants . 
Yet self representations viewed as representations of the self are not entirely 
logically consistent within Fordh am's model. Conceptually, 'the primal self 
cannot be represented but its deintegrates can, and from these inferences can 
H Here I am understanding 'rhar we a re dealing nor only with successive phases hut also wi th 
simultaneous domains of self experiem.:e' beyond childho od (Stern 1985, p . 2.9). 
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be made about the self (Fordham 1994 , p. 76; my italics)". Rather self-
feeling ('kh Gefiihl'), with its representations and symbols, 'would be conceived 
as manifesting the central archetype of which the ego is a part' (Fordham 
1985, p. 108 ). Hence I am modifying Fordham's idea of self-representations 
as representations of the self in rhe ego, to state that sel(representations and 
self S)'11tboliz,1tio1t m·e more aptly considered as representations and symbols of 
the central ,1rchetype. 
In furtherance of this, Fordham noted that the primary function of the central 
archetype was integrative ; 'it transcends and unites opposites' (Fordham 1985, 
p. 33). Vejayan 's song-note can be seen as an expression of an integration of 
his sense of other, of object, and of self, emerging from the space provided by 
a triangulation of the constituents. Vejayan's new thought, fused as it is with 
self feeling, can be seen as ego development resulting from the same integrative 
activities that Fordham, from Jung, ascribed ro the central archetype. 
Archetypes, as Fordham summarized them, are 'typical and universal , ... at 
once mental and physical' (Fordham 1986). Brain developments occurring at 
the end of the first year are typical and universal, archetypal, and hence they can 
be conceived to be archetypal. Furthermore they are physical, the result of brain 
activity in which circuits and systems firing together become wired together; 
and they are mental, as is Vejayan's having a new thought, even if it cannot yet 
be cons idered mentalization. 
Just how brain becomes mind remains unknown, however various eminent 
researchers inquiring into this mystery have forged possib le new links between 
bod y and mind. One of these is Roger Sperry, a neurophysiologist, who spelled 
out a hypothesis involving the principle of emergence ' 0 , a concept which rose up 
in science and philosophy durin g the mid-twentieth century (Sperry 1977; Tresan 
" Herc Fordham is nor viewing inf~ren.:e as ..:ons.:ious. but as a function of an integrated state. 
10 Jean Knox ha s written a fine paper in this ]011m,1/ on emergence, which paralle ls mr own whi le 
.:omin~ from a Jifierent vertex. J..:nox's O\Wall aim is ro integrate an:hetypal theory with attac hment 
theory. :-..line is an examination of forJham·s de\·elopmenral model, borh historically and in the light 
of de\·elopmental and related r~sear.:h. 
The aim of Knox's :?.00 4 pape r is to put forward, 'that mind and meaning emerge our of 
developmental pro.:esses and the exper ien.:c: of interpe rsona l rela tionships rath er tha n existing ,7 
priori' (Knox :?.004, p. 161. This st:1temenr is an apt description of Fordham's model using different 
termino logy. Fordham (w ho wrote ahour parenr-infan t interacti on in the 193o's [Fordham r937)) 
tho ught in terms of dcinregra rion. ·unpacking' 1of the original integrate), and 'unfolding' rather 
rhan ·emergence·. 
Knox uses the term in its .:ommon sense meaning, whereas I am think ing here of ·emergence' in 
a more specifi..: \\'3)', d rawing on Sperry's des.:riprion of thi s prindple. :,..1y doing so has a certa in 
economy. as Sper ry no tes the \\'3)' the brain functiom inregrath·dr ro produce .:onscioum:ss . where by 
suhjecti\'e experien.:e .:an acr ·rop -down' and dfr.:r changes in lower parts of the brain. These 
functi ons arc cm·crcd hr Knox \'ia an exposition of reb ·anr resea r.:h. 
Lastly, whereas Knox applies ·emergen.:e· ro ar.:hctypes in general, I fo.:us here on the de\'e lopment 
of an ar.:hetype linked ro, and muddled with. the .:oncept ot ·self. which Fordham argu ed should 
be defined as the roralir1· of the personality. 
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1996). Sperry suggested that consciousness was an emergent property, and was 
separate from, although dependent upon , brain activity. Basically, emergence 
holds that the whole is irreducibly more rhan the sum of its parts. An example of 
the principle of emergence is water, which is irreducibly more than its constituent 
two hydrogen and one oxygen atoms. 
Sperry was awarded a Nobel Prize in 1981 for his work on the bilaterality 
of the cerebral cortex, which are nvo different systems of consciousness. He 
pointed our that these become , in normal circumstances, 'single and unified' 
(Sperry 1977, p. 376). 
Sperry was cautious when he introduced the conclusions from his work in a 
lecture in the mid-r96o's, when he put forward a view that consciousness is: 
a dynamic emergent of brain acti,·it~·. neither idenrical with, nor reducible to, the neural 
events of which it is mainly composed .... flt isl not conceived as an epiphenomenon, 
inner aspect, or other passive correlate of brain processing, but rather to be an active 
inregral part of the cerebral process itself, exerting potent causal effects in the interplay 
of cerebral operations. In a position of top command at the highest levels in the 
hierarchy of brain organization, the subjectiYe properties ... exert control over the 
biophysical and chemical activities at subordinate levels ... 
(Sperry 1977, p. 382) 
Sperry points out the evolutionary advantage to humans of having 'two 
mutually conflicting modes of cerebral processing, holistic-spatial and analytic-
sequential. .. '(S perry 1977 , p. 3 76) . '[ Cjonsider', he asks, 'the tactical difference 
between responding to the world directly and responding to inner conscious 
representations of the outside world ' ( Sperry 1977, p. 3 8 5 ). This is the advantage 
that Vejayan was acquiring through shared play, when he integrates new 
perceptions, observed from new perspectives, and abstracted them into a new 
thought . He grasped this ne\v thought to be his own, whereby he could 
internalize it by successfully testing it out on the toy, on his own. 
Here the ·central archetype ' , ·emergence' and developments at the end of the 
first year converge to form an understanding toward the early deintegration of 
psyche. Fordham conceived that the primary function of the central archetype 
is integrati ve and 'contributes significantly to the formation of the central 
ego'. This links with Sperry's 'single and unified' consciousness, and Vejayan's 
coming to possess a new thought. The central archetype 't ra nscends and 
unites opposites' and therefore has a transcendent function, just as does 
Sperry's concept of emergence, which unites mutually conflicting modes of 
consciousness. The central archetype ·finds expression especially in conscious 
experiences of seltbood', as Vejayan expressed in his song -note. 
Deintegration of the central archetype from infancy to adulthood 
The emergenc e of capacities at the end of the first year can be seen as a 
developmental prelude to symholization, story-making, mora lity and the variety 
of subjective experiences of the self that Jung had reserved for later life. What is 
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:de to be done is to link early self representations to symbols of the self in later 
de Ye! opment. 
Developmentall y the earliest manifestations of the central archetype are pre-
symbolic, such as Vejayan's song-note and the scribbles drawn by a little boy, 
who was one of the rwo chi ldren from whose activ ities Fordham hypothesized 
:he self in childhood . The boy, who was around Vejayan's age, drew repeated 
circles until he cou ld say 'I', whereupon the circles stopped. 
The capacity for (but not necessarily the acquisition of) symbolization, as Jung 
regarded symbols, develops at around four years (Fonagy et al 2004). At this 
roint there are evidences of reflective function and theory of mind, indicating the 
..:hild 's capacity to represent representations. Thi s could be expected to apply 
ro self sym bol s referring to the child's wholeness of being. In fact Fordham 
described this kind of self-image from his own childhood, when he was around 
fou r. In his Memoirs, he recalled an experience that occu rred as his family were 
moving from Surrey to Hampshire . 
. .\ lot of packing was going on and it continued until we left the first house in my life 
when I was three or four years old. I do nor remember arriving at Clapham Junction. 
1I am convinced that l was told and remembered the tide of that station at the time.) 
.vly mother and I were together; I was sitting on her knee in a railway carriage looking 
out of the window. I thought we were at the centre of the world and all trains came 
to Clapham Junction where our train had stopped. I felt important and secure. 
(Fordham 1993, p. 27) 
Fordh am's reflection conveys his sense of wholeness, of being 'at the centre 
of the wo rld '. Simultaneously it is of self-integrativ e processes of the central 
archetype, expressed as a self image, or symbol, of a junction where 'all trains 
came to' and 'where our train had stopped'. (The memory disregards the fact 
that trains also departed from Clap ham Junction.) 
The emergent processes of self-image creation are now recognized to be 
evanescent and fleeting, less comparable to rhe fixed properties of H,O, and 
more to school s of certain fish or flocks of certai n birds. These burst into 
an overall form and move as a unit until disso lving into entities behaving as 
individuals. The sight of a flock of starlings preoccupied Samuel Coleridge, 
who made the following entry in his journal as he was leaving the Lake District 
to start a new career as a journali st. 
Starlings in \'asr flights dro\'e along like smoke, mist, or any thing misty without 
volition - now a circular area inclined in an arc - now a Globe - now from complete 
Orb into an Ellipse & Oblong - no\\' a balloon with the car suspended, now a 
concave Semicircle - & still it expands & condenses, some moments glimmering and 
shimmering, dim & shadowy. now thickening, deepening, blackening!'. 
(Holmes 1989, p. 253) 
Richard Holmes, Coleridge's biographer, wrote, 
This image haunted him for years after . . . It is an image of shifting energy and 
imagination, a protean form or a force field, lacking fixed structure or outline, a 
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powerful personality without a solid identity, or unified will - 'without volition'. 
Clearly this was some sort of self-image for Coleridge. both stimulating in its 
freedom, of 'vast flights'; and menacing in its sense of threatening chaos or implosion, 
'thickening, deepening, blackening'. 
(Holmes 1989, p. 254 ) 
This captures the ceaseless movement of both consciousness and unconscious-
ness, one state blending into or clashing against another in what appears to 
be the way emergence functions to create mind and enable mind to create and 
recreate itself. The term 'representation ' and 'image' seem inappropriate because 
they convey an impression of something static. These symbolic expressions are 
ephemeral and elusive, rising up, emerging into consc iousness seemingly from 
nowhere and then disappearing again . Jung famously experienced this kind of 
self-image of mind reflecting on mind, evidenced in the changing mandalas in 
his series of drawings during 1918-19. He referred to them as the 'ultimate'; 
'Formation, Transformation, Eternal Mind's eternal recreation' (Jung 196 3, 
p. 221). 
This then is a very brief sketch of the deinregration of the central archetype, 
from infancy to adult life. 
Summary comment 
The subject of this paper is the self in Jungian theory as Fordham came to view 
it, having made it the conceptual centre and basis of his model. Working out 
his model required it to be logically coherent and consistent, so when Fordham 
discovered a contradiction in the ways Jung used the 'self', a resolution was 
required. Fordham separated the 'self' defined as a psychosomatic totality, 
from expressions of its wholeness in human psychic experience. For this he 
suggested the term, 'central archetype'. This resolved the contradiction via 
his developmental model; the self is primary, and the central archetype is a 
deintegrate. What I have here pressed to clarify is that the logical consequence 
of this is that phenomena associated with the self should be regarded as 
manifestations of the central archetype. 
Curiously Fordham, having suggested the term, neither developed nor 
dropped it, although he preserved it in the culmination of his work, Explorations 
i,zto the Self (1985). I am arguing for the value of this concept, based on my 
own studies into infancy and Fordham's model. 'Centra l archetype' serves as 
a conceptual tool providing logical consistency to Jung 's theory of the self. 
It offers a more precise way of describing the deintegration of mind because it 
accommodates the wealth of data from infant research not avai lable to Fordham, 
while demonstrating how readily his model comprehends it. 
As a deintegrate out of which the ego develops, the central archet ype provides 
a link between early ego development and the primar y self. Locating the 
emergence of its early phenomena at the end of the first year marks the closing 
of what I have elsewhere considered to be the period of the primary self, and the 
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earl y beginnings of psychic phenomena, including symbolization, which were 
the data of Jung's work {Urban 2005). This link preserves Ford ham's view, 
following Jung, that the individual self is woven into the whole fabric of one's 
life. In Fordham 's model, the self is not emergent, or a construct derived from 
others, or a process alone, but inherently. bodily and essentially one's own. 
TRANSLATIO:- S OF ABSTR.-\CT 
Cet article traite du soi tel que Fordham fut amene a le concernir, a partir d'une 
analyse conceptuelle de ]'usage jungien de ce rerme. Fordham identifia chez Jung une 
contrad iction clans !'usage du terme. qu'il resolut en resen·ant "soi,. a une defini tion de 
l'entierete psychosomatique de l'individu et en utilisant un rerme separe pour se referee 
aux expressions du soi clans !'experience humaine des symboles ). Fordham proposa 
de nommer « archetype central ,, ces occurrences du soi, mais cette proposition ne 
fut ni deve]oppee ni abandonnee. j'etudie clans Cet article Ja Ya]eur de Ce terme clans 
une perspective deYeloppementale et. plus specifiquement. en termes de de-integration 
de la psyche clans une unite ps~·chosomarique precoce, ceci en reference a I' « infant 
research », ainsi qu'a l'observarion d'un bebe de quatorze mois. Enfin, je decris et illustre 
brievement des developpements u!terieurs. clans !esque!s des expressions p re-symboliques 
de !'a rchetype central dedennent symbo liques er en \·iennent a refleter ce qui pour 
Jung etair le bur« ultime ,,; « Formation, Transformation, Eternelle recreation de !'Esprit 
E.ternel ». 
Die vorliegende Arbeit beschaftigt sich mit dem Selbsr, so wie Fordham es enrwic kelt 
und verstanden hat, einer begrifflichen Analyse \·on Jungs Gebrauch des Terminus Selbst 
:olgend. Fordham erkannte einen Widerspruch inJungs Gebrauch under loste ihn auf, in-
dem er das 'Selbst' fur die Definition der psychosomarischen Gesamtheit des Indi viduums 
reservierte und einen gesonderten Begriff benutzte, um auf die Ausdrucksmoglichkeiten 
Jes Selbst in der menschlichen Erfahrung lz. B. Symbole) zu ,·erweisen. Fordham schlug 
,·ersuchsweise YOr, dieses letztere als 'zentralen . .\rchetypus' zu bezeichnen, wenngleich 
dieser Vorschlag weder weiter entwickelt, noch fallen gelassen wurde. Ich unte rsuche 
den Wert dieses Begriffes von einer entwicklungspsychologischen Perspektive aus und, 
:10ch spezifischer, in Begriffen der Deintegration der Psyche ausgeh end von einer 
friihen psychosomatischen Einheir. Dieses verweist auf die Sauglingsforschung und die 
Beobachtung eines 14 Mona re alten Jungen. SchlieBlich werden weitere Emwicklungen 
;.;urz beschrieben und il!ustriert, wobei die prasymbolischen AuSerungen des zent ralen 
. \rchecypus zu symbolischen werden und beginnen, das zu reflekrieren, was fiir Jung <las 
·Endgiilt ige war, Formation, Transformation. des ewigen Geistes ewige Neugestaltung'. 
Questo lavoro tratta de] se come Fordham giunse a considerarlo, seguendo un 'an alisi 
concettuale dell'uso che Jung ne fece. Fordham scopri una conrrad dizione nel modo di 
usarlo di Jung, e la riso!se riserrnndo ii termine se per una definizione della totalita 
psicosomati ca dell'individuo e utilizzando un rermine diverse per riferirsi all'espressione 
de! se nell'esperienza umana (ad es. i simbolil. Fordham propose come tentativo di 
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chiamare quesr'ultimo ·archetipo centrale' sebbene questo non fosse ne sviluppato ne 
lasciaro cadere . Esam ino ii ,·alore di questo termine da un punto di vista evolutivo e, 
piu specificamente in termini di deintegrazione della psiche a partire da una totalita 
psicosomatica. Cio si basa sull'infant research e sull'osservazione di un bambino di 
q mesi. Infine ,·erranno descritti e illustrati ulteriori sviluppi per mezzo dei qua li le 
espressioni delrarchetipo centrale di,·engono sirnboliche e arrivano a riflettere cio che 
per Jung era 'ii definiti\'O '; •formazione. Trasforrnazione. creazione ererna della Mente 
Eterna·. 
Esre rrabajo se refiere al self cal como Fordham lo concibe, seguido de un analisis 
conceptual de! uso que Jung le da al termino. Fordham encuentra una contradicci6n 
en la utilizacion de Jung, )' la resueh·e reserrnndo el rermino 'self para definir la 
entidad psicosomatica del indi\'iduo. 1· utilizando un termino aparte para referirse a 
las expresiones de! self en la experiencia humana ( p.ej. los simbolos ). Tentativamente 
Fordham sugiere que este ultimo sea denominado como 'arquetipo central', a pesar de que 
este nose haya desarrollado ni caido. Explore el rnlor de este termino desde la perspecciva 
desarrollisca y. mas especfficamente en terminos de desintegrac i6n de la psique de la 
unidad psicosomatica temprana. Ello mediante la im-estigaci6n y la observaci6n de un 
nino de q meses de edad. Finalmenre. orros desarrollos son descriros e ilusrrados. donde 
las expres iones pre-simbolicas del arqueripo central se hacen simb6li cas y reflejan lo que 
para Jung era . ·la finalidad'. 'Formacion. Transformaci6n. la recreaci6n de la Mente 
eterna·. 
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Conjugating the self 
Elizabeth Urban, London 
James Astor has discerned what he considers to be not an actual, but rather 
an apparent misunderstanding between Warren Colman and myself in our 
respective papers in the special Journal edition on the self Uournal of Analytical 
Psychology, 53, 3,J une 2008). The substance of his commentary is that Colman 
interprets the view of Fordham and myself to be that the primary self has, a 
priori, 'a blueprint which sets patterns for development' (see Astor 2009 in this 
issue, p . 395). Astor considers that this is a matter of linguistic rather than 
conceptual differences, and that this is due to the way Fordham and I discuss 
the concept of the primary self; that is, we describe it in a way that can imply 
that it has structures and contents a priori, although it is hardl y the case that 
Fordham and I conceive this to be so. I agree with Astor that the differences he 
cites are primarily apparent, and express my appreciation for his insight into 
this. I would also like to restate some of Astor's points from my own position 
and add some of my own thoughts. 
Firstly, Fordham was staunch ly against the notion of innate images and 
contents. The idea seems to derive from Jung's idea of the self as ' an a priori 
existent' (Jung 19 54, para . 391), but became distorted into the misconception 
that the infant self is 'filled ' a priori with an archetype-rich unconscious, which 
is projected onto the mother. This was Fordham's argument with Neumann, 
and the vehemence of his objection comes through in his paper, 'Neumann and 
childhood ' (Fordham 1981). 
Colman, Jean Knox, myself and other contemporary developmental Jungians 
view infant development to be interactive and emergent - as did Fordha m. In 
1937 he wrote: 
I have attempted to develop the idea that there is a constant interplay between the 
child and its own world on the one hand and the world of parents and teachers and 
adults generally on the other. It is through this interplay that the child develops. 
(Fordham 1937, p. 15) 
Secondly, as for emergence, Fordham commented, 'The idea of the self as an 
integrator alone leaves no room for the emergence of part systems brought into 
being by the dynamic patterned drives and environmental stimuli. This, then, 
was an important motive for introducing a more dynamic theo ry .. .' (Fordham 
© 2.009, The Society of Analytical Psychology 
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1969, p. 99; reprinted 1994, p. 72; my italics). Did Fordham understand 
'emergence' in its current philosophical sense? It seems he did. Philosophically, 
emergence is subsumed under holism (or 'wholism' }, which maintains that 
'properties of the whole cannot be defined by the properties of the parts' (Audi 
2001, pp. 390-91). Fordham wrote that the self is 'the sum of part systems' 
(Fordham 1994, p. 73); that '[t]he summation would differ in more or less 
important respects from any primordial experience and be outside and beyond 
it' (Fordham 1985, p. 21), and implied that the whole is more than the sum of 
its parts when he wrote, 'any symbol that carries the experience of or of which 
is postulated as having a greater totality than man himself can be a symbol of 
the self' (ibid ., p. 18). 
Then there is the matter of defining the self. Colman resists the way Fordham 
and myself draw upon 'abstract logical postulates', and argues in favour of 'an 
alternative view of the self and of archetypes that relates them more firmly to the 
phenomenal world and therefore to being and knowing' (Colman 2008, p. 3 5 3 }. 
He then appears to try to dispense with Fordham 's model as if it were outdated, 
although I do not suppose that this is Colman's actual intention. Rather I think 
that Colman is trying to grasp and describe the subjective experience of the self 
in development, and to make a developmental model based on that. I believe 
that there are problems inherent in attempting this. 
Before cont inuing I must correct Colman's statement that Fordham had 'two 
major definitions of the self, the primary self and the self as archetype (especially 
the 'central archetype of order')' (Colman 2008, p. 3 5 3 ). Fordham did not have 
two definitions of the self; Fordham defined the self as the whole of the individual 
organism. Fordham did point out that Jung gave two (apparently) contradictory 
definitions of 'self', both of which referred to totality and wholeness. One 
way was in terms of a conceptual definition, and the other was in terms of 
phenomenology (the product of an archetype). Although Jung might eschew 
theory in favour of experience ('It is not the concept that matters; the concept 
is only a word, a counter, and it has meaning and use only because it stands 
for a certain sum of experience' Uung 1951, para. 63]), Fordham notes (with 
characteristic wryness}, 'that theories have advantages over myths in scientific 
studies' (Fordham 1985, p. 8). 
Since the time he studied medicine at Cambridge, Fordham was interested 
in the application of science to practice. There are two elements to Fordham's 
application of science to Jung: the validity of the data on which Jung based his 
theory (clinical experience and cultural studies}, and logical consistency within 
the theoretical system. Fordham accepted Jung's data while noting its limits. 
But in order for the theory to be sound the inconsistency in Jung's definition 
had to be disentangled into archetypal phenomena on the one hand, and an 
abstract definition on the other. Fordham did not want to confound things by 
using muddling nomenclature, such as 'archetype of the self', to refer to the 
phenomenology. Hence he suggested a different term: the 'central archetype' 
(Fordham 1963). 
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I am not clear from reading Colman's paper whether he sees that the primary 
self is a conceptual and mystical, rather than ontological, postulate. The primary 
self has no beginning and goes back through evolution, while it also represents 
the very beginning of a new individual life. It refers to an 'ultimate': to an 
emptiness that is 'pure' potential; the nothing that is everything. It represents 
'a state in which there is no past and no future, though it is present like a 
point which has position [but] no magnitude. It has no desires, no memory, no 
thoughts, no images .. .' (Fordham 198 5, p. 3 3 ): 
So in a sense it's not describable, like Bion's 'O' ... , though it is describable in as much 
as it's an absence, a creative absence. It's out of that all the psyche and development 
emerges. It's a mystical concept primarily but people don't like that word. 
(Fordham 1:987) 
Thus the primary self is quite separate from the collective unconscious although 
they are often erroneously linked: 
[I]t does not seem that, in spite of the occasional visions of small children, the collective 
unconscious in its sophistic sense becomes a significant element in a child's life until 
his psychic structures have developed sufficiently for him to become related to the 
wider society outside his family. 
(Fordham 1985, p. 49 ) 
For Fordham development comes through inherent processes, the ungain1y-
termed deintegration and reintegration , which lead to internal structuring and 
contents, which in turn can lead to self-consciousness, symbolization, and self-
reflection. In short, Fordham 's postulate represents the 'ultimate' source from 
which emerges the self that is Jung's 'ultimate': the subjective experience of 
individuation and the wholeness of oneself; of "Formation, transformation, 
eternal Mind's eternal recreation" (Jung 1963, p. 2.2.1) - or, as Colman puts it, 
'an indefinable "empty centre " at the heart of me . . .' (Colman 2008, p. 364). 
In a previous paper I described actions of the self in two newborns. One was 
of Andrew immediately after birth, dried but not washed, and placed on his 
mother's abdomen . He makes his way to her breast, orienting himself visually 
by looking from her areola to her face and back again and via smell by tasting 
the amniotic fluid on his hand, which is similar to the scent of her nipple. 
His manoeuvrings elicit hormonal changes in his mother's body, producing 
uterine contractions and oxytocin (the 'love' hormone). The.other description 
I gave was of Jake, who, asleep while his mother and I were talking, oriented 
preferentially to his (familiar) mother by reaching toward her, and aversively 
away from me (a stranger) by pushing his arms and hands away from me (Urban 
2.005). . 
Colman would presumably take them, from a first person perspective, as 
Andrew and Jake experiencing being a self. For my part, these views omit what, 
from a third person perspective, is for me most impressive: the overall functional 
unity of the neonate's endeavours in engaging with particular (and not other ) 
aspects of the post-uterine environment. This unity, which is in place by birth, 
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integrates the newborn's body, central nervous system with its own perceptual 
system, and individual temperament in ways that contribute significantly to 
relating to others and also to themselves. So for me 'primary self', 'actions of 
the self', and 'central archetype' stand the rest of usefulness in making sense 
of individual infants, provide a crucial conceptual developmental link between 
Fordham and Jung, and helpfully inform clinical work about the emergence of 
psychic developments. 
In a previous paper I noted that Fordham uses 'primary self' in two ways: 
as a postulate and as the initial period of life marked by the predominance of 
actions of the self. This is pertinent to Astor's final point; 'So what has gone 
awry is that Fordham and Urban's theoretical language are at odds with their 
actual scientific observations. Their language implies an unfolding of something 
pre-existing is taking place whereas their observations describe an interactive 
flux' (see Astor 2009 in chis issue, p. 398) . Fordham and I have tried to illustrate 
the 'primary self' (the postulate ) by giving observations of actions of the self 
(the early period marked by such actions, such as those of Andrew and Jake), 
with the result that the actions can be mistaken for the postulate. 
Because his postulate refers to a concept beyond phenomenology, Fordham 
was led to say that the primary self, like Jung's 'self', is a 'mys tical' concept and 
a 'special case' amongst definitions (Fordham 198 5, pp. 22 and 21 respectively}. 
Elsewhere I have noted that self is a 'special case' as it belongs in a special class 
of ideas known as canonical conjugates. These are an extension of Heisenberg 's 
uncertainty principle, whereby pairs of attributes are related to one another 
in such a way that 'the more determinate or 'sharp' the value of one of the 
quantities, the less determinate (or more 'unsharp') its value for the other 
quantity' (Bullock & Trombley 2000, p. 893 ). In quantum physics, 'A particle's 
position and momentum together define its path .. . ' but both cannot be sharply 
defined within the same system (ibid., 893). Phenomenology and 'abstract, 
logical postulates' both define the self, yet when one is trying to think in terms 
of human experience, the subjective approach becomes 'more sharp', while 
thinking in terms of theory becomes 'more unsharp', and vice versa (Urban 
2005 ). Hence the self by its nature is, 'The elusive 'I' that shows an alarming 
tendency to disappear when we try to introsp ect it' (Blackburn 1996, p. 344). 
Colman and I tend to describe our thinking about this particular canonical 
conjugate from a reciprocal rather than opposite approaches, that is, respec-
tively, sense of self (phenomenology) and self (abstraction). Astor and I follow 
Fordham in regarding sense of self as an ego attribute, conceptually separate 
yet deeply linked to the self. Colman reacts to this position, in particular to 
questions I raised in previous discussion with him, in a section of his paper 
irol}ically entitled 'Sense of self revisited: do trees have selves?'. He writes, 
'Such questions are the price we pay for not defining the self in purely psychic 
terms' (Colman 2008, p. 358). Yet Colman does not define the self in purely 
psychic terms, nor do I. Both points of view recognize, following Jung, that self 
is psyche and soma. Whether 'being and having a self' adds to an already 
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well-worked out Jungian developmental model based on observation and 
research, is open to question. 
Colman and I come from different perspectives: his, like Jung's , draws on data 
from work with adults, while mine and Fordham 's from work with children 
and infant observation. Colman sharpens up the first person perspective, while 
I sharpen the third person perspective, which does not mean we exclude what is 
'unsharp'. If it appears that Colman and I are quibbling over terminology and 
viewpoint, we are also engaging with one another in the course of developing 
our respective position s - and hopefull y that of others - about the same, elusive 
subject. 
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Reflections on research and learning from the 
patient: the art and science of what we do 
Elizabeth Urban, London 
Abstract: Over three decades ago, John Bowlby argued for psychoana lysis ro seek beyond 
its own par ameters if it was to maintain its claim to be a science. Since then there has been a 
wealth of relevant research from various fields. While this has been instrumental in the 
development of my own work, this paper concerns learning from the patient. 
The paper begins with a premise: interpr etative analytic work requi res 
three-dimensionality (self, other and object ). Although interpretative work ma y be 
ingrained in our professional identity, this triangulation may or may not exist in 
our patients in any stable way. The paper continues with a brief developme ntal 
account of how early arc hetypally-s haped shifts in the infant 's field of interest estab-
lish the experientia l components of three-dimensionality. From there, observational 
and clinical ma teria l with a toddler and a young boy describe how early relati onal 
deficits hindered their capacities for three-dimensionality. Yet both were able to engage 
with the therapist and to become active in the creation of three-dimensionality within 
their own minds. 
Implied in thi s work are consideratio ns for wo rking with patients for whom interpre-
tat ions do not work. M ichael Fordham's comments on 'working out of the self' are 
linked with the art of wha t we do. 
Key words : Anne Alvarez, Boston Change Process Study Gro up, John Bow lby, Michael 
Fordham, infant deprivation, infant research, Christian Tetzlaff, three-dimensionality, 
Colwyn Trevarthe n, triangulation 
Jung's final statements ['We need a different lang11age for every patient ' (Jung, 
1963, p. 153)/ should be taken not as a denial of the value of theoretical 
guidelines for psychotherapy, but rather as a suggestion that the treatment of the 
patient is an art. 
(Fordham 1979, p. 195) 
Over th ree decades ago, John Bowlb y argued for psychoanalysis to seek 
empirics beyond its own parameters if ic was to maintain its cla im to be a 
science (Bowlb y 1979) . Since then the picture has changed and research, 
particu larly that into infanc y, neurobiology and attachment, has been given a 
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place within the controversies and literature in psychoanalysis and analytical 
psychology . A good example is the recent JAP conference in Boston USA, 1 
where this paper was presented in an abbreviated form. 
The Boston conference directed attention to the potential enrichment that 
contemporary research can bring to Jungian understanding and practice; in-
deed, various elements of this research have been instrumental in the develop-
ment of my own studies and clinical work. However what follows will not 
elaborate on that contribution, which, like theory, is peripheral to my purposes 
here. Rather, I shall focus on learning from the patient. 
I shall begin with a premise: interpretative analytic work is based on a three-di-
mensional configuration comprising two people with minds or, rather, minds-in-
the-making, sharing interest in objects of thought and feelings (or lack of them). 
Put simply, the object of interest, whether a toy or a memory the patient recalls, 
serves as a kind of 'constant' in relation to which there are two different positions 
made up of a complexity of attitude, affect and meaning. These differences allow 
both parties to separate their minds from one another while becoming more 
deeply engaged with one another's selves. This triangulatio n lays the foundation 
and provides the on-going means for realizing our human capacities for abstrac -
tion, language, imagination, symbolization and reflection .2 
Although interpretative work may be ingrained in our professional identity, 
this triangulation may or may not be held in the minds of our patie nts to any 
workable degree . 
What follows concerns just this and might be seen as an account of 'Formation , 
transformation; actions of the self in the mind 's creation'. 3 Firstly I offer a condensed 
outline of the developmental shifts in the infant' s field of interest that provide the ex-
periential components of three-dimensionality: self, other, and object. Secondly, I 
show how the infant and child are active in the creation of their minds, presuming 
the participation of a mindful other. Implied in these are considerations for working 
with patients for whom interpretations do not work. Herein lies the art of what we do. 
Formation: observations of Baby Harry 
In the same year Bowlby delivered his case for the recognition of attachment research, 
Edinburgh Professor Colwyn Trevarthen concluded that 'psychological functions that 
' 'Attachment and Intersubjectivity in the Therapeutic Relationship ', JAP XIth International 
Conference, with sponsorship from the New England Society of Jungian Analysts, the C. G. Jung 
Institute (Boston) and the Child Analytic Project Fund (Society of Analytical Psychology, Londo n) 
April 4- 7, 2013, Boston, MA. 
~ For more about triangulation see Chapters 3 and 4 in The Cradle of Thought, P. H obson (2002) 
London: Macmillan. 
3 This is a variation of Jung's quote from Goethe regarding 'the ultimate': 'Formation, Transformatio n; 
Eternal Mind 's eternal recreation' (Jung 1963, p. 221). It is pertinent that in Goethe's play Faust must 
touch a key given to him by Mephistopheles to a tripod [my emphasis] in order to enter the mysterious 
realm of pure ideas (archetypes, Platonic forms) (Goethe 1954). 
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remain central to the highest intellectual and mora l achievements of adults in society 
are expressed in a one-year-old on the threshold of spoken language' (Trevarthen & 
Hubley 1978, p. 184). Trevarthen researched into the precursors of language, draw-
ing upon observations of 'no rmal' mothers' responses to their babies during the first 
year. His research therefore included behaviours other than social interaction. 
Extracts from Lynn Barnett's filmed observation 4 of the infant I shall call 
Harry at four different points over his first year illustrate the shifts in the in-
fant's interest noted by Trevarthen. These incremental changes move from 
self with other, to self with object, and then, at the end of the first year, these 
Picture r. Harry at 3. 5 weeks Self - attentive 
Picture 2. Harry at 3.5 weeks Self - freeze 
• Lynn Barnett is a British child psychotherapist who filmed a longitudinal observation of a boy, 
titled 'Sunday's Child' . I have changed the baby's name at the request of Ms Barnett (r988) for rea-
sons related to her on-going observation . 
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are integrated into a triangulation of self, other and object. These shifts of at-
tention are typical and universa l, that is, archetypal, and are man ifestations 
of post-natal neurological developments dependent upon parenta l interaction. 
At birth and during the neonate period (birth to two months ) the infant's 
behaviour is regulated by the basal ganglia, which is associated with instinctua l 
action and survival (fight, flight, freeze). (Pictures r and 2: Harry at 3. 5 weeks 
'Self) Notice Harry's engagement in his feed (Picture r) : and, afterwards, his 
post-feed freeze-like trance (Picture 2). 
Picture 3. Harry at IO. 5 weeks: Self and other 
Picture 4. Harry at IO. 5 months: Self and object 
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Around six weeks to two months the mid-brain and limbic system come 'o n-line'. 
The most obvious features of this change are face-to-face interactions marked by 
emotionally rich exchanges of smiles and vocalizations ('protoconversations') 
(Picture 3). At this point there is a new quality and intensity of attention to the 
mother's face, which is highly evocative and elicits expressive responses. Previ-
ously the infant looked at his mother's face; now he looks into it. 
Picture 5. Harry at 10. 5 months: Self, object and other 
Picture 6. Harry at 10 .5 months: Self, other and object--one second later on from 
Picture 5 
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At around four to five months, there is a shift in the baby's interest from his 
mother's face to objects that she animates, which then become an interes t in 
themselves (Picture 4). 
Toward the end of the first year highly important developments occur in the neo-
cortex. The baby's focus of interest shifts back and forth between the toy (Pic-
ture 5) and the other's face and gestures (Picture 6). Up until now the baby 
takes the lead in social interaction, but at this point the baby turns to another 
for guidance. 
Now the baby looks behind the face and searches into the other's mind. At this 
point , self, other and object come together in shared play to create an 'idea ' in 
the infant's emergent mind of what the game is about. 
Transformation: observations of a toddler 
Vijay's mother had suffered an acute post-natal depression just after his birth, 
not long after which she was admitted, with Vijay, to the perinatal in-patient 
mental health unit where I work. They regularly came to my mother-baby 
group, where I frequently observed Vijay, only a few months old, twist his 
whole body away from his mother in order to avert what he registered of her 
lifelessness. There were times when she was too withdrawn to look after her 
baby, and nurses cared for Vijay. 
Over the months Vijay's mother improved and took pride in her son and 
authority for his care. Not long before she was discharged, when Vijay was 
fourteen months old, I videoed them playing together. 5 What I saw aroused 
my concern because there was no shared play; Vijay seldom looked at his 
mother's face and moved quickly from one activity to another until becoming 
exc ited and boisterous. At one point Vijay approached his mother and stood 
on her lap, held by her. He playfully tapped a skittle against his own head 
and then his mother's, then swayed back and forth touching, then more 
aggress ively, knocking his head against hers. Their interactions were sensation-
based and two-dimensional; Vijay and his mother were head-to-head rather than 
mind-to-mind. 
I then videoed Vijay and myself, while I tried to engage him in shared play. 
I started by inviting him to put an object he was hol ding into a bucket, 
which be did, but soon he became distracted and messed about . Twenty-five 
minutes into the session, I return ed to the bucket play, intentio na lly trying to 
engage him in the three-dimensional property of the bucket: it can contain 
some thin g else within it. Although Vijay could not make sense of wha t I 
was doing, from what followed very soon afterward he had gleaned some -
thing from my behaviour . 
5 For a more detailed account of these observations ofVijay see Urban 2.008. 
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Frustrated with not understanding my intentions , he smacked his hands 
against a large toy. He sauntered off and picked up a small plastic lid he had 
earlier thrown away, and put it into his mouth. At the time I regarded his 
behaviour as distracted and disorganized but when I studied the video, Vijay 
was clearly looking intentionally for the plastic cap. When he found it 
and put it into his mouth , he, almost simultaneousl y, put his hand into an 
opening on the top of the toy (Picture 7). He was thus actively experimenting 
in a cohere nt way, delibera tely trying to comprehend 'insiderness', and 
'conta iner' (his mouth) and 'conta ined' (his hand) by using direct sensation 
(see Bower 1977). 
Picture 7. Vijay's experime nt with three -dimensionality 
I then initiated a game of putting the cap into the top of the toy and then 
retrieving it from a door at the bottom. Too physically close to be able to 
see the toy and me together, Vijay was unable to infer wha t I had in mind 
to do with the toy. Tired and uncont ained, he stumbled over, got upset 
and went to his mother's knee. In so doing Vijay positioned himself with in 
a physical tr iangul atio n of himself, me and the game (Picture 8). From that 
adva nta ge he wa tched me as I demonstrated the game. 
He then leaned forward, emitted a little joyful note of recognition and discovery, 
and came close and repeated wha t I had shown him. His song-like note (the C 
above Middle C) marked the instant when wha t he saw through direct, sensate 
perception was transformed into something mental: he 'got it'. This marked 
the emergence of a triangulation of self, othe r and mental object. 
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Picture 8. Triang ulation of Vijay, other and toy 
Formation, transformation: clinical work with a young boy 
The boy I shall call Bryan had been grossly neglected during his first two years, 
when develop mental capacities are particu larly sensitive to and dependent upon 
parental care . His behaviour and responses revealed deprivations in each of the 
domains of self, self and object, and self together with other and object. The de-
gree of Bryan's neglect was evident in his lack of the most elemental human so-
cial norms, includin g face-to-face intimacy, mutuality , turn- taking and seeking 
protection from another . 
Social Services removed Bryan from his mother 's care not long after his 
birth and placed him with his father. That arrangement broke down when 
Bryan was around two years old. At the same time his younger sister was 
taken into care at birth and the siblings, who had never met, were fostered 
with separa te families. A year-and-a-ha lf later, Mr. and Mr s. B. adopted bot h 
chi ldren. By the end of their first year together as a family, Bryan's behaviour 
had become unmanageab le. 
I've distilled the following clinical materia l to show how Bryan, despite gross 
deprivation durin g his first two years, was act ive in re-formi ng delusional as-
sumpt ions and revising early relational memori es. By the end of treatment, 
Bryan was tran sforming mindle ss dread into benign three-dimensional space . 
Bryan was five-and- a-half when he began his once week ly treatment over a 
fixed-term two-year period in my NHS clinic. His adopt ive mother, wanting 
to avo id the negative conno tation of the treatment, had explained to Bryan that 
he wou ld be seeing a 'n ice person who was int erested in getting to know him'. 
When I first met Bryan with his adoptive parents, he appeared impress ively 
con fident, until Mr. and Mrs. B. left the room. 
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Bryan carefully explored a few of the toys in his toy box then went to the window and 
saw his father open the car door, presumably to get something. Bryan said, as if to 
himself, 'They're going and leaving me'. He found a toy cheetah in his toy box and told 
me that the cheetah-' the fastest animal in the world' - was his favourite in the zoo. 
By his third and final assessment inter view, Bryan's anxieties dissipated into 
physical activity. 
Running in place beside me, he showed me how he could run faster than a horse. He 
then became the horse, racing furiously till he suddenly dropped over and 'died'. He 
repeated this several times. I said he seemed troubled that his parents left him alone 
with me. Although I was sure his parents would be in the waiting room when we 
finished, he seemed to believe that they would go away without him, and he worried 
whether he would be fast enough to catch up with them. 
Formations: the first year of treatment 
Once treatment had started , Bryan seemed to anticipate every session as a prelude 
to abandonment. He had, after all, experienced other 'nice people' , that is, social 
workers, who 'were interested to get to know him' before he was removed from 
one carer to be given over to another. Bryan's response to being left was not as 
organized as attachment behaviour , which might otherwise have resulted in 
asking for his adoptive parents. Rather, separatio n for Bryan was a threa t to 
his sense of surviva l, expressed in fight/flight/freeze behaviours. 
Much later I heard that Bowlby had said that most animals run away from 
danger, while humans run towards safety. Bryan just ran-and did cartw heels 
and somersaults, and climbed on furniture and the window sill-then suddenly 
dropped onto the floor in feigned sleep. Marginally more collected, he then 
insisted on escaping to the lavatory. I did little more than absorb this in baffled 
impotence. The following is an examp le of his over-activity at three months 
into treatment. I had accompanied him to the lavatory and waited outside. 
I heard him call me, distress in his voice. When I went in, he asked anxiously, 'Is it 
going to flood?' I then noticed the toilet bowl, full to the brim with excreta, soiled 
water and dissolving shreds of toilet paper. I told him it was only blocked and sorted 
this out. Returning to the room, I felt protective of him and wondered if l had proved 
myself to be a safe person. But Bryan became quite manic, and turned two cartwheels. 
He wadded two balls of paper, labelled one his poo and the other mine, blew his nose 
into them and threw them at me. He kicked the wall violently and then a metal cabinet, 
denting it. I physically restrained him, holding him from behind, while he kicked the 
wall again and shouted, 'Stand off!' I said I would stand off; first I'd count to five 
and then both of us would take three steps away from each another. This we did. 
From time to time I initiated what I hoped would become shared play. Occasionally 
I introduced Winnicott's squiggle game, which is based on the imaginative powers 
of recognizing familiar shapes, say, of animals, from simple scribbles. On reflection, 
I was acting out my wish to help Bryan and the omnipotence that I could . This got 
nowhere. Bryan had no imagination; moreover, he had no notion of how to relate to 
me. And nor did I to him. 
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When, further into treatment, Bryan start ed climbing up the safety grill over 
th e window, Brya n's bodil y activity becam e communica tive because I could 
identify my projecti ve identification s six months into treatment: 
Bryan climbed onto a chair and from there to the windowsill, then clambered nimbly 
as a monkey up the safety grill over the window to the top of it, eleven feet up. From 
there he crowed down to me contemptuously, 'Look! Look!', as he touched the ceiling. 
I felt humiliated. I was tremendously anxious that he would fall. There was no point in 
trying to coax him down as it only drew attention to his position of power and my 
helplessness. If I left the room to get his mother, it might make him anxious and 
possibly lose his grip. I knew perfectly well that the anxiety, helplessness and 
humiliation had their sources in Bryan, and, equally, that making an interpretation 
on this basis wou ld make me look only more ridiculous. I stood and waited until he 
decided to come down. 
Soon after he sta rted his episodes of climbing th e grill, I said that we both knew 
th at climbin g up that high was dangerous. He looked at me with genu ine 
mystification; 'Danger?' he queried. I saw that my sense of safety was for him 
to be on the ground, whereas his sense of safety was based on primate instinct, 
that is, climbing like a monkey up a tr ee. 
Worried about the risks of Bryan's behaviour, I consulted my superv isor. I 
realized that Bryan's climbing had a secondary aim of eliciting me to exert 
contro l, which would only heighten anxiety rath er than contain it. When he 
nex t climbed the grill , I told Bryan I wou ld not look at h im or speak to him 
whi le he was at th e top of the window, but I wou ld when he came down . I then 
look ed down at the floor, much like a foraging mother monkey, whi le keeping 
him in my periph eral vision . This brou ght him down and his climb ing soon 
sto pped altogether. 
Besides Bryan's fight/flight act ions, there were his feigned freeze responses. 
Initially there was the 'dead' horse in the assessmen t interview, then post -
hyperactivity 'co llapses' into sleep. These brief still periods evo lved, almost 
imp ercept ibly, into quiet momen ts tha t cou ld become overtures to relating. 
There were severa l occasions when he appe ared from seemingly nowhere to be 
beside me, almost tou ching , his eyes fixed on mine. Face-to-face, from barely a 
hand-span away, he gazed intently into my eyes w ith an express ion of 
wondermen t and awe . It was a moment when we shared the mos t remarkable, 
unspok en intim acy. Thus it was a sharp surpris e when, with explosive 
impul sivene ss, he kicke d me hard or pun ched my nose and left a lasting sting. 
It was as if he were terrified of the closeness that Ha rry, looking up at his mot her 
from his bath , found so pleasurab ly engaging. 
Fordham was in his seventies when he trea ted his last chi ld patient, a boy not 
dissimilar to Bryan, who climbed to the roof of Fordham's consu lting room . 
Fordham adm itt ed tha t he ' loved him like anyth ing ' . I felt the same toward 
Bryan. Despite thi s, I conside red finishing at the end of the first year because 
th ere had been littl e change outside his sessions, or seemingly with in them. It 
was only when I coun tenan ced giving up that I began to notice that Bryan was 
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changing and was more amenable to being distracted from his aggressiveness. 
Toward the end of the first year, we briefly played together . 
Bryan seemed cheerful, telling me about a picnic when some friends came along. He 
wadded up his shirt and initiated a friendly game of catch. We tossed the shirt back 
and forth cooperatively and after several exchanges Bryan said brightly, 'Let's do this 
the whole time'. No sooner had he said this, he insisted he needed to go to the lavatory. 
He returned aggressive and complained of being bored. He kicked at some toys on 
the floor. 
Trying to re-engage him, I suggested that we play a picture-story game. When it was 
his turn he drew a picture of a boy on the grass next to a rocket, with a speech bubble 
above the boy, inside of which was 'Aaaaagh! Heeeeelp!' I found myself looking for a 
question I might ask about his picture, but this was superseded by my sense of our 
mutuality today . I said 'Aaaaagh', with pretended agony. He ioined in and pretended 
to collapse on to the floor. He asked me to say it again and again, which I did. By now 
cheerful again, he recollected when he drove with his adoptive parents to pick up his 
younger sister. 
Transformations : the second year of treatment 
Bryan returned after a long summer break having grown and changed into a 
'boy's boy'. It was World Cup time as we entered the second year of treatment, 
and session after session he played solo football with a small foam ball, scoring 
repeatedly and declaring he was Wayne Rooney. His movements were clumsy 
and ineffectual, even for a seven-year-old. With no emotional link between us, 
I found it insufferably boring. 
Yet we stumb led on, not much aware that our relationship was becoming 
what Bryan later called, 'getting on together'. 
Bryan's regular flights to the lavatory continued. His adoptive mother told 
me that what she knew of Bryan's history was sketchy and unreliable. With 
thi s caveat, she passed on a disturbing vignette; as a toddler, Bryan was left 
alone in his crib while his father went out with friends. The mattress of the crib 
had been removed, presumab ly so it wou ld not be soiled when Bryan wet and 
fouled his nappy. This became a vivid and discomforting image in my mind. 
Even if historically untrue, it had the ring of psychic truth . I specu lated that 
for Bryan the lavatory was a refuge from others and from the pain and shame 
at feeling such a loser when it came to eliciting care . Equally it was a chamber 
of self-comfort, imbued with self-sensations and self-odours, that is, a prison of 
selfdom. 
What was clearer was that the lavatory was part of Bryan's birth theory; he 
had told me that babies are born out their mummies' bottoms. The following 
comes from a session eighteen months into treatment, just after he returned from 
another sortie to the lavatory . It was the first time that a useful interpretation 
arose out of our interchanges. 
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Bryan noticed the calendar on the wall. He turned each page carefully until finding his 
birthday, and pointed to it. I said, 'Maybe you're thinking about your birthday be-
cause you've just done a poo. It seems you feel you were inside your birth mother's 
tummy until, on your birthday, she did a poo and you came out of her bottom. But 
you believe that she then just fl.ushed you away'. 
There was a pause. Still looking at the calendar, he asked in an interested way, 'When's 
your birthday?' I said, 'I think you're wondering if I was once inside my mummy's 
tummy, and whether I too was born when my mummy did a poo'. He was on the fl.oar 
now, leaning into the space beneath a small table. He pointed to an empty phone 
socket there and asked me what it was. I told him I thought he was wondering what 
it was like to be in the space inside a mummy's tummy, just like he was wondering 
about things in the space under the table. That he wanted so much to understand 
how it was that he had a birth mummy he was inside of, but then had a different mummy 
he lived with now. 
A few weeks later, Bryan was playing quietly on the floor near me. He 
cautiously slid under the side of my chair and carefully manoeuvred himself, 
on his back, face upward, into the space underneath. I always wore trousers 
when seeing him, and I adjusted my legs to accommodate his apparent intention 
to push himself between them. As this was happening, I realized he was revising 
his delusional birth phantasy to become a 'nat ural birth'. When our eyes met, 
I welcomed him with a soft hello. 
Not long after Bryan asked if he would be coming 'forever' . I explained that 
we would be finishing in a few months. Soon he protested against coming to his 
sessions, and his behaviour deteriorated bad ly. In our penultimate session, his 
adoptive father had to carry him into the clinic, with Bryan clinging to him like 
a baby monkey. As soon as we went into the room, Bryan aggressively heaved a 
chair around and then, taking another, struggled to fit the two together. Sensing 
a slight change of mood, I said I thought the chairs were the two of us together. 
With that, and for the first time, Bryan constructed a three-dimensional space: a 
'cottage', with a blanket for the roof. He went in and out of the cottage, and in 
and out of the room, and to and fro between excitement with his new construction, 
and aggress ion . 
Eventually he walked determinedly out of the room, saying nothing. I followed and 
found him sitting on a chair in the corridor. He looked at me with hostility, pushed 
past me and marched to the end of the corridor. I feared he would leave through the 
door there, but he returned. He stepped up on to the seats of a row of chairs along 
the hallway, and strode toward me. Now at my height and eye-to-eye, Bryan glared 
at me menacingly, thrusting his face into mine. 
I struggled with a sense of failure that our ending was little different from the way we 
had begun. I didn't want to part humiliated in a contest of wills and therefore had to 
say something. A useless interpretation came to mind; 'I think you're upset about the 
ending'. This was as obvious as it was trite and dismissive. I knew from some of my 
own vulnerable moments in analysis when my analyst would issue forth (for so it felt) 
with an interpretation. That only made me feel singled out and belittled; that no one 
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else ever felt that way, certainly not the speaker. I 'knew' Bryan would feel the same. 
Fordham's phrase 'working out of the self' came to mind, which was his idea of what 
was needed at just such critica l moments. It seemed a long time before a sentence 
began to form . I said, 'Our finishing affects me, too, Bryan'. It was true and, from 
what followed immediately on, Bryan heard it to be so. 
Bryan instantly jumped off the chair, raced passed the door to our room and, to my further 
surprise, to the room adjacent. He opened the door, realized that someone else was inside, 
and dashed into our room. There he energetically constructed more rooms to his 'cottage', 
excited at how big it was, now calling it-not a 'flat'-but an 'apartment'. I said he was 
building an imaginary apartment in his mind for our being together after we finished, just 
like he and I would be together in my memories of us. He took the soft teddy from his box, 
hugged it close, and said in a baby voice that he loved it. He took the teddy inside his 
'apartment' and added more 'rooms ' until the session ended. 
It was on ly in reflection that I recognized the meaning of Bryan's actions. He first 
rushed into to the wrong room as if re-enacting an implicit relational memory of 
a 'no-entry' maternal mind, comparable to the toddler Vijay knocking his own 
head against mother's when her mind was inaccessible. As if revising this 
experience Bryan then dashed into our room, where he had constructed a 
three-dimensional space. Only now it had the capacity to hold feelings inside, 
just, as he now knew, my mind held feelings like his. In this Bryan was 
transforming the dread of abandonment into a to lerab le sense of being apart, 
an 'apart-ment'. Furthermore it was a three-dimensional mental space that could 
hold loving feelings, and thus-for a moment-Bryan could own what via my pro-
jective identifications I had known throughout the treatment of his love. Here was 
an emergence of a mind different from his assumptions, and the creatio n of an 
internal good object. 
The self and what we do 
I have tried to show how Harry, Vijay and Bryan all possessed capacities for 
engagements that enabled them to be active participants in the creation of their 
own mental development. This is what Michae l Fordham termed 'actions of the 
self' . In this Fordham is distinguishing an infant self that is preliminary to ego, 
awareness of consciousness, and self-consciousness. 
Of course development is equa lly dependent on early interact ions. Herein lie 
the differences between Harry, and Vijay and Bryan. Both Vijay and Bryan had 
in infancy registered pa inful mis- and mal-attunements. Whereas Vijay was of 
an age when he was still open to change , Bryan was far less so. The deprivations 
imposed on Bryan registered not simply as lacunae but as a desolate domain of 
affect coupled with innumerable repud iations. 
As the awareness of the sense of self and others develops during toddlerhood , 
so can counter-developmental protective mechanisms, which serve to protect a 
fragile sense of self-worth and of life being worthwhile. Fordham termed these 
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defences of the self, which operate dynamically via the primitive mechanisms 
identified by Klein, in particular, projective identification. 6 This is different 
from transference and counter-transference, which Fordham had restricted to 
its original use as transferring parental representations on to the analyst 
(Fordham 1979 ). Defences of the self refer to primar y, non-conscious experi-
ences/ what I have referred to as 'primary self functioni ng' in order to indicate 
functioning prior to the emergence of the awareness of consciousness (Urban 
2005 , pp. 5 89-590). As Fordham describes this, 'there is no unconscious-
ness but rather more or less violent attempts to do away with the bad ob-
ject ... ' (19 85 , p. 153), what I have here termed flight/flight/freeze 
responses. 
Subjectively, there is ' impoverishment of self-feeling', and 'feelings of emptiness, 
formless terror and dread' (Fordham 1985, p. 159) . Once, early in his treatment, 
Bryan climbed over on furniture until he sat triumphantly on the top of a tall fil-
ing cabinet. Then he sudden ly slumped over and spoke slowly, with feeling, 'I'm. 
Just . Bad'. Being 'just bad' was Bryan's fundamenta l assumption underlying his 
delusional transference. 
Fordham maintained that delusional transferences can contain reparative 
elements that refer to 'archetypal forms aiming to re-establish relatedness 
although seemingly in a malignant form' (Fordham 1985, p. 159). I have described 
this in terms of acting out that relates through projective identification. It can also 
be seen in other archetypal express ions of instinctual behavior that aim toward 
relatedness, which are linked along a spectrum to symbolic expressions . For 
instance, I observed Bryan' s climb up the gri ll to be ' like a baby monkey', that 
is, an instinctual flight response toward safety, whereas there is also a spiritual 
aspect to the safety of height s; for instance , ' I will lift up mine eyes unto the hills, 
from whence cometh my help ' (Psalm 121:r) . 
Fordham's aim was to establish a physiological basis for archetypal theory and this 
is currently acknow ledged in what might is now be called 'top-down/down-up' neu-
rological interconnectivity. Drawing directly from Jung, Fordham linked the opposite 
ends of the archetypal spectrum by citing similar behaviours in parallel situations at 
each pole (Fordham 19 5 7 ). At the spiritual pole he instanced the mystical experiences 
of Mechthild of Magdeburg, who was tortured by the devil until she submitted to 
him, saying 'Do whatsoever God allows thee to do!' At that point the devil held back, 
saying, 'Because thou givest thy soul meekly to torment, I lose all my power' 
(ibid, p . 2 5 ). At the corresponding instinctual pole Fordham cites Konrad Lorenz's 
description of two wo lves. The larger one had pressed its younger competitor into 
6 See Fordham r985, Chapter II 
7 Fordham's think ing is closely related to what the Boston Change Process Study Group call 
'implicit relational memory'. This is not a transference phenomenon, the projections of representations 
of the parental relationships, but the more primary unremembered undercurrent of the patterns of the 
interrelati onship between the infant and his carer (See BCPSG 2.oro, Chapter r) . 
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submission until the latter expo sed its jugular. At this point , Lorenz observed: ' ... 
the victor will definitely not close on his less fortunate rival. You can see he would 
like to, but he just cannot!' (Fordham r9 57, p. 26; italics from the original). 
Although Fordham emphasized the protective purpo ses of defences of the 
self, he also implied their link with developmental deficits because these 
primiti ve defences interfere with deintegration and reintegration. In a 1979 
paper Fordham wrote of his clinical discovery of an effective intervention 
that penetrated defences of the self. Here he wrote of how he came to identify 
with his patient's affective projections, felt empathy and respect for her, and 
started to speak without knowing what to say. His patient responded to his 
affect and her trans ferenc e changed . Nu merou s analysts were working at 
the time to adapt their response s to similar, difficult to reach patients. For 
exa mple , in 1993 the child psychoth erapist Anne Alvarez explicitly put forward 
from her experience of these patient s that deficits need to be distinguished from 
defences, and made an argument for modifications to traditiona l techn ique 
(Alvarez 1993). 
In the same year, Fordham restated his r 979 clinical discovery of 'an interpretation 
which is not based on theory but came out of the self': 
That involves trusting one's unconscious, in which projective identifications are active . 
. . . [Y]ou must look and listen to your patient as though you have never seen him be-
fore so you will not have any knowledge of him . In that way you will be open to him 
and be in the best position to experience his state of mind today. As you listen you will 
begin to experience [the patient's] mood and then have some thoughts or feelings, etc. 
about him. It is out of this that an intervention will arise. 
(Fordham r993, pp. 637-38) 
I see 'wo rkin g out of the self' as a spontaneous, interna l tempo rary state of 
integration within the analyst, simultaneous with identification with the patient's 
affective state. The integration is neurolo gically 'top-down and bottom-up '. 
When I exposed that I too had humblin g feelings about our finishing, I revealed 
not only that I had feelings, but also, in the way I said it, who I was at that 
moment. Bryan's lightn ing reaction was like a flash of neurological top-down/ 
down-up connection-ve ry like Mechthild and the wolves-t hat seems to have 
trigger ed relatedne ss and developments in his own mind. 
Would this have been working out of the self if it had 'not worked'? 'Wha t 
works' is part of a dynamic between , and within, our selves and our patients' 
selves. When I worked out of my self, Bryan respond ed out of his. 8 
Does working out of the self mean aba ndon ing interpret at ive work? No t at 
all; it means being clearer when interpretative work is failing because the pa tient 
needs a more direct and immediate emotional contact (in cont rast to physical 
8 It is rhe parienr's spontaneo us response that conseq uently quickly changes the relatio nship thar, in 
my view, is the hallmark of working out of rhe self. 
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touch). Th.is contrasts with when the patient is ready-even seeks-to know 
more about himself; for instance, when Bryan pointed out his birthday and 
asked about mine. At this point he seemed to be open to questioning his basic 
assumption that he was 'just bad' and to regard the other, that is, wondering 
something about mothers and birth. 
When I spoke out of my self and Bryan reacted out of his, what happened was 
the equivalent of the fulfilment of those out-stretched fingertips of God and 
Adam on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel. Michelangelo certainly knew of that 
igniting touch, the conjunction of creation and discovery, which the Boston 
Change Process Study Group calls, rather blandly , a 'moment of meeting ' . 
These occur from the personal engagement between analyst and patient that 
has been 
constructed over time and [has] acquire[d] its own history. It involves basic issues ... 
/and} includes more or less accurate sensings of the therapist's and patient's person. 
When we speak of an 'authentic' meeting we mean communications that reveal a 
personal aspect of the self that has been evoked in an affective response to another. 
In turn, it reveals to the other a personal signature, so as to create a new dyadic state 
specific to the two participants. 
(Boston Change Process Study Group 2.oro, p. 2.69) 
What the Study Group learned from research is very close inde ed to what 
Fordham learned from his patients: that is, the transformative connections of 
emotional depth that occur out of an impelling motivation for relatedness. Th.is 
links what we do with art. Peter Schjeldahl notes in his review of the recent 
exhibit ion at New York's Museum of Modern Art , 'The proof of any art's 
lasting va lue is a comprehensive emotional intensity: it's something that a 
person needed to do and which awakens and satisfies corresponding needs in 
us' (Schjedahl 2013). 
'Formation, transformation; eternaJ mind's eternaJ recreation': the art of what we do 
Taking the bus home one afternoon not long ago, I overheard a teenage girl 
announce to her schoolfriend, 'Some of my ideas are my own ' . None of the 
ideas her e are mine or new. I've intentionally not expanded on the sources I 
have drawn upon in order to emphasize observing and learning from my 
patient. But I'm not demeaning research from whatever reliab le source, or 
theor y and technique confirmed through pract ice. 
Neil MacGregor, the Director of the British Museum, wrote about the challenge 
of identifying ancient objec ts held by the museum. This can equally apply to the 
objects held in others' minds: 
9 The five point s char acterizing moments of meeting listed by BSPSG (pp.26-27 ) comp rehensively 
describe my 'moment of meeting' with Bryan in our penultimate session. 
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We acknowledge the limits of wha t we can know with certainty, and must then try to find 
a different kind of knowing, aware that objects must have been made by people essentially 
like us - so we should be able to puzzle out why they might have made them and what they 
were for . ... Can we really ever understand others? Perhaps, but only through feats of 
poetic imagination , combined with knowledge rigorou sly acquired and ordered . 
(MacGregor 2010, p. xviii; my emphasis 10 ) 
What is mine and new, as with Vijay and Bryan , is what I have discovered and 
simultaneously created from my sources, and how that has become for me more 
than the sum of its parts. I have not tried to define what it is that we do because 
my point is the holistic and emergent nature of what we do with our patients, 
with our instruments of theor y, research, technique, experience and imagination. 
Jerem y Eichler, classical music critic for the Boston Globe, published a profile 
of the German violinist, Christian Tetzlaff. He writes: 'Since the time of Paginini 
violin virtuosos have tried to overwhelm aud iences with feats of agility. Tetzlaff is 
after something different' (Eichler 20r2 , p. 34). Tetzlaff tries to understand the mind 
of the composer : 'Interpretation , Tetzlaff believes, should ultimately be an act of 
compassion' (p. 38), and 'whether you can allow yourself to be touched by things, 
to be receptive to other people, to be in the pain of the composer' (ibid., p. 39 ). 
The Finnish composer and condu cto r, Esa-Pekka Salonen, who has worked 
w ith Tetzlaff for over two decades, states : 
What always strikes me when I hear him playing , and when I work with him myself, is 
that it's not about the violin. It's about music being realized, and abstraction becoming 
reality, through the violin. He happ ens to play it extreme ly well, but tha t's not the point. 
(ibid., pp. 34-3 5; emphasis in the original) 
TRAN SLATIONS OF ABSlRACT 
U y a p lus de trente ans, John Bowlby plaidait pour que la psychanalyse cherche au -dela 
de ses propres limites si elle voulait maintenir sa revendication a etre une science. Depuis 
!ors une profusion de recherches pertinences dans differents champs s'est developpe e. 
Bien que cela air jou e un role de dans le developpement demon propre travail, cet article 
concern e ce qu'on apprend du patient. 
L'a rticl e commence avec une hyporhese: le travail analyrique interpreta tif exige une 
tri-dirnensionnalite (le soi, l'autre et l'o bjet). Bien que le travail d' interpretatio n fasse 
parti e de notre idenrite prof essionnelle, cette triangulation peut exister ou non chez nos 
pati ents de fac;on plu s ou moins stable . L'arcicle contin ue avec un bref compt e-rendu 
developp emental de la fac;on done les modification s archetypiques precoces dans le 
champ d'interet du nouveau-n e etablissent Jes composantes de !'experience de la tri-
dimensionnalit e. A parrir de la, le materi el clinique et !'observation d'un petit enfant et 
d'un jeune garc;on decrivent comme nt Jes deficirs relationnels precoces emr avent !curs 
'
0 I emphasize this because working out of the self is the child of considerab le experience and 
analytic discipline. 
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capacites a la tri-dimensionnalite. Cependanr, rous !es deux ont ere capables de s'engager 
avec le therapeute et d 'etre actifs dans la creation de la tri-climensionnalite dans leur 
propre psyche. 
Dans ce travail, sont aussi contenues des reflex.ions sur le tra vail avec !es patients avec 
lesquels !'interpretation ne fonctionne pas. Les commentaires de Michael Fordham sur 
« !es elaborations du soi » sont relies a l'art de ce que nous faisons. 
Vor ilber drei Jahrz ehnren warb John Bowlby dafur, daR die Psychoanalyse ilber ihre 
eigenen Parameter hinaus forschen moge, wenn sie ihren Anspruch auf Wissenschafclichkeit 
aufrechterhalten wolle. Seitdem gab es eine Fillle an einschlagigen Forschungsarbeiten aus 
verschiedenen Gebieten. Gleichwohl diese bei der Weiterentwicklung meiner eigenen Arbeit 
niltzlich gewesen sind, beschaftigt sich dieser Beitrag mit dem Lemen vom Patienten . 
Der Aufsatz beginnt mit einer Pramisse: interpretative analytische Arbeit erfordert 
Dreidirnensionalitat (<las Selbst, den Anderen und <las Objekt). Auch wenn interpretative 
Arbeit in unserer professionellen Identitat fest verwurzelt sein mag, so mag diese 
Triangulierung in unseren Patienten in irgendeiner stabilen Form vorhanden sein, oder aber 
auch nicht. Der Beitrag fahrt fort mit einem kurzen EnrwicklungsabriR darilber, wie frilhe 
archetypisch bestimmte Verlagerungen im kindlichen Interessenfeld die erfahrungsmaBigen 
Komponenten der Dreidimensiona!itat etablieren. Hiernach wird anhand von an einem 
Kleinkind und einem kleinen Jungen gewonnenen Beobachrungs- und klinischem Material 
beschrieben, wie frilhe Beziehungsdefizite ihre Fahigkeiten zum Aufbau von 
Dreidimensionalitac behinderten. Trotzdem waren beide in der Lage, sich aufden Therapeuten 
einzulassen und beim Aufbau von innerpsychischer Dreidimensionalitat aktiv zu werden. 
Eingeschlossen in. cliese Arbeit sind Betrachrungen zur Arbeit mit Patienten, bei denen 
Deutungen versagen. Michael Fordharns Kommentare zu 'working out of the self' werden 
verbunden mit der Kunst, die wir betreiben. 
Gia trentenni fa John Bolby sosteneva che se la psicoana lisi voleva mantenere la sua 
asserzione di essere una scienza doveva andare oltre i suo i stessi parametri . Da allora 
c'e stata un'abbondanza di rilevanti ricerche in vari campi. Sebbene queste siano state 
utili per lo sviluppo de! mio stesso lavoro , quesro scritto riguarda l' imparare dal paziente . 
ll lavoro inizia con una premessa: ii lavoro analitico interpret a tivo richiede una tri-
dimensiona lita ( ii se, l'altro e l 'oggetto). Per quanto tale lavoro possa essere radicato 
nella nostra identita professionale, tale triangolazione puo esserci o no nei nostri pazienti 
in modo stabile. Il lavoro prosegue con un breve resoconto evolutivo del come i prim i 
cambiam enti che formano in modo archetipico il campo di interesse de! bambino 
stabiliscono le componenti esperenziali della tri-dimensionalita. A partire da cio, 
materiale clinico e di osservazione con un bambino piccolo e un ragazz ino descrivono 
quanto presto i deficit relazionali impedirono la loro capacita della tri-dimens ionalita. 
Eppure entrambi furono capaci di impegnarsi con ii terapeu ta e di diventare attivi nella 
creazione all'int erno della loro mente, della tri-dirnensionalita. 
Implicite in questo scritto sono le considerazioni che riguardano il lavoro con paz ienti 
con i quali l'interpretazione non funziona. I commenti di M ichael Fordham sul ' lavorare 
con ii se' sono legati all 'arte di quel che facciamo. 
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6onee -rpex )leCSITJ,1Jien1ii Ha3a.ll Ll:)f(OH 6oyJI61i npli3b!BaJl nc11xoaHaJIH3 K nOHCKY HCTO'-IHHKOB 
no3HaHMSI 3a ero co6CTBeHHblMH npeaenaM11, 'lT06hl He y-rpaTl1Tb B03M0)f(H0CTb Ra3h!BaThCSI 
ttayKoii. C Tex nop HaM CTaJia ocryntta Macca cseaeHHii H3 Ha)le)f(H1,1x HCTO'IHHKOB H MHoro 
HCCJJe)lOBaHJ1ii H3 pa3JJH'-!Hh1X o6JiaCTeii. M XOTSI see 3TH cee.ueHHSI 6blJIJ1 '1pe3Bbl'laMHO 
no.lle3HblMH B pa3BHTHH Moei\ co6CTBeHHoii pa60Thl, see )Ke J:laHHaSI CTaTbSI TIOCBSl!UeHa TOMY, 
KaK SI Y'f)'Ch y nau11eHTOB. 
CTaTbSI Ha'111ttaeTCll c )lOTiy1UeID1S1: aHa.JIHTH'leCKaSI pa6oTa lpe6yeT -rpex l13MepeHH.l1 
(SI, npyroii, o6'beKT). XOTll HHTepnpeTaTHBHaSI pa6oTa y1<0peHeHa B ttarneii 
npocpeCCHOHaJibHOH M)leHTH'IHOCTl1, aKoro pona -rpuattryJISIUHSI MO)l{eT 6b(Tb, a MOll<eT M He 
6b(Tb np11cymeii HallJHM na1.111eHTaM Ha CTa6HJlbHOH OCHOBe. CTaTbSI npo)lOJl)l(aeTCSI KpaTKMM 
o63opoM Toro, KaK no Mepe pa3BMTHSI paHHHe, C<j}OpMHpOBaHH],(e apxeTHTIOM, H3MeHeHHSI B 
none HHTepeca MJia,uettua cpopMHpyIOT 3MTIHpH'leCKMe KOMnOHeHTbl -rpeXpa3MepHOCTM. IlocJie 
'!ero MaTepwan Ra6moneHMl1 H KJIMHM'leCKJ.IM MaTepJ.lan pa60Tbl c pe6eHKOM, TOJibKO 
Ha'-!MHalOll.(MM XO.UMTh, a TaK)l(e C Ma.JieHbKHM MaJlb'IMKOM, naeT 803MOlKHOCTb orrncaTh, KaK 
11ecj)MUHT a CTa)lMl1 paHHHX OTHOWeHJ.fH 3a-rpyJlHSleT cnoco6HOCTb K TPeXpa3MepHOCTM. 
HecMOT()SI Ha TPYJ:IHOCTJ.I M TOT, 11 11pyroii OKa3aJIMCb cnoco6HblMM ycraHOBHTb KOHTaKT c 
TepaneBTOM H CTaTb aKTHBHblMM yqaCTHHKaMH C03)laHJ,!SI T()eXpa3MepHOCTl1 B CBOeM 
co6CTBeHHOM bllUJieHMJ.I. 
CTaTbSI CO)lepll<MT B ce6e pa3MblWJJeHJ.ISI OTOM, KaK pa60TaTb c nauJ.1eHTaMJ.1, )lJJSI KOTOpblX 
MHTepnpeTaUMM He roW(TCll. KoMMeHTapJ.1J.1 MaiiKJia <l>op):IX3Ma O «pa6oTe M3 caMOCTH» 
CBSl3b!BalOTCSI C HCKYCCTBOM Hawero .nena. 
Hace ya mas de tres decadas, John Bowlby sostuvo que el psicoanalisis debe ir mas alla 
de sus propios parametros para manten er su pretension de ser una ciencia . Desde 
entonces, ha habido una gran cantidad de investigaciones relevances proveniences de 
diversos campos. Si bien esto ha sido instrume ntal en el desarrollo de mi propio trabajo, 
este artflculo se refiere al aprendizaje obtenido con mi paciente. 
El trabajo comienza con una premisa: el trabajo analitiv = co interpretative require de 
tres dimensiones Si Mismo, El Otro y el Objeto) Aunque la labor interpretativa puede estar 
arraigada en nuestra identidad profesional, esta triangulaci6n puede existir o no en nuestros 
pacientes en cua lquier forma estab le. El documento cont inua con un breve desarrollo de 
c6mo las primeras formas arque tipales movilizan el campo de interes del nifio hacia la 
esfera de intereses de los componentes vivenciales de la tridimensionalidad. Desde alli, las 
observaciones y el material clfnico con un niii.o y con un joven describen c6mo los primeros 
deficits relaciona les obstaculizan su capacidad par a la tridimensionalidad. Sin embargo, 
ambos pudieron enganchar con el terapeuta y a participar activamente en la creaci6n de 
la tridimens ionalidad dentro de sus propias mentes. 
Implfcito en este trabajo se pre sentan algunas consideraciones para el trabajo con 
pacientes en los cuales las interpretaciones no funcionan . Los comentarios de Michael 
Fordham sobre como 'Trabajar fuera de! Sf mismo' se relacionan con el arte de lo que 
hacemo s. 
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